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Abstract 
The central argument in this MA research report is that arguing for a compromised or 
depleted political culture or space is extremely difficult if we consider the complexity of 
the public sphere. This involves firstly arguing that by re-interrogating the concept of the 
public sphere underpinning orthodox critical perspectives on democratic functioning 
from deliberative democratic theorists, we find notions of the critical public sphere have 
been corrupted by the idealism that accompanies this nonetheless important concept.  
 
By illuminating this flaw in the orthodox critical democratic perspective and applying it 
to critiques of South African democracy, I argue that critiquing South African politics 
and policy making should in general be done with more care, since what is under-
contemplated in these critiques by way of the actual nature of the public sphere, is not 
negligible. Critics, who often start by characterising the political space as dominated by 
one party which allegedly renders the political space unfit for its critical purpose, ought 
to be fairer in their accounts. The end result of this increasingly consensual critical 
position is that we inhabit only a relatively meaningless formal democracy.  
 
The exploratory case study of the Human Sciences Research Council which I go on to 
consider was chosen on the basis of the considered guess that it was likely to throw up 
evidence of interesting illustrative tendencies in what I argue may constitute a ‘new’ 
public sphere. The theoretical possibilities I aim to highlight are arguably deserving of 
more focused appraisal in themselves, but the aim of this dissertation is to introduce the 
theoretical possibility of an under-theorised public sphere through highlighting how that 
situation came about, and less so, what would constitute evidence of the nascent theory’s 
correctness. 
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Introduction 
 
1. Consensual critique 
 
The argument running through this research report is that arguing for a compromised or 
depleted political culture or space is extremely difficult if we consider the complexity of 
the public sphere. The public sphere is understood as that medium in wider society from 
and through (not just via the formal political sphere) which contributions that impact on 
agenda setting and political consciousness formation issue.   
 
I will show firstly how my position was arrived at by re-interrogating some of the 
concepts and arguments underpinning some orthodox critical perspectives on political 
consciousness formation, and secondly, show that those who readily embrace a critical 
perspective have often not deigned to properly interrogate the full implications of the 
theoretical tools they believe bolster these critiques of democratic functioning.  
 
Thirdly, once some of the flaws in the orthodox critical perspective are highlighted, I 
argue that applying these types of critiques to South African politics and policy making, 
which they often are, should be done with great care. The state is often cast as 
undemocratic unless it is characterised by particular features. Critics start by 
characterising the political space as dominated by one party, the African National 
Congress, followed by how this renders the political space unfit for its critical purpose. 
This is, I argue, if not totally indefensible, then much more difficult than often assumed 
considering the multiple features of our democratic space/ realm or sphere1 which are 
overlooked. The end result of this increasingly consensual critical position is that we 
inhabit only a ‘formal democracy’.2 It has become almost a consensual position to take in 
analysing our nascent democracy.  
 
The exploratory case study of the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC)3 which I 
go on to consider is admittedly not as exhaustive as it might be, but it nonetheless serves 
to highlight an empirical example of tendencies in our public sphere which are either 
overlooked, or equally likely, underemphasized. The HSRC is I argue a ‘new’ space - 
along with other similar types of organisations and spaces - illustrative of tendencies 
which are, and will continue to grow in relevance, making better analysis of the public 
sphere in South Africa ever more necessary if objective democratic theory, and ultimately 
political analysis, is the desired outcome.   
 
The theoretical possibilities I aim to highlight are arguably deserving of more focused 
appraisal in themselves - the under analysis of the democratic landscape remains the 
focus of this report - and the aim of this dissertation is to introduce the theoretical 
possibility of an under-theorised public sphere through highlighting how this went under-
contemplated, and how it is that the recent transformation and present functioning of the 
HSRC arguably epitomises an empirical example of some of those trends I argue remain 
under-theorised and consequently overlooked.  
 
                                                     
1 There terms are often used interchangeably. 
2 Giliomee, H; Myburgh, J and Schlemmer, L, 2001, p 161. 
3 See HSRC home page: http://www.hsrc.ac.za/
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One could, and arguably should, propose other organisations or processes as evidence. 
Specifically, the HSRC case study serves not as knock down evidence of what I argue, 
but rather hypothetical evidence for a nascent fleshing out of the theoretical case to be 
made in some detail.   
 
In an important 1993 essay, while reviewing literature on the subject of democratization 
and civil society, Honneth demands of those who argue for radicalized democracy using 
the popular concept of civil society that they provide an adequate theoretical account 
justifying their particular project.  
 
They must, he argues, one, set out how democracy should work to such an extent that it 
can be shown that the actual functioning of democracy is at fault; two, offer an account of 
the distribution of power stemming from their argument (ideal), showing it to be at fault 
at the level of either the economy, culture, or politics (there could any number of 
combinations of these); and lastly, why it would be worthwhile for society to pursue 
increased democracy through the proposed method – where the cultural and motivational 
resources for such an attempt would come from.4
 
I argue Honneth is correct in making these demands, and that many such attempts 
(though not all entirely consciously) have been made to fulfil these theoretical demands. 
This might for instance be in the form of a stand alone critical account of existing 
sociologies’ of domination, or alternately suggested other political arrangements. Those 
who provide such alternatives have in fact effectively answered Honneth’s challenge in 
the face of a decline in the catch-all faith political and social theorists have shown for 
‘civil society’, and despite the theoretical imprecision surrounding that concept, 
stemming as it does from disparate traditions which often sought at least initially to 
theorise the arguably distinct spheres of public and private space.  
 
Honneth correctly pointed out that what civil society theorists were arguing for - an 
alternative political dispensation - meant their conceptions of democracy (it was inherent 
in their critiques, or less direct) demanded of them proof of where the present 
dispensation fell short on their standards, and their own project’s ability to fulfil these 
standards. Such a challenge might equally apply to all (not only those who argue in 
favour of greater civil society participation) critics of democratic practises in South 
Africa.  
 
I argue that this ought to be a useful test to be applied in testing the veracity of those 
democratic critiques. The critique might fail to offer a normative theory of democracy, or 
to adequately or honestly examine where structural barriers to the normative principles’ 
empirical realization lie. The purveyors of these critiques need to, among other things, 
show what the structural barriers to extending current democratic participation are. Only 
then does a falsifiable construct exist. The critic’s case would effectively consist in a 
normative account of the democratic process in which political consciousness is formed, 
and then show empirical fault lines.  
 
We should, I argue, then query whether they always either implicitly, or explicitly offer 
the present political system a chance to redeem itself; by interrogating the premises of 
                                                     
4 Honneth, A, 1993, pp 19 – 20. 
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those arguments. In other words do critics present a believable characterisation of the 
democratic formation of political consciousness?    
 
Often I believe they do not. Why? For many reasons; but I argue that the root of the 
normative theoretical arguments underpinning the majority of critics’ cases is either, 
applied inadequately or their full ramifications are not thought through. Consequently the 
characterisation and subsequent analysis of alleged empirical structural deficiencies 
suffers.   
 
2. Corrective surgery 
 
The theoretical task involved in offering a corrective to the tendency to uncritically 
accept the consensual position in critiquing the veracity of the South African political and 
public sphere (a concept already customarily used in normative theoretical accounts of 
democracy) as a medium in democracy,  lies in accurately presenting how complicated 
public sphere functioning is. Ultimately that would form the basis for a positive account 
of what this ‘new’ public sphere positively consists in. 
 
But beginning the theoretical enterprise requires a brief look at the history of the concept 
of the public sphere in democratic theory; as it developed through late modern civil 
society theory was used to bolster deliberative democratic theory.   
 
I argue that these normative cudgels are all too easily the ones picked up by radical 
democratic political theorists and importantly in this instance, those who rely to differing 
degrees on aspects of their work. The onus is on those who evaluate the state and the 
formation of political consciousness to be fair by being accurate in their rendition of the 
nature of the public sphere/realm/space.  
 
The result is a partially reformulated concept that might then in turn be used, to criticize 
at their root those theoretical and empirical critical accounts which might lead one to 
believe that since the normative conception proffered entails that certain conditions ought 
to prevail in reality – and quite obviously do not by these standards – certain corrective 
measures are definitely called for.   
 
In addition the argument made here is that these accounts are often informed by a flawed 
understanding and appreciation of the actual nature of the state and the public and not-so-
public conversation within, without, and between its interstices.5 I aim to better 
demarcate the complexity of the public sphere by outlining the space in which the power 
game (sometimes dubbed ‘democratic culture’) is played.  
 
The nature of the public sphere as well as the increasing role the state has come to play in 
civil society itself (especially in South Africa it might be argued; with the recent 
transition from a police state to a social democratic one) makes it prima facie unlikely 
that the state does insulate itself from civil society and the public sphere. This is an 
argument I will pursue in detail in chapter one. 
 
                                                     
5 My case might be seen as similar to that made about South Africa’s democracy by Raymond Suttner in 2004 
when he disputes the case made by theorists who bemoan our ‘formal’ or one-party democracy, and will be 
discussed further; see Suttner, R, Democratic transition and consolidation in South Africa: the advice of ‘the 
experts’, in Current Sociology, September 2004, Vol 52, no. 5. 
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Of course one can argue until the end of time that democracy is never adequate, based on 
flawed voting systems at any number of levels (the traditional stock and trade of the 
political scientist), but the target here is accounts that seek to characterise the state as 
inadequately inclusive based on the fact that the state listens (however it is alleged to do 
this) to these, but not those, or that certain discourses are clearly unlikely to influence the 
formation of political consciousness tout court, and that this proves it is insular. 
 
We need to be aware of universalizing claims about the state of democracy made by 
those who feel that power operates as they say it does - often patently based on particular 
cases of (and one might add, often justified) felt dissatisfaction. But justified 
dissatisfaction is not righteous indignation. That this is at times the case does however 
not entail what is claimed (for whatever purpose) about the entire political order, in 
addition. There is no shortage of such accounts.   
 
For those who have treated Jurgen Habermas’ normative sociological account6 with due 
respect and then tried to offer theoretical accounts of how to implement the required 
discursive conditions so that either the public sphere and its relation to organised politics 
does not, one compromise rational politics, or two, enables all citizens to be included in 
legitimate (not just ‘legitimating’) decisions, the urgency of rectifying the alleged insular 
democratic space takes on epic proportions. My argument is that in their haste to show 
ways of fulfilling the necessary conditions for democratic political autonomy there is a 
failure to give the fullest account of how political consciousness formation actually 
occurs. The idealized conceptions of how communication ought to occur in the public 
sphere are often naïve in appreciating how communication actually does occur in the 
many intersections and turns in the civil society district.   
 
3. South Africa and the Human Sciences Research Council 
 
That being the case leads me to argue, in chapter two that critics of many shades may 
have misdiagnosed the space in which power in South Africa has operated since the end 
of apartheid, leading to calls for increased participation and consultation. It will be 
argued that many past debates on South Africa’s emerging power equation have become 
dominated by those who seek ultimately to see the state listen to particular voices - 
whether it is ‘cultural’, ‘economic’ or ‘political’ bias (allegedly) at fault is sometimes all 
we are informed of, if we are lucky. This, not unrelatedly, can (and has perhaps) led to a 
virtual glut of accounts of how the state is, in a positive sense, open to influence. The 
number of claims that the state is not open to rational influence, is too centralized or too 
domineering; are numerous. These accounts often entail, ultimately and essentially, a 
particular negative characterization of the state of the public sphere I argue.7   
 
A theoretical corrective to this tendency toward doom and gloom is based on a 
reformulated conception of the actual nature of the public sphere as introduced in chapter 
one, that tentatively offers as an empirical example of the manner in which we might 
better understand the public sphere, such organisations or processes as the HSRC. The 
proffered corrective accepts that what deliberative democratic theory has offered in its 
characterization of the public sphere and the relation it has to the state administration is 
more than minimally correct. This understanding takes the public sphere and how it does 
                                                     
6 See for instance O’Neill, S, 2000 and Baynes, K, 1995.  
7 See for example Adam Habib on post-apartheid civil society - state relations, 2004. 
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have a bearing on the rationalizations within the democratic state, to be as important as 
deliberative democrats have made them out to be. 
 
An effectively functioning HSRC would be an organisation that illustrated important 
positive tendencies in the public sphere. In the case of theorisation on the state of 
democracy in South Africa it might open up possibilities for conceptualizing a ‘new’ 
public sphere.  Therefore I undertook to investigate to what extent this understanding of 
the HSRC8 represents part of the foundations for an argument for a fundamental lack of 
clarity in local theorisation about the public sphere.   It might be possible to argue for a 
‘new’ public sphere where the HSRC is a supporting strut in this expansive 
understanding of our democratic culture.   
 
What is important is to show that often when critiquing the South African state, bodies 
like the HSRC and the audiences they arguably represent through their work, and the 
influence they may have via the public sphere, are not often explicitly acknowledged – 
either through negligence, or purposive narrow characterisation of the public sphere. 
 
There are of course numerous other ways to argue for extending democracy further than 
traditional liberal democratic theory and its attendant faith in interest group politics. 
Interest group functioning (pluralism) is emphasized in our understanding of democracy 
since the concept is less ephemeral than the more abstract ‘public sphere’.  Theoretical 
interventions like those are acknowledged as necessary but not at the expense of a 
thoroughly nuanced consideration of the public sphere, whose contours and liminal9 
nature I have only hinted at thus far.   
 
The public sphere properly delineated should be rendered the candidate for more 
theorisation about democracy and power.  Often the manner in which it has been 
rendered assumes that one, the public sphere itself is either a whipping boy to be used in 
a critical theoretical rendition of reality as it shows communication is distorted10, or two, 
the state automatically is in need of absolute critique based on theoretical claims about it 
being prone to becoming insular and/or steered by money and power alone, rather than 
communication of values, and alternative visions. A proper understanding of how the 
public sphere might, and does, achieve its undeniably democratically-essential purpose, 
makes claiming it fails to do so, a more difficult claim to assert than is often assumed.  
 
***** 
 
• “As I see it, the global renaissance of interest in civil society has a lot to do with 
the problem of unaccountable, overextended power which - especially in the 
twentieth century - has committed unprecedented, terrible crimes. Those crimes 
should remind us of the lessons about hubris first formulated by classical Greek 
thinkers and historians like Herodotus and Thucydides. Here is their problem: 
given the tendency in the world of politics towards hubris, how, if at all, can its 
disastrous effects be overcome? In other words, can human beings find ways of 
organizing power that would release us from the permanent dangers of corruption, 
                                                     
8 See chapter three of this dissertation. 
9 Merriam-Webster’s online dictionary defines liminal as; (1) Of or relating to a sensory threshold; (2) Barely 
perceptible; (3) Of, relating to, or being an intermediate state, phase, or condition.
10 As argued by the early Habermas who feared the public sphere had been fundamentally transformed through 
mass communication and how this induced conformity, following Theodor Adorno. 
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bossing, and bullying? Or is there no cure for hubris? Is life, as Hobbes thought, 
nothing more than an endless struggle for power that comes to rest only at the 
point of death? Or perhaps, as Heidegger thought, only divine intervention can 
rescue us from our own hubris? I'm not absolutely certain how to reply to such 
questions.”11 
  
• “…But there’s just something wrong when you 
Just feel like you’re the hardest little button 
To button 
I had opinions 
That didn’t matter 
I had a brain 
That felt like pancake batter 
I got a backyard 
With nothing in it 
Except a stick 
A dog 
And a box with something in it… 
 
…The hardest button to button…” (x7)’12
 
• “Well the world of research has gone berserk – too much paperwork…”13 
 
• “Simon Retallack, from the Institute for Public Policy Research, stood up and 
reminded Sir David what his job was.  As chief scientist, his duty is not to 
represent political reality – there are plenty pf advisors schooled in that art – but 
to represent scientific reality.”14 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
11 Keane, J, 1999. 
12 The White Stripes, March 2003. 
13 Dylan, B, 2006. 
14 Monbiot, G, 25 October 2005. 
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Chapter 1  
The Public Sphere in Liberal Democracy: By No Means Clarified 
1. 1 Under-theorised of the public sphere and its significance for accurate 
democratic theorisation 
 
Whether it is a particular account and critique of the insularity of the liberal democratic 
state or an argument in favour of the reconfiguration of power based on adjusted state 
relations with civil society one ultimately refers to ‘the question as to how democratic 
participation in the process of formation of political consciousness can be widened and 
enhanced’.15 What is required of the advocate for radicalising democracy is a falsifiable 
account of how the functioning of democracy in the way they suggest empirically does 
not adequately exist; how structural barriers inhibit that type of participation.16
 
Before claims for democratically illegitimate effective exclusion from the political public 
sphere can legitimately be made, it surely rests on the critic to show that from within their 
own theoretical account of democracy the state does in fact fall short.  The starting point 
is to argue that often a fair case is not the object; and that as a result, particular 
circumscribed understandings of how political consciousness has and does come to be 
configured, come to dominate particular debates. 
 
Critics who look to either, one, accuse the state and administration of insufficient 
democratization, or two, of being party to a more critical and systemic situation, where 
‘political domination is located in the same symbolic dimension in which individuals and 
groups form an image of their will and their situation, in subtle institutional and cultural 
blockages of public processes of reflection in which a society thematizes itself’17 - 
explore all the actually existing avenues where this potential democratic ‘resource’ might 
reside?   
 
I argue that some civil society theorists and most of their deliberative democratic ‘allies’ 
(a relationship that will shortly be explained) have not in fact exhausted the meaning 
inherent in the concept of the public sphere, which they (and others) so heavily rely on in 
critiquing the actual formation of political consciousness. 
 
1. 2 Starting point for arriving at a reformulated conception of the public sphere: 
the state 
 
State theory appears much less confident in contemporary times than it used to be. In a 
chapter entitled ‘The Theory of the State in Search of its Subject Matter: Observations on 
Current Debates’ Claus Offe mused on the likelihood that the state in advanced 
democracies will be able to relinquish much of its historically assumed responsibilities to 
‘parastatal actors’.  As the title suggests this is in response to the lack of clarity about 
what the tasks of state should be.18  Meanwhile, similarly John Keane - while 
contemplating a similar question except with respect to the socialist state - attempted to 
outline what future the concept and political category of ‘civil society’ had in a post-
                                                     
15 Honneth, A, 1993, p 19. 
16 Ibid, p 20. 
17 Dubiel, H, 1992, p.  
18 Offe, C, 1996, pp 61 – 71. 
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centralised socialist society, and by more clearly delineating what the emerging 
relationship between the state and of civil society would ideally look like, writing that 
any form the socialist project might take in the near future needed to reject the 
assumption that the state could ever legitimately replace civil society, and vice versa.19  
He goes on to outline the task of the state as ‘enacting legislation’ and that of civil society 
as increasing its power, so as to keep their political ‘representatives’ under control in 
doing so.   
 
These are common conundrums and fundamental to political science.  Beside the need to 
keep potentially corrupt power under control, a further reason they are familiar refrains is 
because the issues at stake illustrate the confusion that reigns in state theory as a result of 
the fading of traditional certainties across the different schools of state theory (these 
conundrums presented themselves in different guises at other times in the history of 
modernity) anchored above all perhaps in the ‘agreed scepticism all schools of state 
theory have toward the ability of developed capitalist industrialized societies (and former 
socialist state, as evidenced by John Keane’s exploration of the widely acknowledged 
limits to state action in these states20), to influence themselves and their future 
development by means of rational government planning, control and intervention’.21 The 
state is becoming more and more an object of scepticism with regard to its ability to 
rationally steer society in the direction of (themselves the object of arguments favouring 
democratic determination) cherished valuable outcomes, especially since the collapse of 
Socialism. 
 
It is a short step from that scepticism about whether states are capable of rational action 
to a generalised scepticism concerning their general activity and where ‘democracy’ fits 
into this situation.  If the justification of state action is its ability to act rationally, when 
that faith evaporates how can the state defend its actions?  It would not be unrealistic to 
assume both a considered and the common sense response to this question to be ‘the 
degree of democratic inclusivity embodied in the reaching of the state’s decisions’, given 
an environment where more and more is open to considered suspicion.    
 
State theory – whether a state-centric perspective on the state or a society-centric 
perspective (liberal democratic) perspective - can no longer take for granted its 
assumptions and simply argue over which is more correct, whether socialist or capitalist 
relations of production exist.  ‘Relativism implies the need for democracy, for 
institutional arrangements and procedures which guarantee that protagonists of similar or 
different forms of language games can openly and continuously articulate their respective 
life forms.’22  Offe and Ulrich Preuss point out, ‘as a consequence of some of the 
structural changes taking place within modern societies, the ideal of ‘progress’ – 
technological, economic, military, social, and cultural – which was the underlying and 
powerful energizing force for democratic optimism of the nineteenth century, and, 
notwithstanding the barbarous regression of fascism, also of the twentieth century.’23  
This once-present optimism is also lacking in civil society; something Michael Walzer 
points out in his account of ‘the’ civil society argument (to follow). 
 
                                                     
19 Keane, J, 1988, p 14. 
20 Ibid, 1988. 
21 Offe, C, 1996, p 62. 
22 Keane, J, 1988, p 237. 
23 Offe, C and Preuss, U. K, 1991, p 146. 
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1. 3 Civil society theory steps into the breach? 
 
If there has been confusion in the status of state theory this is no less true of civil society 
theory where in trying to fill the void left by the evaporation of that confidence, theorists 
- having added, ‘…we are not sure how the state does, did, or should function; and 
therefore our own suggestions carry a hefty suggestive element fuelled by a faith in 
democracy as the only acceptable enemy of well-meaning authoritarianism’ - have been 
more than willing to step into the breach. They have cloaked their own accounts where 
necessary in the language of historical precedents, functionalist rejoinders, empirical 
critiques, and any other kind of justification that would serve the purpose of ‘deepening 
democracy.’  
 
An important trend in political thought has come to the fore. This simultaneous rise in the 
expansive and imaginative theorisation of civil society has been accompanied by the rise 
of theorisation about the public sphere. Theorisation on the latter is most prominent in 
deliberative democratic theoretical accounts. That is unfortunate, because the public 
sphere deserves wider consideration than it is afforded here, and as a result of the 
assumptions which tend to congregate in any ‘school of thought’ the concept has become 
contaminated by assumptions deliberative democrats are prone to hold about the actual 
nature of conversation within it: about the search for consensus.   
 
So, civil society and the public sphere as theoretical concepts have been 
disproportionately appropriated by those wishing to further pursue or encourage radical 
democratic thought.  This has been at times to the detriment of the continuing usefulness 
of the public sphere/space/realm concept itself, as I will argue.   
 
But it is still possible (and necessary) to use the concepts in a normative sense to evaluate 
the quality of democracy in an ongoing manner without assuming that the meaning of the 
concepts has been settled in favour of the various projects of those who have appropriated 
them as an accepted theoretical repository of radical democratic energy, which deserves 
no further reflection.   
 
Drawing the boundaries between state and civil society24 is perhaps one of the oldest 
occupations of the political theorist: which issues should remain in the private sphere and 
which have a claim to political attention?  After all, the demarcation of a realm of activity 
or life into which the state should not intrude, or how civil society would organise to 
protect its interests is one of the foundation stones of political theory. Though closely 
linked to my current concern I will not be dealing directly with these arguments.  In fact 
it could be argued that that particular question is one common to civil society and state 
theory. The name of the commonage on which the question grazes might further be 
‘democracy’.   
 
Of course the explosive interest in the significance of the concept of civil society to 
political theory has not been unaccompanied by the acknowledgement of the need for an 
accompanying democratic theory by many of the responsible theorists.  The reasons for 
the great interest in civil society theory (aside from the declining faith in ‘confident state 
theory’ alluded to) are many but one which runs through the entire civil society project is 
                                                     
24 Keane, J, 1988, p 6. 
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arguably the broadly common conception of how civil society can contribute to 
democracy.  
 
The space in which civil society and the state interact is thus of great importance to the 
veracity of these conceptions of democracy. It is not so much the various interesting 
internal squabbles about civil society definitional questions that are ultimately of concern 
here.  Rather it is the ubiquity and scope of the debate which illustrates for present 
purposes the vigorous hope held out for the concept and the existence of critiques 
themselves that are.   
 
The argument I go on to make concerns the widespread failure of civil society and 
deliberative democratic theorists to fully appreciate the complicated theoretical terrain 
they have to navigate in order to achieve their goals, notwithstanding the complicated 
‘internal’ definitional debates they have engaged in.  
 
The claim is not that this is something which has up until now been overlooked25 but 
rather that in better cataloguing the diverse ‘democratic opportunities’ available in 
democratic capitalist (or socialist) states, resulting in a rejuvenated conception and 
understanding of the public sphere, we should be wary of ill-considered critiques of 
insufficient democratisation or over centralised bureaucratic structures; which then 
usually go on to appeal to the nascent power of civil society. 
 
1. 3. 1 Civil society theorists: foot soldiers 
 
The point of considering civil society and the theorisation about the relation it has to the 
state, lies in showing how understandings of modern civil society have fed into 
theoretical accounts of deliberative democracy and the public sphere, which themselves 
ultimately serve to structure or create, and then bolster critiques of the existing 
democratic system.  
 
If the nature of the public sphere in which civil society interacts with the state is not 
carefully presented then what civil society theorists and practitioners (and others critical 
of the state of particular democracies) assume about that space might well turn out to be a 
conclusion of a straw man argument.  Furthermore the critical repository which the public 
sphere concept has become (and ought to remain) stands to lose a lot of its undeniable 
potential legitimate power if proponents’ depiction, or appreciation of the state and how it 
interacts in and through the public sphere with civil society, proves to be ultimately 
unfounded. 
 
In order to present the strongest case advanced for deepening democracy it is necessary to 
show what civil society theorists have argued about the significance of the concept, since 
deliberative democratic accounts rely heavily on many of the same arguments and 
concepts.   
 
In looking at why the civil society concept came to be so ubiquitous Honneth states that, 
‘it was precisely the vagueness of this concept which gave it a distinct strategic 
advantage.  Its indefiniteness gave different dissident groups, faced with different 
national and local problems, the possibility of including their varying social institutions, 
                                                     
25 See Cohen, J and Arato, A, 1992, for an excellent historical account of the self consciousness of advocates 
and theorists of the concept of civil society. 
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such as the economic institutions of the market, the free association of debating citizens, 
of the soviet-like organisation of ‘round tables’, within the all-encompassing concept of 
the civil society.’26  The fact that this was a possibility has not a small amount to do with 
the complex and confusing history of the concept itself.   
 
Some theorists have attempted to rectify what is at other times a perceived weakness 
which opens those who swear by the concept - and all it allegedly entails for them and 
their projects - to numerous types of attack.  Gideon Baker has criticized how the concept 
has been effectively defanged for the purpose of critique when he argues that far from the 
original use of the concept by radical oppositionists from the 1970’s and 1980’s in 
Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, ‘where civil society was itself the seat of 
democratic legitimacy’, current usage now denotes a very different type of usage. ‘The 
central change to the theory of civil society’, he argues, ‘is that civil society is now seen 
as external to - though no doubt important for - democracy understood as a political 
mechanism for controlling the state.’27  Baker continues saying, ‘effectively, this (not 
examining the potential of civil society as a democratic end in itself) means, limiting the 
horizons of civil society theory to the liberal agenda of separation of powers, control of 
power, and pluralist interest representation’.28  Whether these arguments are true or not 
and to what degree, is not something I wish to argue about directly and questions such as 
these are debated ad nauseum by various civil society theoretical interlocutors.   
 
While these debates show for the present argument to what extent the concept has taken 
on significance in political theory the crucial point to be made in presentating these 
arguments is that while they do alert us to the continuing power and critical potential of 
these concepts, an aporia often exists in their appreciation for how the state does function, 
which if not rectified - or acknowledged at least - ‘in proportion’ to the scope of the 
critique they and others who use their insights wish to carry out, poses a mortal risk to 
their project(s) and those of other critics of democracy who use the same and similar 
tools. The subsequent corrective should be used to judiciously delimit their critiques. 
 
Arato and Cohen present an understanding of civil society that acknowledges the need for 
strong theoretical grounding.  They say that while not having any quarrel with the 
diagnosis by civil society theorists, or ideologues of new social movements (one of the 
better known and popularised contemporary instances of civil society), it is ‘essential to 
examine the concept of civil society in the light of a systematic social theory that at the 
very least incorporates an objectivating perspective’ and, they add ‘a rich tradition of 
interpretation has not been exhausted’.29   
 
In ultimately presenting their own reconstructed version of a concept of civil society 
commensurate with modern realities they assess the different theoretical strands 
previously integral to the concept - and still with us to varying degrees.  They go on to 
acknowledge how the work of Jurgen Habermas (arguably the best known social theorist 
and advocate of the case for deliberative democracy) has played an important role in the 
‘rediscovery, critique, and reconstruction of the early modern concept of civil society’30.   
 
                                                     
26 Honneth, A, 1993, p 19. 
27 Baker, G, 1999, p 3. 
28 Ibid, p 4. 
29 Ibid, p 121. 
30 Ibid, p 129. 
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The early modern concept for instance is most often depicted as clearly different from the 
older traditional conception in that the early one includes the principles of ‘autonomy, 
moral and social plurality, and universality’; while the older version entails a vision of an 
inherited Sittlichkeit, or a shared ethical life.31  Now what the (late) modern version of 
the concept of civil society amounts to, is complicated, and by no means settled.   
 
Arato and Cohen, working within the tradition of critical theory, say that ‘the 
reconstruction of civil society that we wish to base on Habermas’ dualistic social theory 
with its categories of system and lifeworld’, has a ‘practical intent’ which is a ‘critique of 
functionalist reason, which is completed by a new theory of democracy.’32 Functionalist 
reason might best be defined as that type of reason which seeks to get from A to B with 
the least possible sidetracking; in other words to consummate a goal, and decide how to 
achieve it (while consulting others as little as possible, and thereby avoiding contact with 
those who might either disagree on the goal and/or the method of attaining it). The elitist 
model of democracy most closely approximates this form of decision-making in a 
modern democratic state.   
 
What this amounts to in the case of Arato and Cohen - having accepted Habermas’ 
account of the mechanics of the lifeworld, which very elaborately defines and defends 
‘the lifeworld’ as a ‘reservoir or background of implicitly known traditions and taken-for-
granted assumptions embedded in language and culture and drawn upon by individuals in 
their everyday lives’ – is extending and anticipating the threat posed by the expanding 
modern state and capitalist economy not only to the functioning of the state (a more 
common assertion), but to the autonomy of the lifeworld in civil society.  The very hope 
many hold out for civil society and the public sphere as critical concepts is not so taken 
for granted by Arato and Cohen, as they see threats to the very possibility of behaving as 
an autonomous individual coming from a modern way of life, placing them squarely in 
the critical theoretical tradition.  They consequently require ‘a framework of fundamental 
rights’ to become stabilized in institutional terms.     
 
It might seem passé in theoretical terms, and merely covering old ground, since 
individual rights have been guaranteed globally since 1948, but Arato and Cohen perhaps 
more than anyone in the tradition specifically reiterate why the issue of rights are so 
significant to democracy, the state and civil society.  They particularly emphasise, after 
making the point about how actors in civil society (the lifeworld) are open to threats of 
loss of autonomy and solidarity, that the ‘cultural reproduction of the lifeworld’ requires 
these rights; and that stabilizing, expanding and channelling into institutional innovations 
these rights, is ‘the task of radical democratic politics whose primary terrain is civil 
society.’33  For these rights to begin as ‘claims asserted by groups and individuals in the 
public spaces of an emerging civil society’ the development of a political culture ‘whose 
influence does not stop at the boundaries of civil society’ is needed.34  In other words 
civil society (and its need of certain conditions to continue existing) is as under threat as 
the democratic functioning of the state and economy, but to secure civil society, civil 
society needs to extend beyond itself so as to influence the state to guaranteeing these 
rights.  
 
                                                     
31 Ibid, pp 122 – 123. 
32 Ibid, p 130. 
33 Ibid, p 136. 
34 Ibid, p 139. 
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So while Arato and Cohen place their hopes for further democratization on the ‘terrain of 
civil society’ they rely heavily on the state as the ultimate guarantor of that revitalised 
civil society.  I am not convinced that what Arato and Cohen present is not in fact passé 
after all.  They speak of how civil society itself needs to be democratised in the first 
place: ‘it is our contention that influence on legislation and policymaking is 
inconceivable without the establishment of democratic publics within the firm and the 
state – or where they exist, their redemocratization within a programme of self-
limitation’.35   
 
Ultimately their actual argument is: democratization cannot be furthered if civil society 
itself is not stabilised through rights fought for but guaranteed by the state.  Admittedly 
this is their goal: redefining the civil society concept for (late) modern times – unlike 
Habermas and some of his followers’ grander visions of the public sphere and civil 
society perhaps.  But Arato and Cohen in saying that these ‘small and finite steps in 
political and economic democratization can have dramatic implications for all modern 
societies’ do not clear up any further than Habermas did - which they claim to have done 
– how the state becomes further democratized through the manner in which it interacts 
with the public. 
 
Arato and Cohen argue, ‘in civil society the potential scope for democratization is far 
greater than in the institutions of state and economy, and so is the possibility of 
combinating a genuine plurality of forms of participation’; and though this serves to 
reiterate the reasons for their focus on the reconstruction of the civil society concept, this 
does not get us any closer to saying how the state can be further democratised; which 
they rely on to further democratise civil society, in the first place.  Though they sought to 
provide an account of civil society that would strengthen the concept itself they have 
failed to add anything substantial, and merely reiterate the importance – acknowledged 
by many others – of the distribution of power within civil society; let alone deal with 
some of the more important recent criticisms of the concept.36
 
Arato and Cohen do however restate some of Habermas’ by now well known theses; such 
as how the influence of a democratised civil society can at best influence political and 
economic institutions indirectly; and they argue that gains in civil society are not to be 
found in a ‘revived agora but in a multiplicity of more autonomous roles, solidary and 
egalitarian relations, and norms of participation in all dimensions of modern culture’.37  
Perhaps their contribution lies in emphasizing what a late modern concept of civil society 
consists in.  They have offered one more concrete account of what civil society can hope 
to achieve by way of further democratization, given the constraints so well documented 
by now.   
 
The concepts of one, ‘system’ where communication is manipulated in favour of 
traditional (not progressive) norms and two, ‘lifeworld’ are important to the 
                                                     
35 Ibid, p 137. 
36 Villa, D. R, 1992; The existence of power relations in the interstices of civil society, through the process of 
subjectification which is so insidious as to make the individual unknowingly complicit in the process of their 
becoming subject in whatever form or shape, has been theorized such that the way the individual is implicated 
almost certainly does not allow for rational contemplation of the ‘morality’ of the individual’s position-going-
forward, from within the situation he finds himself in.   
37 Arato, A and Cohen, J, 1992, p 139. 
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reconstruction of the concept of civil society for those who have thought deeply about 
why civil society matters at all in democracy, such as Arato and Cohen.   
 
1. 3. 2 Civil society and conflict: a reality 
 
Michael Walzer presents what he calls the ‘civil society argument’ an argument he 
presents by differentiating what defines ‘the (modern) civil society argument’ from 
nineteenth and twentieth century accounts (arguments for) of the best setting for ‘the 
good life’ (the civil society argument encapsulating what the ideal and necessary latest 
setting for the ‘good life’ is).  These four older accounts he distils as ‘democratic 
(republican) citizenship, socialist (centralised and workerist) cooperation, individual 
autonomy, and national identity’38, claiming that the civil society version of the good life 
is represented strictly by not a fifth type but what he calls ‘the civil society argument’ 
which challenges the singularity of the four versions he has set out.  The civil society 
argument is ‘part-denial and part-incorporation’ of those versions of the good life.   
 
Walzer argues that civil society theorists are accommodating of conflict, and that in the 
‘associational networks of civil society, in unions, parties, movements, interest groups, 
and so on, people make many smaller decisions and shape to some degree the more 
distant determinations of the state and economy’, and if it is egalitarian, all the better.39  
This is ultimately how civil society links up with the state (an obvious requirement of all 
types of the good life in modernity, or the onset of the enlightenment). 
 
Walzer, in summarising the civil society argument, says he is not convinced by it 
altogether.  He argues that the associationalism prescribed by civil society theorists is 
hardly of the ‘heroic’ proportions of the four projects against which he contrasts this 
present civil society project - pointing to foreseeable motivational problems.  He 
correctly points out that the likelihood of achieving an inclusive civil society is likely to 
come up against the fact that ‘a growing number of people seem to be radically 
disengaged’ and that it is very difficult to define in-and-of-itself.  But nevertheless 
Walzer says the civil society project can only be described ‘against the singularity of 
other projects’.  The civil society project does not confront with an energizing hostility; 
its protagonists are more likely to meet sullen indifference, fear, despair, apathy and 
withdrawal’.40  It is simply one aspect of a prevalent condition in modern society in 
advanced societies.   
 
His claims - perhaps even more so in developing countries, where the social welfare state 
has not even inculcated ‘dependable workers’ yet41 - which Offe and Preuss sum up as 
political alienation; deal a body blow to those hoping to organise under mainstream (for 
example, land reform movements), let alone alternate (for instance, climate change 
ideologues) project banners.  Political alienation can be partially characterised as one, a 
loss of collective memory about decisions made about issues which were not available 
for scrutiny at the time of voting, two, the separation between people and politicians (the 
political class), and three, the growing distance between ‘everyday knowledge, values 
and experience of ordinary citizens and the expertise of political professionals’.42  
                                                     
38 Walzer, M, 1992, p 105. 
39 Ibid, p 99. 
40 Baker, G, 1999, p 106. 
41 Offe, C and Preuss, U. K, 1991, p 164. 
42 Ibid, p 165. 
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Alienation might well be read as a consequence of lack of democracy by radical 
democrats.  This I argue need not bother us since in conjunction with proponents of 
deliberative democracy arguing for ‘maximal inclusion’ we might be able to define the 
civil society argument so as to account for any objection.  
 
Walzer suggests his own perspective which he dubs (‘awkwardly’, he says) ‘critical 
associationalism’; which is for all intents and purposes a corrective (and not an 
uncommon one) to the original civil society argument he outlines and critiques; which he 
says by way of definition, requires the state decentralizing, to give citizens opportunities 
to take responsibility for some of its activities; socializing the economy, and pluralizing 
and domesticating nationalism, so there are different ways to sustain and realize historical 
identities.43 The latter point being important since it brings to bear more perspectives 
than allowed by a nationalistic ethos.  All this, says Walzer, ‘does not lend itself to a 
singular description’ - and here Walzer might well be accused by a Gideon Baker of 
‘limiting the horizons of civil society theory to the liberal democratic agenda’, in 
eschewing more radical aims.44 Ultimately what Walzer considers as engagement in civil 
society (or a site of ‘critical associationalism’ as he has marketed his own version of the 
civil society argument) is a type of activity which he sees as sadly on the decline; and 
although the ‘project of projects’45, civil society can only hope to have limited impact on 
the distant state for instance.  
 
Walzer does not argue for this decentralized basis for decision making among the 
citizenry using arguments for the systems’ ability to distort the background assumptions 
of the ‘lifeworld’ as Arato and Cohen tend to, but he does see civil society as being a 
repository for more democratic autonomy-inducing decisions. 
 
Baker on the other hand argues, against Walzer, that ‘civil society is something that we 
already possess, not an ideal toward which we should aspire.  It is the loss of this critical 
edge to civil society theorisation in particular which should cause disquiet for it 
represents the effective demobilization of an idea that he argues, two decades ago was 
oriented toward change.’46   
 
Walzer plays the realist conservative to Baker’s radical (for Baker the decisions taken by 
the state are by their very nature about issues which do not exist in an ideal society where 
legitimacy resides in the concept of civil society itself), while Arato and Cohen sit 
somewhere in the middle, but closer to Walzer arguably.  Walzer argues that while 
nationalism, the belief in a republican democratic citizenship which unites us in forming 
rational policies by which to live and so forth, are no longer here, this new civil society 
creed is perhaps the modern equivalent – a creed which recognizes the ability of citizens 
to take part in the running of society (as opposed to advocating that they pursue some 
earlier classical conception of the good life), but also that this is totally different from the 
old desire to find the ‘best social formation’.47  Uncertainty is a way of life here. 
 
Advocates of status quo contemporary democracy might say we have democratically 
elected governments, separation of powers and so forth, questioning what there is to 
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quibble about.  The often immediately reverted to answer is, that as the concepts of 
‘lifeworld’ and ‘system’ arguably illustrate, there are differences between the 
‘communication types’ involved.48  Though not everything implied by these concepts 
need be accepted, they do provide insights into what critics find wrong with the 
functioning of democratic orders.  
 
Civil society theorists claim many things for the concept including that the associational 
life involved in civil society is a good in-itself; that civil society can have an impact on 
the state indirectly if it is itself better organised; and that civil society has become too de-
politicised through being co-opted by the liberal democratic theoretical paradigm - when 
arguably it should fight to keep its status as a purveyor of ‘alternatives to the status 
quo’.49  All these accounts share in common a belief in the ability of civil society to 
deepen democracy to varying degrees.  How it does so differs from theorist to theorist. 
 
1. 3. 3 Civil society: much hope, but for what, and why, ultimately? 
 
The reason this is important is because once again it justifies what faith many political 
theorists hold out for the concept of civil society – and this has implications for 
conceptions of democratic politics as will be illustrated. For ultimately all accounts of 
civil society or the civil society argument have a conception of where the suggestions 
about society they make, gel with democratic politics. Walzer for instance argues that his 
critical associationalism involves civil society members ‘shaping a co-op budget rather 
than deciding on national fiscal policy or volunteering in a hospital than joining a 
political party’.50  
 
While I have presented some of the different arguments which outline the significance of 
the concept of civil society to modern political theory it should be stressed that for 
current purposes the most important thing to bear in mind is that, and how, all of them 
ultimately have the aim of furthering the struggle for democracy; whether they differ on 
how that is to be done is not for the moment of overriding concern.  What is important is 
that the rise of interest in civil society represents notification of a growing crisis in the 
realm of state theory (and correspondingly democratic politics) which ultimately further 
challenges often unnecessarily or at least prematurely (as shall be argued), the overall 
legitimacy of the state.   
 
1. 4 Hegemony of the deliberative democratic ethos 
 
I argue that deliberative democratic theory (relying on key theoretical concepts from civil 
society) offers further refinement of the arguments inherent in much civil society theory.  
But I will argue that in having done so, deliberative democrats offer (like many of those 
who have faith in the ability of civil society to ‘democratise the state) an imprecise 
(biased) formulation of the relation between civil society and the state, which fails to 
acknowledge much that could (and should) already be deigned radical democratic 
activity.   
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The inspiration for arriving at this conception of ‘critique of critique’ was through 
considering Honneth’s challenge to specify structural barriers to participatory democracy, 
and anticipating what might be offered by way of rejoinder. Additionally, if a truer 
theoretical reflection of the democratic space continues to elude us, the constant critique 
that results from overlooking objects in the field will overexpose or saturate those it is 
aimed at, rendering justified critique less and less believable. 
 
Civil society theorists are not alone in their appreciation of the significance of ‘the civil 
society argument’ for democratic inclusion.  Let me illustrate: admittedly the modern 
concept (consider its different historical incarnations) came to life (broadly) on the back 
of considerations of the ‘possibilities of a democratically organised political opposition’ 
in socialist countries (then a determinedly aggressive civil society) - and as Baker alerted 
us, this was usually in the interest of a radical opposition movement’s self-
aggrandizement - but in the West as Honneth argues it ‘was rather used to found a new 
conception of radicalized democracy’.51  This meeting of East and West, as I have 
outlined in the rendition of civil society and deliberative democratic theory, saw many 
hybrid political theoretical projects hatched which sought to feed off this energy.   
 
Honneth presciently points out that ‘today, when one talks about the task of further 
democratization within the context of the highly developed countries of the West, then 
one is referring to the question as to how democratic participation in the process of the 
‘formation of political consciousness’ can be widened and enhanced within the 
framework of the established political institutions of a parliamentary democracy.’52 This 
conception of democracy implicitly accepts all the arguments that have been put forward 
for there not being any discernable ideological differences between competing political 
parties or candidates.  The emphasis on highly developed countries need not concern us.   
Honneth’s distinction between East and West types are often difficult to distinguish in 
reality, but it is important in that support for cries of democratic ‘illegitimacy’ are likely 
to be shriller in the East (and similar societies), but they do echo loudly in the West (and 
South) to.  As for the Developing States (South) calls for further democracy equally takes 
many forms, and it is difficult - if called for - to provide a catch-all term for what further 
democratization entails.   
 
Nonetheless, for the moment I will discuss how this furthering of democracy has been 
attempted and theorised using arguments about deliberative democracy (they apply in 
South Africa).  The main characteristic civil society theory and deliberative democracy 
share in common is that each tends to argue for the deepening, or furtherance of 
democracy based on how countervailing forces - sometimes simply assumed to lie 
outside the state in civil society – should have great political significance.   
 
The reason for setting up the manner in which ‘furtherance of democracy’ has been 
argued for is in order to show that this is a more complicated project than is often 
assumed.  I want to argue that a theorists’ licence (so to speak) to argue their case for 
insufficient democratisation rests upon the fulfilment of a set (here, one in particular 
since it the most important) of theoretical requirements – which are occasionally fulfilled 
admittedly, but not often.   
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The challenge laid down to those who wish to claim that the intensity and extent of 
political consciousness formation in a democratic state lacks is to show that what they 
call for does not exist adequately; that they are not presenting a straw man argument 
which they can bayonet at will, and which slyly comes to serve their own purposes. 
Deliberative democratic accounts - often closely but perhaps not directly aligned with 
civil society advocates and theorists, and taken up by all manner of critics - cannot simply 
self righteously assume through a cleverly crafted appeal to flimsy evidence that their 
claims hold water.   
 
Critical claims are disputable not because civil society is itself ‘less than civil’ (and not 
therefore deserving of attention for the reasons it says it is) as some have argued, but 
because the terrain in which a nominally rights-based civil society (consider Cohen and 
Arato’s fears) operates is often less constrained by a lack of opportunity to influence the 
formation of political consciousness than alleged.   
 
1. 4. 1 ‘The system’ and how we influence it 
 
Before illustrating the immanent possibility that that could be true a representative 
deliberative democrat position is presented in order to illustrate the strength of the 
position that has been put forward for the likely existence of insufficiently inclusive 
democracy.   
 
Just as civil society theorists have laboured to fashion a concept that is commensurate 
with present realities (constitutional democracy and all this entails about the position of 
civil society) so also in ‘traditional political theory’ is it held that the ‘holistic concept of 
political practise has lost its lustre and motivating power’ and that since ‘the 
contradictions built into the concept of popular sovereignty itself became manifest (i.e. 
The People from whom all government authority is supposed to derive clearly does not 
comprise a subject with will and consciousness) democratisation now works to overcome 
not genuine political forms of resistance but rather systemic imperatives of differentiated 
economic and administrative systems’.53   
 
It then falls to deliberative democrats to elaborate on what their unique contribution to 
ongoing debates about political self-rule in a radically sceptical world (a world which 
Michael Walzer and Offe and Preuss correctly portray as providing very difficult terrain 
for the civil society argument to navigate, from a motivational perspective, as we saw 
earlier) consists in. 
 
Habermas describes his aim as ‘simply to determine how a radically democratic republic 
might even be conceived today, assuming we can reckon on a resonant political culture 
that meets it halfway’.54  It should be clear that present day civil society theorists share 
many of these concerns, though often they do not state as much, or as eloquently.  
Habermas refers to how in the mid 1850’s a particular German democrat conceived of the 
idea of a total will along completely nonutilitarian lines, saying this assigned to ‘public 
discourse the role that Rousseau ascribed to the supposedly universalizing force of the 
mere form of the legal statute’.55  He goes on to say how ‘public discourse must mediate 
between reason and will, between the opinion-formation of all and the majoritarian will-
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formation of the representatives.’56  This tension between equality and liberty (the 
procedures of bringing arguments to bear secure equal liberty via rights (as Habermas 
and Arato and Cohen have argued for in the present day)) can be resolved ‘as soon as an 
overly concrete reading of the principle of popular sovereignty’ is renounced.57   
 
Habermas argues that in the past the political parties of the day were free associations 
that specialized in bringing influence to bear on the process of public opinion- and will-
formation.58  Of course the same faith in political parties no longer exists,59 and it is 
largely this fact which accounts for the rise of attempts to incorporate the public more 
effectively in political decision-making.   
 
Habermas goes on to show that historically the shared goal of universalizing basic rights 
took the form of ‘normalizing the status of dependent wage labour through participatory 
political and social rights’ and shared prosperity, in exchange for control of capitalist 
growth managed by the parties in power, who operate the levers of administrative power 
to implement goals via intervention.60  This ‘right’ was in turn disputed by anarchists 
whom Habermas (now) dismisses as ‘utopian’ in an age of advanced (global) capitalism.  
Unfortunately ‘by now,’ he argues, ‘it is clear that the administrative instruments for 
implementing social-welfare programs are by no means a passive medium without 
properties of their own, as it were.’61  In other words bureaucrats who manage these state 
accounts have an interest in their ongoing existence. It might be argued that as the 
intricate welfare state is permanent in European countries so is it with the policy of 
Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment (BBBEE) in South Africa.  BEE deal-
makers and verifiers of codes mirror the social democratic state bureaucrat.  We cannot 
rely on interest groups to secure through the fanning of democratic energy, decisions 
made in a democratic spirit. 
 
Habermas proposes ‘a distinction in the concept of the political itself, consonant with the 
duality of the normative (democratic) and instrumental perspectives.’62  The manner in 
which power is generated is either ‘communicative’ or ‘administratively employed’.  
There seems also, on Habermas’ part, to be an acceptance that part of the system will 
never be open to democratic imperatives. It is ‘an empirical question’ as to which 
overpowers which in the ‘political public sphere’.63 He argues that communicatively 
generated legitimate power can have an effect on the political system ‘insofar as it 
assumes responsibility for the pool of reasons from which administrative decisions must 
draw their rationalizations,’ meaning it is not true that ‘anything goes’.64  Up until this 
point as far as Habermas’ account goes, there does not seem to be much to quibble with.  
In fact it could be argued that as far as civil societies’ influence in political reality goes, 
this represents an immanently workable model for the present discussion’s purposes.   
 
In fact the logic of this theorisation and how it is realized in empirical reality does form 
the basis of the working definition of the public sphere. Habermas’ own account of how 
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the public sphere operates and functions, however, labours under his theoretical 
requirements unnecessarily I argue. For Habermas political deliberative democracy is 
instantiated when the state is responsible – Offe outlines how responsible agents act; ‘by 
methodically taking the critical perspective, simultaneously and in the futurum exactum, 
of the expert, the generalized other, and of themselves’65 when evaluating their own 
actions.    
 
1. 4. 2 Who is being fooled? 
 
Habermas retains his earlier fears (stemming from the early proponents of critical 
theory)66 about the gullibility of popular opinion, and the ever-present possibility that the 
relation between organized politics and the ‘surrounding environment of unstructured 
opinion- formation’ proceeds according to ‘ideologically pre-given assumptions’.   
 
He can only be as optimistic as to argue that the normative expectation of rational 
outcomes (based on normative arguments) means the public sphere functions as a 
normative concept, with voluntary associations representing the nodal points in the 
communication network that emerges from the ‘intermeshing of autonomous public 
spheres’.67  I would argue that he is perhaps too pessimistic (idealistic), too 
circumscribed, about how and what organisations can be expected to come up with, or 
productively crystallize useful-to-democracy normative contributions.  Perhaps realizing 
some of the ingredients in Habermas’ recipe do not come cheap, is partially the way 
forward?   
 
Voluntary organisations and mass movements of public opinion (the continued strength 
of which he says, is sometimes illustrated by about turns or large changes in party 
political platforms) ‘specialize in discovering issues relevant for all of society, 
contributing possible solutions to problems, interpreting values, producing good results, 
and invalidating others’.68  But Habermas’ construal of the public sphere means a heavy 
normative burden is placed on a fairly flimsy concept which has it that an 
‘intersubjectively dissolved popular sovereignty withdraws into democratic procedures 
and demanding communicative presuppositions of their implementation’.69  Why it has to 
be indirect is that if influence is direct, Habermas, it strongly appears, has convinced 
himself that this entails the communication was too purposive and thus, obviously, 
strategic (systemic, and not inclusive).  This distorts the legitimacy of the ‘democratic’ 
decision then.  All we can rely on is voluntary organisations, and social movements, and 
so forth.  The answer would, for Habermas, appear to be blowing in the wind.  To a 
degree, that he argues this is understandable but need we be so pessimistic? 
 
That organisations that can assist in the formation of discursively formed judgements and 
decisions (upon which voters are to base their choice ultimately) actually exist is not 
certain for Habermas either.  This epitomizes his sceptical position and might explain to 
an extent his penchant for sticking to normative debates but does not do sufficient justice 
to what has been achieved, or what might conceivably be said to constitute a democratic 
advance, even within this strict radical democratic paradigm.   
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This is not a knock-down argument against his own case for ‘how a radically conceived 
democratic republic might be conceived today’ but it is a strong indictment of Habermas’ 
own lack of appreciation of what we do possess by way of ‘vessels’ for informal opinion-
formation in (sufficiently) autonomous public spheres. Habermas’ account of opinion-
forming organisations that catalyze the growth of ‘autonomous public spheres’ and which 
thereby ‘change the spectrum of values, issues, and reasons’ and which are meant to be 
the measure of an unsubverted public sphere which is ‘not inundated with discourse 
channelled by the mass media, unions, associations and parties according to the dictates 
of power’70 speak to hefty credentials in order to qualify as ‘collective’ avant-gardes.  
Perhaps Habermas has become too complacent in his analyses of other organisations in 
civil society, or other aspects of the public sphere? Habermas is spot on when he opines 
that ‘communicative power can become effective only indirectly, insofar as it limits the 
implementation of administrative, hence actually exercised, power’71, but the manner and 
means in which this ‘siege’ is (and can be) affected deserves more attention.   
 
‘Large segments of the political and socio-scientific public of the 1980’s’ says Helmut 
Dubiel, ‘quite unlike the leftists generations of the 1950’s and 1960’s – were fascinated 
by social developments that tended to contradict rather than corroborate the conclusion 
that total domination (in its manifold manifestations) was being established’.72 Ultimately 
those who ‘stage’ the ‘siege’ might not achieve the fulfilment of a normative vision such 
as Habermas’ (he admits: ‘an unsubverted public sphere is unrealistic, but not utopian ‘in 
a bad sense’), but it is debateable whether we need confine our assessments of the degree 
of autonomy of opinion- and will-formation (an agreed good) to how ‘permeable to free-
floating values, issues, contributions, and arguments of political communication that 
cannot be organized as a whole’ the formally structured organisations of political will-
formation are.   
 
Habermas is no doubt trying in the interests of the bigger theoretical picture he is 
painting, to emphasize the extent to which many supposedly value-free impartial 
organisations have a stake in the status quo, or in changes to it, and cannot thus be said to 
hold opinions and values free of the power or money perspective; but I argue, at the 
expense of less grand ‘fairer’ arguments probably.  
 
A perpetual problem involved in discussing the refinement of political preferences into 
‘reasonable and non-regrettable outcomes’ as we have seen, is what is meant by ‘rational’ 
or ‘enlightened’.  Offe and Preuss handle this question in perhaps a less abstruse manner 
than Habermas has tended to.  A sufficiently rational (and democratic) outcome for them 
would ideally have to be ‘fact-regarding’ (not ignorant or doctrinaire), ‘future-regarding’ 
(not myopic), and ‘other regarding’ (not selfish).73   To what degree the aggregate 
outcomes of citizen’s individual acts of participation can be justified as reasonable has 
been measured in the history of democratic theory by different standards: theorisation on 
civil society, the public sphere, and democracy is but a recent attempt at setting the 
coordinates of a standard.     
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Offe and Preuss even argue for a radicalisation of the principle of democratic 
participation which amounts to ‘organizing an orderly social conflict’ between ‘inner 
conflict’ in addition to that between minorities and majorities, between cherished and less 
cherished desires.  The premium here is placed on actual deliberation (Habermas has 
been accused of neglecting the actual site of arguments and what can be expected to 
emerge) itself since that is the source of legitimacy: publicly defending these conflicting 
desires.  Offe and Preuss say that neither Rawls' veil of ignorance nor Habermas’ 
rationality standards are up to the task of institutionalizing these developments.  But they 
go on to say that the ongoing achievement of the principle of reciprocity requires an 
emphasis on how preferences are formed and learned in civil society.  A particular 
suggestion for how to achieve this kind of reflexiveness: inserting ‘elements of statistical 
representation into the established forms of representation through party competition and 
party bureaucracies’74 is indicative of this style of thought as holding out against hope, 
though reluctantly having to rely on quite familiar refrains.   
 
Habermas’ own thinking on the manner in which his particular vision of voluntary 
organisations can - through public sphere - influence organized politics, is highly 
differentiated and complex, firstly, in what he is trying to achieve with the theoretical 
account (there is no longer any other way to conceive of autonomous democratic 
sovereignty), and secondly, in that the way in which the capitalist-welfare state has been 
factored into his theory is so realistic as to be almost exclusory of traditional would-be 
democratic forces.   
 
The biggest intervention he makes is to put forward a ‘discourse theoretical approach 
which offers a way of understanding the connection between the rule of law and popular 
sovereignty without appealing to a transcendent notion of reason or overburdening 
citizens’ capacities for public virtue’.75  He does that by putting across how actual 
communication (allegedly because of the nature of actually engaging in conversation) 
enhances democracy. 
 
But Habermas’ increasingly pessimistic conclusions led David Held to say ‘at the 
moment, in Habermas’ opinion, there is no way of cogently deciding questions about the 
chances of a self-transformation of advanced capitalism’.76 Habermas has the success of 
deliberative politics depend not on a collectively acting citizenry but on ‘the 
institutionalization of the corresponding procedures and conditions of communication, as 
well as the interplay of institutionalized deliberative processes with informally 
constituted public opinion’.77  While the intricacy of the account is the result of trying to 
formulate the conditions whereby it would mean ‘an administration limited to pragmatic 
discourse’ not disturb ‘anything in this universe by its contributions’, and at the same 
time draw ‘therefrom the normative premises that have to underlie its own empirically 
informed, purposive-rational decision-making’, it is arguable that Habermas’ account of 
the ideal workings of the public sphere need be confined in the way he does.   
 
In fact what the broad theoretical picture presented by deliberative democratic theory 
allows is a better appreciation of how (should, could, and does) civil society broadly 
understood (including voluntary associations) comes to influence power.  The emphasis 
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placed by Habermas on the link between the administration and unorganised opinion- and 
will-formation provides a realistic model for the manner in which civil society might 
influence the organised political sphere.  In fact it has been suggested that this is the 
‘main thrust’ of a discursive account of legitimacy: ‘the attempt to show how the 
demands of maximal democratic inclusion might be reconciled with a politics of reasoned 
agreements’.78  Once the latter is acknowledged the important question becomes that of 
providing the order in which rights ought to be recognized, or providing a list of the 
material requirements that would make these rights effective.  Arguments abound 
concerning how to bring certain substantive features of democratic life (inequality) into 
focus, which should supplement the deliberative democratic procedural account.79
 
I argue that what Habermas has presented is an adequate conception of the function of the 
public sphere, and one which many could agree with.  However the problem with 
understanding communicative power as Habermas does: a product of an overlapping and 
intermeshing of a variety of (more or less institutionalized) pragmatic, ethical-political, 
and moral discourses80, means that the model of procedural democracy allegedly required 
to institutionalize these discourses in the public sphere(s), often implicitly under-
appreciates the kind of discourse that is available in the public sphere and in fact does 
‘encircle the organized political system with reasons, without, however, attempting to 
overthrow or replace it’.81   
 
The question ought perhaps to be, do we have an adequate theoretical understanding of 
the public sphere which might live up to the demands of describing the possibilities and 
instances of radical democracy of the type we have broadly agreed is desirable?  
Crucially, this challenge applies both to those who seek to defend or endorse the current 
level of democratisation; and those who wish to critique it.  For the critic of the status 
quo, her position ought to come off as strong a base as possible, in order not to be 
accused of presenting a straw man argument (in the interests of plausibility rather than to 
dispute the veracity of critique for the sake of it); while for the defender of the status quo, 
wanting to point out what the critic overlooks, theory is paramount. 
 
Habermas’ discourse theory model provides a good idea of what is ideally required in 
terms of institutionalization of deliberative processes involving the public sphere 
throughout; but the ability to appreciate how close we have moved to those siege-like 
procedures is lessened by some of the notions Habermas and those who share his 
assumptions about the make-up of the public sphere hold.  For them the public sphere as 
they understand it has become depoliticized, and politics scientised – ‘individuals have 
very little, if any, say in decisions which are supposedly made in the public interest, or 
for the common good.’82  Thus, predictably, we find the ‘demise of the public sphere as a 
sphere of human discourse and debate, a sphere of the production of ideas… exacerbated 
by the rise of mass society and cultural consumerism’.83   
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Thenceforth the main concern is with the framework or foundation provided by 
deliberative democracy. Kenneth Baynes argues that Habermas’ ideas suggest a ‘two 
track’ process with a division of labour between ‘weak publics’ (‘informally organised 
civil society’, and ‘strong publics’ (parliamentary bodies and other formally organized 
institutions of the political system.)84 He then goes on to outline the division of labour 
between them, acknowledge the steering responsibility as the ‘goal of radical 
democracy’, and to raise the question of Habermas’ conception of the public sphere and 
whether there might not be an alternate ‘division of labour’ between his suggested ‘weak’ 
and ‘strong’ publics. Many others have raised the issue of the importance of the relation 
between these suggested weak and strong publics and how important it is that mediation 
occurs to produce a rational or democratic - not coerced - outcome.85   
 
The extension of Honneth’s challenge to civil society theorists to those who claim the 
insufficient presence of democracy in political consciousness formation is a legitimate 
one. Better appraisal of what the public sphere consists in – a vast and complex 
communication network – allows for that challenge to be strongly stated.  
 
In order to gain that, a return, paradoxically it might seem at first, to state theory, will 
assist in better sketching what the nature of the public sphere consists in. Referring to 
Claus Offe’s conception of policy formation serves to allow me a starting point in better 
defining the nature of the state, and thenceforth to offer, counter-intuitively, a better 
empirical account of the nature of the public sphere which - while this is very likely 
considered wholly insufficient by vociferous deliberative democrats and radical civil 
society theorists - will allow for a more considered appreciation of what it is possible to 
hope for.  And ultimately what will be shown is that what can be ‘hoped for’ is not 
always as distant as one might think. Throughout the following discussion it should be 
borne in mind that ultimately what is at issue is a diagnosis of claims that the state is 
characterized by insufficient concern for democratic values and opinions. 
  
1. 5 State, decision modes and what this means for the public sphere 
 
Why I present Offe’s analysis about the problem of policy formation is that his 
formulation and the sub-conclusions he reaches along the way to his eventual sceptical 
conclusion about the mode of decision-making in the capitalist state, illustrate perfectly a 
fundamental point concerning the relation between civil society, the state and policy-
formation in a capitalist state, that will run throughout my discussion of civil society and 
the public sphere(s) as they relate to policy-making in a capitalist democracy, and in 
present day South Africa.   
 
Offe presents a concise breakdown of the types of decisions which states must and do 
take.  My interest in this rendition of policy formation is in decision rules the state might 
use.  Although Offe’s account of these decision rules is put forward with the intention of 
weighing up the pro’s and cons each has for the fulfilment of the state’s (capitalist) 
mandate, my purpose in reviewing them is to provide a backdrop for a more schematic 
rendition of the public sphere which - as will be shown later - makes it prima facie 
difficult to pose a case for democratic inadequacy. 
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Why that is important is that what Axel Honneth has called a ‘sociology of domination’ 
or an ‘analysis of power’86 is henceforth likely to be a more complicated analytical 
construct to manufacture, taking on different dimensions, when consideration of  these 
state tasks and the possible decision rules used in achieving them is factored in.  It will 
ultimately require a different understanding of the capitalist public sphere. 
 
Different expressions of the relation between the formal political sphere and the informal 
(civil society and its different nodes of communication) have long existed, and these 
circumstances (including the Catch-22 situation of the state ultimately guaranteeing civil 
societies’ existence) felt in whatever form they happen to present themselves from place 
to place are the fruit of the global and regional history of democracy.   
 
The plain fact however exists that ‘the state is an interventionist one in advanced 
capitalist societies.’87 Despite the different formulations made over the last century about 
the motivations for state behaviour in the various schools of state theory, it seems 
indisputable that ‘if we think of the budgetary obligations of the state…its extensive 
reliance on surplus created in the accumulation process and derived through 
taxation…becomes immediately clear.’88 And ultimately all the state’s policies depend 
on the accumulation process (dependency) and the state performs actions which denote 
that it accepts that exclusion (exclusion) from the capitalist economy, but despite this the 
economy cannot function without the state engaging in policies that maintain the 
conditions of accumulation (maintenance).  This means for a state to be a capitalist state 
‘every interest’ and the resulting policies of the state personnel must incorporate, at some 
level - through a particular ‘selective principle’ - those policies which do not offend 
against that (the state’s) reliance on the main principles of exclusion, maintenance and 
dependency.     
 
This is in fact the focus of Offe’s discussion.  His is a normative account of what a 
capitalist state needs to do to achieve its aims.  An ideal capitalist state would in an ideal 
capitalist world approximate a well oiled machine that could act on itself and its 
surrounding environment at all the necessary levels (it could survey the entire societal 
terrain and make short and long term decisions which maintained the smooth functioning 
of all institutions and systems that upheld and remained true to the three principles by 
which this state had to operate).  Unfortunately there is the small problem of what people 
(and government) are capable of deciding, and of what people (short or long sighted) 
actually want, based on their limited conception of ‘the good’.   
 
The history of political thought not discussed here, in reaching this definition of what it 
means for the state to be rational, is of course not negligible!  The state being rational or 
not is a matter of extensive debate which there is no time to discuss here - mainly how the 
state, or the common will of The People, is not, and should not be treated as a person 
with desires writ large - which proceeds from a variety of premises about what the state 
should aim to achieve, what the basis of human nature is with which it must work in 
achieving what it must, and what it can, given this, expect to achieve.  Where do civil 
society, democracy and policy making fit into this look at the ideal capitalist state?  That 
is not an easy question to begin to answer, let alone answer.   
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Offe seems to suggest an answer when firstly, he asks what is ‘responsible for the 
coincidence and harmonious coexistence of these conditions’ – in other words how is it 
possible for the state to do all it has to, to keep a capitalist state functioning smoothly; 
and secondly when he answers that this is ultimately possible only through ‘legitimation’. 
The latter involves the state conveying the image of an organization of power that 
pursues common and general interests.89  This is exactly Habermas’ concern in 
advocating deliberative democracy: how to avoid such a situation!  ‘Legitimation’ is thus 
completely different from ‘legitimate’, needless to say.  So in other words the state 
remains rational to the extent that it can achieve all it has to while using symbolic means 
to convince and conceal its true nature.   Should it not achieve a measure of legitimation, 
it would stand no chance of even beginning to behave rationally as a capitalist state.  
Legitimation is a necessary but not sufficient condition for acting rationally in other 
words.   
 
But this is not in fact where Offe does - having summoned up a very believable 
conception of how the state largely does function (I will shortly elaborate, to illustrate 
how institutionalized deliberative processes and informally constituted public opinion, 
including civil society, do in fact relate in policy-making) - drop talk of ‘democracy’.  It 
remains an open question as to where he himself actually stands on the question of a 
judicious compromise in the search for rationality and the extent to which the state must 
give a nod to the search for democratic consensus.  This need not concern us.  He does 
acknowledge that this democratic-consensus mode exists to a greater or lesser degree in 
practise, but the nature of his argument about the best procedure for maintaining capitalist 
societies leads him to question to what extent it is functional to pursue this mode of 
organizational procedure (democracy or the search for consensus).90  It is likely, given 
the positions in later work, that he sides with a formulation similar to Habermas’ concern 
with reciprocity; discourse mixed through institutions, to produce deliberative politics.  
 
At the time Offe in fact essentially sets up a well functioning legitimacy-inducing 
machine as an ideal for the capitalist state to approximate – in addition to the other taxing 
conditions it must heed.  Democratic (or what he calls decisions that emerge from 
‘consensus’ decision making) exchanges involve a search for consensus (dear as we have 
seen to deliberative democrats who worry about the distinct possibility of ‘individuals 
and groups forming an image of their will and their situation’ shot through with 
domination, in that search for consensus), and separately and/or simultaneously a state 
effort at employing symbolic gestures to achieve widespread acceptance of what are 
capitalist policies in Offe’s schema.   
 
Offe highlights ‘two modes of intervention linked to the changing pattern of threats, or 
structural problems, that emerge out of the accumulation process and to which these 
modes of state activity can be seen to be responses.’91  He proposes allocation-type 
modes of interventions or activities such as making laws about compulsory schooling, 
and productive modes of activity such as manpower training.  The former ‘operates’ by 
way of political power and is based on political decisions (paradoxically perhaps, not 
democratic at all), while in the latter – the state has to intervene when ‘the rules of the 
game’ are changed, putting many at a disadvantage because they cannot approximate the 
level of innovation to remain competitive – where the rationale is to restore 
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accumulation, a different decision mode is in operation.92  Offe says that the state has to 
respond to negative events, and does not respond to demands in the latter case (usually, in 
allocative activities, those of the most powerful), and for this reason it has to ‘devise 
decision rules of its own’.93  ‘Social and economic problems, as items on the state 
agenda, may trigger changes in the formal strategies according to which the state 
operates, and conversely these formal strategies may substantially determine both the 
ability of the state to perceive problems, and the nature of the ensuing policies.’94  So the 
state self-consciously sets up procedures in response to problem situations, and these may 
subsequently determine to a great degree which problems are picked up. 
 
I do not agree entirely with Offe’s breakdown of possible state activity into these distinct 
types, since allocative type interventions, or ‘political decisions’, will also entail 
decisions based partially on ‘devised decision rules’.  Perhaps this simply means there are 
no ‘simple’ exclusively allocative interventions?  This minor detail does not affect my 
subsequent argument.  Offe’s is vintage system’s theory in that the ‘formal rules 
determine what potential goals are and what problems have the chance to come up on the 
agenda of the political system’.95  
 
This analysis of ‘form’ by Offe’s is meant to be distinguishable from the ‘content’ 
aspects of public productive policies, where analysis leads to a clearer picture of the 
processes in the ‘environment’ of the political system that led to problems being 
recognized, whose interests those were, and what the distribution of benefits amounted 
to.96  For Offe the types of formal rules or procedures are either one, Weber’s ideal-
typical bureaucratic model; two, a technical rationality geared to purposive action; or 
three, a consensus–based mode where there is determination of administrative action 
through ‘conflict over interests, or agreement on common interests’, involving members 
of the state (administration) and the state’s ‘environment’97 (perhaps this is the category 
under which ‘simple’ allocative decisions fall?).   
 
While these distinctions are useful Offe and I (he is interrogating why an ideal capitalist 
state does not yet exist and probably never will) argue none could on its own ever be used 
to describe an actual administration’s relation to its environment.  Offe says instead that 
what is real about ‘the capitalist state’, since the depiction of the ideal capitalist state he 
has offered is never approximated because each mode is insufficient to the task of the 
capitalist state on its own, is that there is a ‘constant attempt to reconcile and make 
compatible these various functions with its internal structure, or mode of operation’.98  
For instance, one, ‘participation and unfiltered conflict tends to interfere with the 
institutional constraints, under which state agencies have to operate, leading to highly 
unstable situations’, two, the environmental actors (business) ‘retaliate’ against purposive 
rational decisions (a chain of disinvestment), or three, bureaucracy is ineffective or 
wasteful.99   
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1. 6 Better defining a contested arena, the public sphere: do we not know enough 
about the public sphere? 
 
Consider that Offe’s eventual conclusions and focus is that there is ‘neither visible nor to 
be anticipated’100 a strategy that actually does reconcile these functions.  What makes 
neither of these procedural types adequate to the tasks of the capitalist state in its 
productive functions, is also the door to the public sphere; but a particular version of the 
public sphere.  How?  Let us imagine that the public sphere is not only distinguished for 
the level and type of discussion happening in it, but for the type of function it serves in a 
democracy.  Offe’s account of the decision modes and the decision types which states 
engage in offers an interesting picture of just how broad the functions of a public sphere 
might be.   
 
Firstly, Offe mentioned amidst this dire and pressing need of the capitalist state the 
legitimation process as one where the state conveys the image of equal access to power 
and response to justified demand.  This obviously involves strong elements of populism 
mixed into the bureaucratic decision-making process.   
 
Secondly, allocative decisions by the state involving disposal of state resources (an 
example in the field of health would be laws that make certain behaviour mandatory, or 
regulations that makes certain claims legal) surely also allow for a degree of influence by 
the civil society actors on the political arena.   
 
Thirdly, the proposed insufficiency of the three modes of decision for the productive state 
activities (which require ‘control by output’ – not ‘control through input’ like typical 
bureaucracies101) deserves further consideration, paradoxically, for what this conclusion 
does not say.  
 
It is likely that different parts (executive political authorities, ministries, line ministries, 
other official judicial structures) of the capitalist state will produce decisions through 
either one of the three varieties of decision modes, a combination of these may exist, and, 
more likely still, a combination of these three decision modes might exist, for argument’s 
sake, in respect of a particular issue in a particular ministry. This all told is not an 
insignificant arena for informal will- and opinion-formation to coalesce with formalized 
will- and opinion-formation.   
 
1. 7 Public sphere and democracy: the onus of proof shifts 
 
Claus Offe’s conception of the choices a capitalist state faces in ‘choosing’ its decision 
rules is arguably a concise accurate rendition of much in the state theory tradition.  
Although this is not Offe’s intention at the time, the account serves through discussion of 
the appropriateness of decision modes for particular types of problems faced by the state, 
to teach us what we might expect to exist regarding dynamics in the public sphere.   
 
The intention here is not to show that the public sphere likely does fulfil its democratic 
role, rather the aim is to show it is unlikely that it does not, given a realistic account of the 
public sphere and what ultimately it might be argued it consists in, contra overly 
idealistic deliberative democratic theory.  That is, given that the public sphere has been 
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said to consist in the (more or less) institutional arrangements between formal political 
publics and informal publics.  Complaints pointing to structural barriers to widespread 
participation often overlook the actual functioning of the public sphere; which as 
Habermas’ social-theoretical account of the way in which political autonomy ought to be 
exercised in constitutional states points out, ideally exists (very broadly) in ‘the language 
of law acting as a transformer that picks up messages originating in ordinary language of 
everyday communication among citizens and translat(ing) them into an abstract but 
binding form’.102    
 
The rationale, behind including a look at firstly, the confusion in state theory, secondly, 
how civil society theorists consider their conception of the relation between civil society 
and state pertinent to democratic theory, thirdly, the arguments of deliberative democratic 
theorists, and finally, a detailed look at Offe’s account of how the state formulates 
policies it must, lies in better illustrating how it is that the public sphere does operate, 
both ideally, and ultimately empirically.  These illustrate just how complex the public 
sphere is, and accordingly how difficult it is for empirical account of a ‘sociology of 
domination’ or analysis of power to be able to account for the variety of ways in which 
the public sphere does in fact function in a capitalist (or otherwise) democracy.   
 
1. 7. 1 Public sphere in focus: theoretical questions 
 
What might a better rendition the nature of the informal public sphere where citizens 
discuss and form opinions in civil society (and not only voluntary organisations) consist 
in?  In answering this question it will be important to broach questions like: does not a 
problem exist in, one, identifying what constitutes the nature of that ‘ordinary language’ 
of opinion; consequently, two, identifying when, or even whether it is being ignored by 
constitutional structures and ‘the language of law’, three, whether public opinion about a 
particular issue is always discernable, and four, whether ordinary language ever (or 
always) thematizes itself adequately from out of the purported ‘weak’, ‘strong’, ‘formal’ 
and ‘informal’ public spheres?  These questions are fundamental to analysing the quality 
of democracy. 
 
Not doing so adequately can result in claims that ordinary language is being disregarded 
by the administrative system (‘the informal public sphere acts as a warning system for the 
formal constitutional structures in identifying new problems and providing potential 
solutions for them before they are taken up by legislative bodies’103), when actually what 
is happening is that the themes and values generated in civil society organisations just 
happen not to be those of particular critics who are also but not exclusively participants in 
that informal public sphere. 
 
I argue that at the same time that the strong ideal of the public sphere seeks and serves to 
‘highlight the forms of asymmetry, coercion, violence (as opposed to ‘power’ where 
acting is in concert after agreement) and communicative distortion’104 by presenting the 
ideal picture of how communicative power in civil society can provide the basis for 
influencing the administration, it also provides a distorting mirror on the configuration of 
what constitutes communicative power properly understood.  This distortion of the 
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theoretical space often makes it difficult to fathom ways in which the administration does 
find itself influenced by ‘communicative power’.   
 
I do not want to quibble overly about the philosophical mechanics of the activity in the 
public realm or sphere – whether it is at base consensus-driven or not (Habermas)105, or 
whether the public sphere has become distorted or transformed because of the 
substitution of voting and judicial decision-making for spontaneous agonistic action.106  
 
This does not entail proposing instead a different (equally idealistic) ‘theory of political 
action and speech’107 such as one that instead of seeing value in the formation of a 
rational general will (Habermas’ deliberative democratic story) rather takes as its ideal 
‘agonistic subjectivity’ ‘where to speak is to fight in the sense of playing, and speech acts 
fall within the domain of general agonistics’.108 An example of such an alternate vision of 
the public sphere which is not as critical of reality as Habermas’ is Mouffe’s argument 
about the public sphere(s): ‘I have argued for a model of ‘agonistic pluralism’, one which 
acknowledges the role of power relations in society and the ever present possibility of 
antagonism.  According to such a view, the aim of democratic institutions is not to 
establish a rational consensus in the public sphere but to defuse potential for hostility that 
exists in human societies by providing the possibility for antagonism to be transformed 
into ‘agonism’’.109 The thesis presented here is agnostic about the nature of action in the 
public sphere.  
 
Rather the public sphere will be depicted as a mixture of these modes and more besides.  
A minimal understanding of ‘policy networks as political structures, although, of course, 
not unchanging structures’110 is the starting point for this understanding. Policy networks 
result in ‘a distinctive leadership drawing to themselves those interested in the 
accomplishment of particular tasks, sometimes creating demands for activities not 
otherwise articulated.  Alternately, external pressures from the community may meet 
sympathetic hearing if the capacity of the agency is oriented to meeting this demand.  
Those parameters collectively may be identified as the policy environment’.111  
Hilgartner and Bosk point to how ‘authoritative versions of reality compete to be 
accepted as characterisations of the situation’ and additionally, and importantly, how ‘a 
large collection of problems compete with one another for public attention’; the relation 
between these levels meaning social problems ‘must compete both to enter and to remain 
on the public agenda’112  
 
The point argued is that a better depiction of the public space or sphere would partially or 
significantly invalidate the justification(s) for radicalizing democracy according to 
proponents own standards. I argue that many theoretically well informed depictions of 
failure to inaugurate ‘maximal inclusion’ or accounts of skewed sociologies’ of 
domination have become intoxicated with their own apparent sensibleness. 
 
1. 7. 2 A complex, liminal, ‘structure’ 
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The beginnings of a model of the public sphere that go some way to rectifying the bias 
inherent in the elaborate but at the same time vague requirements of the normative model 
of the public sphere might be those suggested by Nancy Fraser in her reference to an 
issue being ‘political’ if it is contested ‘across a range of different publics’; and which 
‘contrasts both with what is not contested in public at all and with what is contested only 
in relatively specialized, enclaved, and/or segmented publics’.113  This discourse sense is 
contrasted (not in the sense of being diametrically opposed) to the institutional sense 
where a matter is deemed ‘political’ or ‘official political’ if instead of being handled in 
‘the family’ say, it is handled in the institutions of official government like government 
administrations and parliament.   
 
Fraser identifies the key factor underpinning these two axes as ‘publicity’ – understood to 
be ‘differentiated’, in the sense that it is ‘possible to identify a plurality of distinct 
discourse publics and to theorize the relations among them’.114  A variety of publics can 
be identified along further axes such as ideological, stratification principles (like gender 
or sexuality), class, profession, and central mobilizing issue.  These publics can also be 
distinguished by their relative power, into ‘leading publics’ and ‘couterhegemonic 
publics’ according to Fraser.115   
 
Now, while Fraser illustrates the existence of these axes and what binds them together, 
publicity, through considering instances of ‘needs talk’ or ‘needs discourses’116 in 
developed welfare societies, and saying how ‘in general the best needs interpretations are 
those reached by means of communicative processes that most closely approximate ideals 
of democracy, equality and fairness’117, I argue118 that we can accept what Fraser says 
about ‘needs talk’ (and ‘rights talk’), but add that the same axes and requirement of 
publicity apply in understanding discourses/talks other than these.   
 
This arguably has a major bearing on how the public sphere might be better apprehended.  
It represents a climb down – in the same way that discourse ethics in deliberative 
democratic theory represents a climb down from grand hypotheses on the substance of 
‘progress’ or ‘liberation’ in that it seeks only to establish rules and procedures of sincere, 
fair, and open-minded communication (and sometimes decision rules) without claiming 
to qualify morally the material results of these rules in advance’119 - from the strict 
versions of discourse ethics where only voluntary organisations can crystallize out 
opinions free of distorting influences, to something which though not as demanding as 
what Habermas demands of the public sphere he outlines, is nonetheless significant both 
to democratic theory and political analysis. 
 
Fraser’s points about where ‘needs’ and ‘rights’ talk occurs might be called the 
situational and quantitative aspects of the public sphere.  The qualitative aspect on the 
other hand is perhaps best captured by outlining what discourses other than ‘needs’ and 
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‘rights’ talk might be said to occur in the public sphere, in their relation to the formal 
political process. A preliminary appreciation of the qualitative extent of the public sphere 
is provided by Andrew Chadwick when he breaks down ‘political ideas’, broadly, into 
the following:  
 
• ‘Ideas communicated by the practise of philosophical discourse where certain concepts 
enjoy status because they are seen as perennial’,  
• ‘Ideas communicated as supremely political interventions and as elements of particular 
political strategies’, and  
• ‘Ideas communicated as ‘symbolic discourses’ such as flag burning’ – the latter is the 
traditionally the territory of free speech theory.120   
 
In South Africa for instance the barricading of roads by placing rocks on them to protest 
against poor municipal service delivery might be seen as a similar political intervention 
to ‘flag burning’.   
 
Although I do not consider this exhaustive of the types of communication in the public 
sphere, it offers a traditional theoretical conception of how policy is influenced by 
different types of communication which I would like to take further in the interests of 
better defining the concept of the public sphere for democratic (deliberative) theory.  
 
1. 7. 3 Qualitative aspects of the public sphere 
 
In an important paper analysing the processes involved in policy-making Gotz - in that 
context he argues for better policy foundations to be set through the asking of better 
questions which would be the starting place for arriving at better policy answers - refers 
to the ‘conceptual preconditions that allow a desired outcome to be asserted in the first 
place’, quoting Michel Foucault who refers to  the ‘connections, encounters, supports, 
blockages, plays of forces, strategies, and so on which at a given moment establish what 
subsequently counts as being self-evident, universal and necessary’.121  Although 
Foucault’s intent was to point out and ‘breach the self-evidence’ of practises and 
processes which he referred to as a being visible through practising a form of enquiry he 
dubbed ‘eventalisation’122, this conception of knowledge claims is furthermore 
interesting for it says about the world of policy. 
 
The interest I have in this rendition of how conceptual preconditions come to be so 
established is in the relation they have to an understanding of the public sphere.  Fraser’s 
axes are a useful starting point in taking that forward.  She argues ‘as a result of these 
processes (‘the setting of the terms of debate’) members of subordinated groups 
commonly internalize need interpretations that work to their disadvantage’.123  I have no 
argument with that but question whether the interpretation be as schematic as that?  
Dialogical practises involving this kind of establishment of ‘what subsequently counts as 
self-evident’ surely criss-cross the public sphere and make their way from the informal or 
weak public sphere into the strong public sphere or formal political public sphere, and 
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vice versa, and across a number of what Fraser refers to as publics.124  There are 
powerful ‘discourse publics’ and alliances between them which no doubt have a strong 
part to play in the complicated process of ‘constructing’ what ‘conceptually makes 
possible statements of government intent, and what those statements in turn make 
possible’.125   
 
And once these statements or policy problem-spaces are crystallized out (a never ending 
process of forming and re-forming in itself) ‘objects of analysis’ followed by ‘projects of 
reality’ (in turn made possible through analytical constructs, or savoirs126) allowing an 
expansion of the range of viable interventions as these ‘projects of reality’ change or are 
discarded, become possible, and actual.   
 
The point about the qualitative aspect of the public sphere is that this process involves all 
sorts of discourse publics in the public sphere.  Gotz uses the example of how ‘reducing 
unemployment’ with respect to that particular project of reality - which in turn falls under 
the rubric of ‘the economy’ as an object of analysis - could not be dealt with effectively 
simply by using the savoir ‘how to move away from apartheid’.  He sees ‘the moment of 
transition’ (in South Africa) as being strung out into a permanent and pervasive savoir 
through which every perceived challenge was then read.127  He also says by way of 
qualification to his critical tone however, that ‘revolutionary savoirs such as conceiving 
the link between poverty and fertility do not come along everyday’.128  Presumably the 
same applies to the search for savoirs in relation to unemployment.   
 
Generalizing in the way Gotz does here does not hint at how important and useful the 
concepts suggests they could be - since the first instance he refers to is no doubt 
oversimplified for (justified) polemical purposes, and the latter no doubt involved quite a 
lot more conceptual legwork than Gotz implies was involved.  The concepts at work here 
lead me to ask the question, why should we not consider this ‘qualitative aspect’, 
incorporating the admittedly complex workings referred to by Foucault, Fraser and many 
other, important ingredients in mapping how the public sphere (and importantly, in this 
instance, its relation to political consciousness formation for the sake of policy 
ultimately) is actually constituted? 
 
Consider the following example of a likely policy-making process: if we think of the 
entire process through which the policy of ‘mentoring in the South African workplace’ 
comes to be established it cannot be denied that Gotz’s and Fraser’s (read for ‘needs’ and 
‘rights’ talk instead ‘interests’ or ‘values’ or ‘project’) conception of policy and the 
public sphere are at work (although Gotz does not directly theorise the actual social and 
political action implied by his particular policy-making theorisation). Remember the aim 
is to objectively consider how the values communicated in the public sphere might 
impact on political consciousness formation.  
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Take the following drawing out of logic in political policy-making in the African 
National Congress (ANC)-led Alliance, by (then) Deputy President Thabo Mbeki, and 
the implied connection this entails to civil society and the public sphere.129  ‘Mentoring’ 
as a government policy is arrived at as roughly as follows:  
 
We start with the following admirable goal: a ‘non-racial’ South Africa.  This in 
turn requires the upliftment of the ‘black majority’, which requires equality with the 
‘white section of the population’.  To do that requires ‘addressing racial imbalances 
in our society (through) affirmative action; as an example of one policy instrument.  
In order, according to then-vice president Mbeki, to do so successfully requires that 
the future (black) candidates for ‘Director-General’s in the public service, 
professors, judges, and financial managers’ be trained and educated.  Mbeki 
continues: ‘taking into account that these black applicants are most likely not to be 
as well prepared as their white counterparts applying for study places, the 
educational institutions would also decide that it would discount the under 
preparedness of the black applicants.’  The vagaries of policy-making then lead him 
to suggest ‘bridging courses to enable black students to cope’ with the syllabuses, 
therefore not impairing the overall objective of the course itself.  What follows in 
the next step in the ladder of policies, as they cascade forth toward dry land (a non-
racial South Africa) from the ship of state?  Once there is a pool of available 
qualified candidates a company can change its management structure by employing 
a ‘black MBA graduate to understudy its current white finance manager’ and play 
its role in creating a non-racial South Africa.   
 
In getting from A to B - from Policy White Paper to legal injunctions - the steps are: A, 
A2, A3, A4…B, rather than simply A to B.  And the entailment of A2 by A1, or A4 by 
A3, or B by A8 is by no means self-evident, as Gotz’s picture of how good policy is 
made suggests.  This applies likewise to any policy area, or political goal, and however 
self evident the measures taken to reach it appear; there are and were always foreseeable 
alternatives at each calculation.     
 
Involved in each step (what is rejected in each step is even less easy to discern by those 
who make the decision as well as their remote democratic interlocutors, the public) is a 
process involving many different organisations, public and less public debates.  As shown 
previously Habermas and other deliberative democrats see the public sphere(s) as a place 
in which reasons which can be publicly endorsed come to influence the reasons 
(including those which should be inadmissible) offered by the administration for 
particular laws.   
 
1. 9 The public sphere(s) as the setting of settings: saving Habermas from himself? 
 
That is all very well, but the argument is that in proffering accounts of power that claim 
to show the power dynamic to be insular, the true nature of this relation between civil 
society and the state is often insufficiently theorised, deliberately ideological, overly 
naïve, or inadequately articulated.   
 
Byron Reinstra and Derek Hook have argued that,  
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‘the danger involved in taking Habermas’ earlier approach to communicative action 
and applying it in literal fashion to deliberative politics is that we end up with a 
political theory that has little to say about political structure – except to condemn it as 
an agent of distortion. For under communicative rationality – especially in its 
counterfactual extreme of the ‘ideal speech situation’ – the only force that applies is 
that of the better argument. Decision is ideally secured by consensus; implementation 
of the decision is secured only by the commitment of the individuals involved to the 
content of the consensus; and subsequent compliance relies on free consent. Such a 
sequence is not easily related to real-world political institutions and processes, 
especially those in complex and plural societies.’130  
 
Arguments about the political structure, decisions made therein and background 
conceptualisations leading to those decisions, are I aver, possible; and Hook and Reinstra 
are correct to point out how applying Habermas to real life has little to say about political 
structure, but this is to become confused over the totally normative nature of Habermas’ 
project.   
 
Contra Reinstra and Hook, whose critique is I argue only a partial rendition of the most 
appreciable problem with Habermas’ theory, the major problem with Habermas’ idealism 
is that the normative expectations it rightly encourages can be too literally interpreted. 
This need not be the case. An accurate appreciation for what is by definition not ideal but 
certainly not as tainted as the normative theory implies by its strictness (and vagueness) is 
possible. 
 
In a stab at Habermas’ conception of the deliberative rationality model of discourse John 
Keane says, ‘gone are the days when intellectuals could suppose that media of 
communication serve continually to correct and refine and autonomously control their 
own utterances (as David Hume thought was the chief advantage of the printing 
press)’.131 The ‘ideal speech situation’ is thus anything but guaranteed.   
 
While Keane’s observations on communicative abundance also show that power is no 
longer so easily able to hide its motives and justifications, the ‘communicative 
abundance’ of the (post) modern era means attention of audiences is thinly and broadly 
stretched.  He thus calls for realism and an end to use of the ‘solar imagery’ of the ‘public 
sphere’ – where the proponents of the values of the enlightenment supposedly shone light 
on the dark workings of unanswerable power. 
 
Following Keane, my own position lies somewhere between Hook and Reinstras’, and 
Habermas’. While Hook and Reinstra cynically argue that Habermas’ idealism is 
counterproductive for real world policy process analysis, what I argue essentially is that 
the normative intent of Habermas’ theorisation on how communicative power should 
influence the administration can be seen to be a legitimate normative project, but as 
regards how that ‘siege’ by public opinion actually occurs, Habermas sells himself – as 
do many others who see and argue the value in this project - short. 
 
‘Revisionist’ critical social theorists (many of them deliberative democrats) are correct in 
‘locating domination in the same symbolic dimension in which individuals and groups 
form an image of their will and their situation’ (unlike the ‘old’ radical critical theorists 
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who locate(d) domination in institutional facts or functional imperatives to which 
collectives responded mechanically),132 but since ‘negative utopian constructs recall what 
is irredeemably lost’133 (as Keane warns against) they tend to grossly undervalue what 
does exist, I argue.  
 
The idealized public sphere of the polis - even as nuanced and intelligently reworked a 
concept as Habermas’ ‘potential of the public sphere’ - is just that, ideal. It is mistaken to 
believe Habermas correctly conceptualises how the public sphere actually lays siege to 
the administration, but it is mistaken to think he ever thought to do that. There are other 
useful models for understanding how one might better critically appraise the ‘formation 
of political consciousness’ in a democracy  
 
The worst effect of this type of theory is to induce an under appreciation for the actual 
occurrence of dissonance and widespread democratic consultation because of the false 
perspective it induces. Adopting an overly idealistic stance often issues for instance in 
overly simplistic analyses of the public sphere allowing (either consciously or otherwise) 
for certain claims to continue to hold water.  These can be generalised to mistakenly 
indict large swathes of the democratic order, thus devaluing critique in-itself.   
 
The question arising, in surveying characterisations of domination allegedly pervading 
the public sphere, is whether they adequately capture the range of different types of 
‘communication practises’, of the variety hinted at above, and the relation which holds 
between them ala Nancy Fraser’s suggestive theorisation?  
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Chapter Two 
Domination in Post-Apartheid Democratic South Africa: Getting to 
Grips with Institutional and Identity Changes? 
 
The image of a ‘solar’ public sphere that impacts on the workings of potentially secretive 
and undemocratic governance is both illuminating and distorting at the same time as 
argued. How is what has been argued about the possible under- or misdiagnosis of the 
nature of the public sphere applicable to theorisation about South Africa’s nascent 
democracy?  
 
What follows is an attempt to show firstly that a need to reconsider critical diagnoses of 
the health of South Africa’s (the same might be said of any particular polity one chose to 
focus on) democracy exists. In the second place the argument that a particular type of 
theorisation on democratic politics in South Africa based on particular well worn 
assumptions further distorts objective theorisation on our political culture is presented.  
 
Finally, once a case has been made along those lines I argue it is possible to take both 
these insights, and using the reconstructed concept of the public sphere from chapter one, 
illustrate with empirical material (the case study in chapter three) that in order to attempt 
to present unbiased democratic theory applying such a theoretical corrective in political 
analysis in South Africa is warranted. It is quite possible, however, that once under this 
theoretical lens other aspects of the functioning of South Africa’s democracy would show 
it to be in need of significantly democratic reforms.   
 
2. 1 High hopes: fairly deep troughs 
 
According to Greenstein ‘scholarly literature on transitions in contemporary South Africa 
focuses on the social dimension of power, discusses to a limited and insufficient extent 
the institutional dimension, and largely ignores the discursive dimension of power.’134  
Greenstein maintains that ‘little attention has been paid to the need to transform the ways 
in which state power is conceptualised and exercised, and the ways in which it interacts 
with society.’135   
 
I argue that while this might appear superficially to be the case given that many past and 
present debates on South Africa’s emerging power equation have become dominated by 
those who seek to see the state listen to particular voices representing what they allege to 
be legitimate interests or perspectives, much analysis of ‘state structures, mechanisms 
and practices, shifting relations between institutions and forces, and discourses that shape 
their operation’136 has taken place.  Why then might these not spring to mind?  
 
Critics of many stripes have tended to under- or misdiagnose the space in which power in 
South Africa has operated since the end of minority rule, leading to generalized calls for 
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increased participation and consultation.137 These orthodox critical perspectives are not 
confined to any particular recognizable political class, or sector of society.  Instead they 
emanate from the traditional left and right, and almost everything in between.   
 
This was not a situation widely predicted.  Cosatu, the civics, and the ANC participating 
in a host of negotiating forums in sectors like metropolitan government, housing and 
electrification, with the outgoing regime and organised business, which constituted a 
‘new and relatively structured inter-penetration of state and civil society’ according to 
Mark Orkin.138   
 
A point that deserves making is that the orthodox critical perspective has understandably 
had an inordinate effect on theorisation about South Africa’s contemporary politics. 
Arguments that currently monopolise this theoretical space are informed by voices that 
have gone before in characterising South African democracy in a particular mould.  What 
these theorists assert in a broad sense - informed by all manner of argument about how 
best to characterise the sociological make-up of the society under question, and the 
prevalence of what they assert are particular critical sociological factors (often portrayed 
as interest positions based on an entrenched political identity) - is that in the case of 
South Africa the transition to democracy was of a particular character, and that given 
that, in order to ‘qualify’ as a vibrant democracy certain conditions ought to prevail to 
sustain that badge of ‘being a democracy’.  
 
Some have pessimistically asserted after their evaluation of the present situation 
(involving an evaluation of ‘interrelated elements of a substantive democracy’) – 
amounting as they do to the collation of data into numerous ‘scientific’ indices of what 
would constitute democracy in this South Africa – that ‘it has to be concluded that 
apartheid, in its collapse, spawned the democracy it deserved’.139 This cynical view has it 
that after the negotiated political settlement with its formulas for fair representation, the 
dilemma of political centralisation and minority alienation set in, and even entrenched 
racial polarisation.140   
 
No less volubly, critics to the left tend to accuse the state of ‘relegating citizens to the 
non-political realm of civil society’ which simply ‘reinforces existing power relations 
within the private realm, and privileges those already powerful interests over grass-roots 
groups and constituencies’.141  Although both these camps have within them numerous 
shades of grey and glimmers of red (‘it seems increasingly unlikely that open 
confrontation with the repressive power of the post-apartheid state can be avoided’142), 
they have both tended to characterise the state as increasingly brooking ‘neither criticism 
not sanctioned policy alternatives’143, even allegedly resulting ultimately in ‘large 
numbers of black and progressive white intellectuals in South Africa withdrawing from 
public debate, making society poorer for their silence’.144   
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Janet Cherry wrote somewhat optimistically in 2001 of a 1995 South African National 
Civics Organisation-organised march symbolising the resident’s refusal to pay for 
recently installed services, which the ANC-dominated Transitional Local Council 
criticized, that while the ANC ‘may be willing to tolerate opposition expressed within the 
parliamentary framework, or from other political parties within the realms of ‘formal’, 
liberal politics, it is not prepared to countenance dissent from the more radical informal 
political spectrum’.145  Local residents appeared unhappy with the processes through 
which local ANC candidates were elected, although Cherry says 97 per cent of the local 
residents voted for the ANC.  She further noted that of those she interviewed many 
indicated they would rather engage in internal ANC politicking in order to voice their 
grievances than vote for non-ANC candidates; some even indicated using other channels 
such as radio talk shows, or getting in contact with their councillors.  The march serves as 
evidence then that stronger communal action was not eschewed either.  Cherry concludes 
by opining that the evidence points to the health of democracy in urban townships in 
Kwazakele.  But from ‘day one’ concerns that there was exclusion from participation in 
our new democracy were evident.  These developments and the numerous forms in which 
they manifested began to worry analysts more. While this type of action clearly would 
not sit well with local councillors, Cherry advises that it be viewed as a form of 
democratic participation.146
 
The reason for introducing this synopsis is not to debate whether or not the type of action 
described is a legitimate form of democratic participation or not, or to make the case that 
although not often successful, this type of dilemma signals the ANC’s (however 
reluctantly) brooks criticism, but rather to introduce analysis that concludes of this 
alleged political development, that it symbolises the kind of hope held out at that stage - 
hope which played a significant (unintended) role in the genesis of later widespread 
disappointments and dissatisfaction with the emerging shape of the public sphere.  
 
It has now become for some analysts, since the installation of the new dispensation under 
constitutional democracy, almost obligatory to cite examples of alleged unnerving signs 
of antidemocratic practise within the state at large, or the ruling party itself which 
illustrate that asserted fact, and then to continue undeterred and brazen into hopeful or 
less so reverie, about the possibilities of reversing that trend.   
 
For instance, in 1998 Webster stated that, ‘since the ANC’s assumption of state power it 
has had access to the resources and capabilities provided for by a modern state 
bureaucracy.  A recent Cosatu Discussion Document captures this shift: ‘Instead of the 
Alliance being the engine for transformation, policy has in many instances been driven by 
the old bureaucracy, business advisors, economists from the (South African) Reserve 
Bank, the World Bank, etc.  We seem to have ditched the researchers and advisors who 
have served the democratic movement.’’147   
 
Still others - who would probably characterise themselves as aspiring to be ‘above the 
fray’ for particular reasons to do with traits typically associated with intellectuals being 
non partisan, such as Richard Calland148 - have attempted to offer a bird’s eye view of 
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what has gone before them, by analysing the ‘anatomy of power’ in South Africa, and 
asserting (rather pithily) that ‘it is those who have adapted best to this new culture of 
dialogue and process that have sustained or acquired political power’.149  The question is 
and remains what ‘new culture of dialogue and process’?  Like many before him Calland 
presents a journalistic tour of events which he deems representative of how political 
consciousness formation occurs in post-apartheid South Africa.  Yet his account relies as 
much as any other on selective memory to push the conclusions he does: ‘many of them 
(new institutions) are important, but not yet terribly influential’.150  And as with many 
other conclusions drawn from the depiction of events, as hinted at above, selectivity and 
interpretation are rife.  
 
Of course critiques of the state of play within the emerging democratic dispensation all 
focus on different and particular aspects of the political system, which play a role in the 
outcome they assert.  Ultimately what they aspire to is to present a story of how political 
consciousness formation should occur, and how given the evidence they present, 
shortcomings of greater or lesser significance are visible.  Certain facets of the political 
order are inevitably valued or focussed on over others in making the argument that such-
and-such ought to occur to rectify the unacceptable situation; or somewhat less hopefully, 
that since the depiction of the situation represents the prevalence of the following state of 
affairs, we ought to mourn.  
 
2. 2 Reality check 
 
Does the continuing unchecked assertion of particular tendencies entail for concerned 
social scientists that in order to attain ‘objectivity’ in depicting the magnitude of different 
structural barriers to democratic participation that the only resort is to refer back to 
official constitutional principles perhaps, and furnish positive counter examples, in the 
fashion of some sort of rough balance sheet?   
 
I argue that while this is an option it is not the sole fallback.  Here the tendency to offer 
accounts of how civil society has managed to hold government accountable, or how there 
has been a failure to do so, abound. Greenstein for instance writes that ‘beyond service 
delivery partnerships with government, and playing a watchdog role in monitoring its 
performance, civil society organisations may challenge the way power is conceptualised 
and exercised by supporting community struggles, social movements and popular 
campaigns that contest the uses to which state power is put; and take part in the reshaping 
of social life outside the control of state authorities. Obviously this will not be done by 
civil society as a whole but by those elements within it that share a critical perspective on 
the state.’ He goes on to detail how this has thus far taken place, and how these 
organizations have, with or without conventional civil society, managed to influence 
government policy through a variety of tactics that centre predominantly on activating the 
means necessary to fulfill accorded rights, such as the arguments of the legal 
community.151  
 
A further and related option for those who demand continuing objectivity exists in 
arguing that while this is an option, the nature of the public sphere was likely 
misrepresented from the word go, through being supported by reliance firstly, on ‘one 
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party dominance’ arguments, and secondly, on too idealistic premises - involving 
consensus democracy and constructive ‘partnership’ - whose logic and the effect thereof 
on accurate theorisation is portrayed throughout chapter one.  
 
In the first place the one party dominance perspective circumscribes the objective search 
for evidence of a healthy democratic culture through general ignominy, and secondly, as 
a result of underlying premises of an ideal public sphere too narrow or encumbered a 
definition of the activity that does or did in fact constitute public conversation about 
values, goals and means prevails.   
 
Dissatisfaction with particular political outcomes has bred a malaise in political critique 
which tends to focus on seminal cases of state policy,152 or actors who present their self-
understanding as it allegedly relates to power and political consciousness formation as 
epitomizing a sociological fact. In the process the significance of said instances is over-
represented to the eventual detriment of necessary ongoing objective and productive 
critique of South Africa’s democratic culture.   
 
If a better and more objective understanding of the quality of our democracy is to emerge, 
than what might constitute one of the most realistic positive understandings yet - that 
democracy in South Africa (a simple working assumption admittedly) still operates in a 
highly fluid political environment in which a wide range of institutional and other 
experiments continue in the daily unpredictability of public life,153 making it difficult to 
propose a model to help understand how policy decisions are made - we will surely have 
to operate on the basis of one, better theory, and two, a more accurate depiction of the 
relation between the political and public sphere. 
 
It would now appear that another significant positive - albeit in a negative sense - 
characterisation of the public sphere and accompanying democratic culture in South 
Africa is presented by theorists who argue that the existence of innovative actors in civil 
society which they have dubbed ‘new’ social movements represents a ‘belief by those 
who participate that they need to force a shift in society’s dominant values’.154  Only ‘a 
belief’ mind you. One is tempted to ask if that is that all their existence represents? Is it 
the case that these movements arise as a result of debate being constrained, and the 
hegemonic rise of particular values incapable of being overturned; or that the actors in 
question see a distinct chance of positively influencing the values, solutions to identified 
problems and debates that make up the national agenda?   
 
Writing with Western Europe in mind Helmut Dubiel says ‘Large segments of the 
political and socioscientific public of the 1980’s quite unlike the leftists generations of 
the 1950’s and 1960’s – were fascinated by social developments that tended to contradict 
rather than corroborate the conclusion that total domination (in its manifold 
manifestations) was being established’.155  The same might be argued for contemporary 
South Africa.  But as argued one would not think so given the diffusion of alleged 
evidence to the contrary.  That accounts of political and public processes have tended to 
become sclerotic is in fact a theoretical possibility alluded to by the author in chapter one 
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– and it is this indefensible scenario which explains the underestimation of a number of 
facets of public life in contemporary South Africa and the widespread continuance of 
skewed orthodox critiques.   
 
In order to better appreciate the argument it is necessary to trace and follow the roots of 
this tendency to despair, from which I argue most critiques of the current state of the 
democratic ethos unfortunately stem.   
 
2. 3 Foundations of local critique in democratic consolidation theory 
 
It might not be far fetched to argue that South Africa is a country obsessed with Fairness.  
Without qualifying this statement it is of course totally banal.  By ‘fairness’ I refer 
particularly to broad processes set in motion leading up to and ending racially-based 
minority rule.   
 
In conjunction with and supplementing or crystallizing out of the popular struggle to end 
apartheid, this obsession encompasses and comprises years of debate about ideal political 
processes - represented initially by the humble ‘qualified franchise’ debate156 which was 
‘popularised’ by the apartheid-era United Party; the National Party’s (NP) failed 
experiments with the Tri-cameral Parliament (and the perplexing ‘homeland’ policy); the 
Convention for a Democratic South Africa (Codesa),157 and the Transitional Executive 
Council with the accompanying subcouncils appended to it as recommended by that 
structures’ technical committee (all of the official pre-democratic era)158, as well as the 
Transitional Local Councils referred to earlier.  The interim constitution served as a 
model of consensus democracy committing the cabinet to rule according to the principle 
of consensus.159   
 
2. 3. 1 The transition  
 
The manner of South Africa’s transition to democracy was exhaustively analysed, as it 
was held that the nature of the transition would largely determine what chances the 
country had of maintaining, or consolidating democracy.  Both the analysis of the nature 
of the transition, and what chances this implied for successfully consolidating democracy 
relied heavily on the work of theorists such as Schmitter and O’Donnell who bought a 
simple theoretical understanding of what is entailed in classifying what constitutes a 
legitimate democratic regime,160 combined with attempts to generalize about what it was 
across different (allegedly comparative) cases of democratisation-in-action that had 
ensured alleged success at subsequently consolidating democracy in those instances.   
 
Notwithstanding the questionable theoretical base from which such attempts begin, these 
various assorted tableau were then applied by theorists to particular countries in the hope 
of identifying (mixing and matching) their particular sociological-institutional 
characteristics, allegedly making the country in question prone to likely democratic 
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success or failure.  It is not difficult to imagine which ‘international opinion’161 these 
earnest attempts were meant to inform.  The indicators which are applied in measuring 
how consolidated a particular democracy is, are numerous.  They range from formal to 
less formal requirements such as democracy being the ‘only game in town’, to particular 
socio-economic requirements, demands that power alternate after the second election, and 
even that it change over to another party twice.162   
 
In his cursory analysis of how the type, or mode of transition, has been held to inform 
later efforts at analysing the state of democratic consolidation, and how this was perhaps 
a worthwhile exercise163 Van Vuuren saw it fit to mention as an afterthought, that while 
one of these above-mentioned consolidation gurus saw ‘real’ democratic consolidation 
(ongoing critical stability) as involving new types of actors, rules, decision-making sites, 
and new problems, rather than simply a continuation of previously successful actors and 
strategies from the transition phase, he also saw parliament and interest associations as 
sites where the consolidation of a particular type of democracy was likely to be 
decided.164   
 
In the days before official or formal democracy the transition NP government accorded 
some respect to the wishes of the soon-to-be ruling power, allowing it to limit the 
temporary government’s powers on a range of issues (or at least inform it), where it had 
previously had the power to do as it wished to a great degree (although elements of 
corporatism existed in South African political decision-making from the 1960’s 
onwards165), and cementing what some saw as a valuable bargaining relationship which 
conceded enough but not to much to those who would possibly become restless, to ensure 
their backing for the incipient power dynamics.166  The hope was that this situation would 
continue, and the belief was that the decision-making sites were by and large adequate to 
the task of ‘joint rule’.   
 
At the time of South Africa’s democratic transition Van Vuuren, largely in agreement 
with the depiction of the transition arrangement described above, wrote (doubtless not 
without concern for his reputation as a political forecaster) that despite the varied 
definitions of the term ‘democratic consolidation’ the existence of democracy in South 
Africa was so new that to attempt to define democracy as consolidated or otherwise, 
whatever indicators were applied, was so premature as to be meaningless. He did 
however make a cursory effort at prediction; first noting the ongoing need for analysts to 
bear in mind the relation between the mode of transition and the likelihood of democratic 
consolidation167, then having a stab at categorising for us the nature of the transition, and 
thereafter using the comparative method of the democratic consolidation theorists to 
hazard a broad set of predictions as to the possible quality of our future democracy.168     
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That baton which Van Vuuren practised running with was also taken up en masse by 
other analysts.  Once the formalities had been settled and we were on our way to that 
situation which has been characterised as the ANC being ‘at pains to respect formal 
democracy’ Van Vuuren’s (Schmittian-inspired) afterthought about the other sites of 
decision-making begins to prefigure in important ways, becoming ostensibly the next 
theoretical step for these commentators.   
 
2. 3. 2 Consolidation proper 
 
Once the incumbent regime and its supporting cast of ‘actors’ has been firmly enough 
embedded in new ‘decision-making site(s)’, abiding by certain ‘rules’, and responding to 
‘new problems’, the time inevitably comes for the theorist to decide on whether this 
(these) new decision-making site(s) are in fact adequate (conducive to democracy): 
‘parliament and interest associations are the sites where the consolidation of a particular 
type of democracy is likely to be decided’.169   
 
This, what I have dubbed (perhaps facetiously) ‘obsession with fairness’, continues 
unabated into the era when the ANC as the governing party has been characterised as ‘at 
pains to respect formal democracy’: an era beginning roughly after the Mandela 
presidency.170   
 
This is by no means a phenomenon exclusive to South Africa, and remains the bugbear of 
those who claim on the other hand that this formal democracy is in fact representative of 
something deserving of more respect.  So fairness is still at issue: is our new democracy 
worth the paper upon which it is written?   
 
The question by some seems to be:  
 
‘The game rules are followed, but are the sides in this compulsory game so 
mismatched as to make the always-weaker of the sides playing (voluntarily, 
admittedly, but essential to the game itself.   All would prefer to see it continue 
and be part of it, as life without this game is horrible, and another side does not 
seem likely to present itself as an opponent in the eventuality of the weaker sides 
demise) likely to be crushed to death?  The answer is often ‘yes’ from the small 
side’s captain and vice-captain, but minor players dispute that they are being 
crushed, just that they should enjoy a little more time on the field of play 
(whichever side that happens to be, but hopefully the winning side!) instead of 
being relegated almost permanently to the substitutes bench.’ 
 
What game are we referring to? Less metaphorically put the ‘substance of our liberal 
democracy’ might be the best way of describing the subject matter of the concerned 
analysts that now run with the political analyst’s baton.171  And as will become clearer 
they are somewhat surprisingly very numerous and diverse.  By now what constitutes so-
called formal democracy seems to have become a fait accompli which is worthy of little 
more than a footnote or cursory mention in subsequent analyses of the recent and current 
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state of affairs.  The real issues which should concern us are by now far more difficult to 
pin down.  They amount to questioning the quality of the processes making up the new 
decision-making site(s), whether the rules are flexible enough, the new problems diverse 
enough, and the actors either representative and/or diverse enough.  By now the question 
is: what constitutes the putative reasons for the façade?   
 
What follows is an outline of how we arrived at this widespread concern with the 
discussion topics and what is deemed unworthy of discussion, and that those who wish to 
raise particular discussion topics or points in discussions are ignored unreasonably: with a 
lack of consolidation in other words.   
 
It will be shown further that this concern is now not limited to those analysts thus far 
discussed. The charge that South Africa’s democracy is little more than formal, or more 
strongly put, ‘illiberal’, extends to a growing variety of actors.  The reasons for this are 
by no means uncomplicated but I attempt to explain the continuing faith in the truth of 
this portrayal, by analysing after the fact the nature of the transition and the self 
perception of the actors who maintain, either, one, that democracy is ‘illiberal’, or two, 
that the promise of the transition and post-transition forums has long evaporated.   
 
What I argue for is the existence of a burgeoning case for seriously doubting the accuracy 
and even honesty of those who swear by the account of what it is that would constitute 
the elements of a ‘substantive democracy’. A possible theoretical corrective to this 
tendency has already been outlined in chapter one, and in chapter three an exploratory 
example of how and where to apply such a theory is presented. 
 
2. 3. 3 Two roads converge: an affair of convenience for orthodox critics? 
 
Geoff Schreiner points out that the government’s legitimacy crisis of the 1990’s in turn 
provoked a policy crisis and that ‘long and bitter struggles were fought to establish a 
wide variety of new representative policy forums – in economic matters, ‘manpower’, 
education, training, health, local government, housing, electricity, and so on.’172  I argue 
that it would not be untoward to include here the arrangements for collaboration under 
the Transitional Executive Council, which some saw as possibly useful in ‘sustaining the 
compromise’ going forward – this culture of bargain-making.173   
 
The proposal that the forums that came after the transition - continuing well into the 
democratic era - were established not entirely for the same reasons as some of those 
during the transition, but for reasons that amounted, for all intents and purposes to little 
besides those of the significance of some of the prior forums, ‘sounding boards’174, would 
not be widely disputed.  One of the major unintended consequences of this period of 
negotiation was that it led to great confusion about what to expect going forward.  This 
culture of deal-making came to characterise the style of politics and led to many 
unfulfilled expectations across the board.  Accepting this has been difficult for those who 
held out great hope for them, but their vocal disappointment has been detrimental to the 
broader debate, and has in fact skewed analytical precision – and in an oddly perverse 
and sad way, to the detriment of the broader case they and their allies make.  They tend 
simply to endlessly raise the ire of their alliance partners, without being able to settle on a 
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characterisation (and offer a believable one) of the wider procedural questions.  This is 
ultimately a burden of proof - which in failing to respond to adequately - they labour 
under almost unnecessarily.   
 
Furthermore, and equally importantly, this like the amplified fear of consolidation 
theorists, has led to a distortion in analysis of the public sphere in South Africa.  Those 
who feel slighted have been able to accuse the state of ‘illiberal’ tendencies and over-
centralisation without appreciating that something approaching the scenario they loathe 
was bound to happen, and was in fact legitimate; but equally that their paranoia has 
diminished the hope for objective analysis.   
 
A permanent red herring in our public conversation has been the result, and not 
surprisingly the red herring serves simultaneously as a red flag to a bull (the ideologues 
of the ANC and state). 
 
Webster writes that in ‘the euphoria that arose after February 1990 with the unbanning of 
the liberation organisations and the return of the exiled and imprisoned leaders, most 
Cosatu members assumed that their organizations would play a central role in the 
Alliance’.175 All those who felt they had a legitimate case for being included going 
forward did.  Webster goes on to note that the time at which these hopes gained purchase 
was ironically precisely the moment when internationally notions of alternative forms of 
democracy vanished. 
 
Schreiner had argued in 1994 that whether forums developed into working corporatist 
arrangements depended on the development of certain factors such as whether civil 
society remains fragile and weak, giving organised labour and business free reign to 
engage government176, or whether the gap between negotiators and their grass roots 
constituencies continued to grow, and constituencies become uninterested in endless 
‘forums’.  This outcome would determine the future corporatist scenario.177  He also 
argues that the form of public policy making that might develop from the fluid 
arrangements that existed at the time, could be a type not dissimilar to that of the mid-
1980’s, where interest groups relied in large measure on secret lobbies with politicians 
and state bureaucrats; or alternately there might emerge a weak form of corporatism 
which is a mix of scenarios.178  It is not important that his preference was for a weak 
corporatism that did not favour entrenched interests over more participative 
arrangements. 
 
Schreiner’s emphasis on the fluidity of the policy-making process at the time and his 
musings on how things might pan out appear naïve in retrospect given what was to occur 
in a few short years.  But are they?  Another feature of political analysis that came to 
dominate political analysis in South Africa after the ANC victory in the April 1994 
elections was how Cosatu (upon whom many had pinned their hopes for a strong form of 
corporatism, or ‘working corporatism’ as laid out by Schreiner) having played a crucial 
role in securing an ANC victory at the polls, and then seeing many of its leaders leave the 
organisation, came to be lauded as a possible left pressure group (and later a possible 
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opposition party in-itself) given its autonomy within the ruling alliance.179   This was the 
beginning of a long and torturous road of self-discovery for the left-leaning within and 
outside the alliance; as well as for the right180 as stated. The understandable and growing 
pessimism of ‘the right’ came to dominate the left ironically. 
 
Thereafter analysis of the Tripartite Alliance began to be dominated by accounts of 
whether ‘democratic policy determination practises…beginning to establish themselves 
within the alliance’ had ‘survived the 1994 election’.181  Lodge argued of policy 
processes within the ANC-led alliance that ‘comparative experience suggests the ruling 
party’s activist community will play a declining role in government decision making’ and 
that ‘interest articulation has become increasingly difficult’ within mature democracies, 
as ‘political parties support has spread with their transition from being mobilisational to 
‘catch-all’ agencies’.182  It is this alleged fact which has been exhaustively argued and 
diagnosed in the last ten years in South Africa, often in respect of particular policies.183  
 
Putative evidence for the wider claims about South Africa’s democratic space tend to 
emerge from these kinds of case studies, and indeed so much significance has been 
invested in projects imbued with this narrative by the media184 that evidence to the 
contrary would now be difficult to sell to even those who consider themselves generally 
impartial in the matter.  The variety of evidence presented for the lack of democracy 
within the ANC and the state more generally has come to dominate the tone of all 
analyses of democratic culture. The focus became one of bemoaning for instance ‘the 
relative marginalization of a developmentalist policy in the corridors of economic power’ 
and thereafter analysing the implications of ‘contestation over the neo-liberal economic 
strategy finding expression through various forms of mass action, including strikes, land 
invasions, and student rebellions.’185   
 
A related method of furthering the attack on the substance of South Africa’s democracy 
has been to present the picture of the ANC’s increasing bureaucratisation and the manner 
in which the ‘communist tail is no longer able to wag the ANC dog’ – while adding in 
order to complement this, an account of how for instance the decision by the New NP in 
2001 to leave the Democratic Alliance (DA) as stand alone official opposition, signified 
‘to many’ the ‘increasingly unassailable dominance of the ANC and the hollowness of 
South African democracy’.186   
 
It has been argued that the ANC’s ‘formidable moral power’ and the manner in which it 
uses this power has come to constitute its method of degrading sections of the opposition, 
so that in fact events have conspired to make democracy nothing more than formal.  For 
these critics the ANC’s protection of capitalist interests has been necessary, by and large, 
‘for the promotion of the interests of the new black elite’187; and over and above this the 
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vital fact is that, cynically to say the least, it ‘has to be concluded that apartheid, in its 
collapse, spawned the democracy it deserved’.188   
 
 
2. 4 What might then be ideal? 
 
One of the problems with this quite shallow undifferentiated type of critique of 
democratic functioning (and by implication the strength of any suggested corrective) is 
that, as Greenstein notes, 
 
‘The analyses (of the left and right) offer different and opposed political viewpoints, 
but they share an understanding of politics as a forum for representation of and 
struggle between consolidated interest groups. What is missing from such analysis, 
however, is precisely what is unique and interesting about the state and civil society 
as spaces of power: the extent to which they create and shape rather than merely 
reflect pre-existing social interests and identities; the specific organisational logics 
developed and deployed within their boundaries…the contestation over the 
meanings of widely-used concepts (such as development, empowerment, 
transformation and capacity building), which may be interpreted and applied in 
many different ways; and the local and global alliances formed between actors in 
different locations, which undermine the notion of internally homogenous and 
externally bounded sectors.’189
 
Of course, as hinted at earlier, in order to overturn dominant interpretation it will not do 
to simply assert that what Greenstein suggests regarding political reality and what 
political analysts might be missing exists, simply by showing that such and such an actor 
does manage to imprint their values on the policy process or public conversation in the 
course of this struggle in the ‘spaces of power’.  Rather the foundations for such an 
interpretation of the situation have to be shown to firstly, exist in theory, and secondly the 
extent to which evidence exists that proves whatever has been asserted about that space, 
determined through analysis.   
 
As a consequence of the portrayal of South Africa as a ‘virtual democracy’ it has for 
instance been confidently asserted that ‘perhaps the advisors to the negotiators of South 
Africa’s new democracy should have given more serious consideration to balancing the 
numerical principle with more substantial provisions for the incorporation of minority 
interests than they did.’  This would involve defining districts from which representatives 
of minorities could emerge and represent their interests in ‘a second chamber 
approximating the US Senate’.190   
 
This formulation assumes that these interests which these minority representatives would 
be so interested to defend against rapacious majorities are forever set in stone (and not 
sufficiently protected by the constitution), that ‘majoritarian hegemony’ cannot be 
‘assumed without justification to best serve the poor black majority’191 and that above all 
it would seem therefore, politics and policy making is impenetrable to a wider democratic 
                                                     
188 Ibid, p 180. 
189 Greenstein, R, 2003, p 1. The same might be said of the false notion of internally and externally homogenous 
actors and the wider discourses they partake in. 
190 Ibid, p 180 
191 Ibid, p 181 
 55
conversation given parliament’s alleged weakness (and probably) the centralisation of 
power in the state executive.  It is a shamelessly peddled narrative despite the fact that 
party systems the world over are accused of similar bureaucratisation and vulnerablity to 
interest group manipulation, but that the space to influence the actions taken by 
government is widely regarded as existent.  
 
That majoritarian hegemony is held not to best ‘serve the interests of the black majority 
automatically’ is the issue which all agree on; ‘right wing’ critics and those with an 
historically tripartite alliance-affinity.  It is arguably not the overriding concern of the 
official opposition and ‘its’ analysts, that the black majority is not best served that 
bothers, but rather that key minority interests are not adequately secure, given this 
portrayal of the state of affairs.  For the left it is the allegedly centralized power 
configuration that has become unacceptable.  
 
The structure of the political system and what might be done to counter its allegedly 
destructive effects is an issue which they have less in common on, but on the accusations 
they bring to bear against the status quo, they share much in common.   
 
On that score, for certain sections of the left within the tripartite alliance, this amounts to 
the call to put into action talk of the South African Communist Party (SACP) and Cosatu 
‘hiving off from the ANC to form a left opposition’192 thus putting an end to what 
Southall has characterised as the constant threats of the unbundling of the tripartite 
alliance which have something of the quality of a ‘phoney war’.193 SACP leader, Blade 
Nzimande, recently added his voice to many influential leaders before him from this 
quarter however, saying in an interview with Peter Clottey that it would not be ideal for 
the alliance to break up in this fashion.194
 
While the ‘official opposition’ in the DA and those with ties to it gladly ‘side’ with those 
who feel sidelined in the alliance, and uses this to bolster its case for the ANC’s illiberal 
tendencies, how true is it that much of the case made by these very vocal forces is not 
grossly ideological, resting on oversight, selectivity and rhetoric? 
 
2. 5 Whose civil society, whose state? 
 
So a dominant view of the how the country is currently being run or how political 
consciousness is formed is offered by Krista Johnson when she writes that, ‘Mbeki and 
his followers in the ANC leadership, most of whom are former exiles and were trained in 
the radical Leninist school of thought that gives primacy to the role of the vanguard party 
and revolutionary intellectuals, are finding that the reorganisation of state-society 
relations along conventional liberal lines is quite compatible with their own hierarchical 
understanding of the relationship between rulers and ruled.’195  Furthermore to bolster the 
seeming sense in this portrayal, quite often this characterization is juxtaposed with how 
things ‘used to be’. When Tom Lodge, for instance, argues, ‘for a time it looked as if 
Cosatu’s dirigiste perspectives would be very influential in setting the ANC’s policy 
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agenda’, and that ‘The ANC had developed quite detailed sectoral perspectives… each of 
these was the result of extensive canvassing’.196   
 
‘The change’ is generally depicted as having taken place between the November 1994 
release of the White Paper on the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) - 
which advocated the establishment of ‘structured consultation processes at all levels’ - 
and the closure of the RDP Office in 1996, which saw the adoption of the Growth, 
Employment and Redistribution Programme (GEAR) in June 1996.197  William Gumede 
argues, ‘the adoption of GEAR further undermined civil society groupings’ and ‘ushered 
in a new style of administration’, and saw Mbeki redefine the relationship with civil 
society from 1999.  Gumede qualifies this, saying that some civil society organisations 
‘successfully reoriented themselves to the point where they could compile government 
policy documents, conduct research and monitor service delivery projects’.198  
 
But by-and-large President Mbeki is charged with ‘ascribing to the state the role of 
knowledge producer, able to develop policy and set the agenda for social transformation’ 
with his solution being one of ‘incorporating popular organisations into corporatist 
arrangements with the state, thereby reducing all politics to state politics’.199  The fear 
that this depiction best captures the dominant reality is well captured by McKinley who 
now heads the Anti Privatisation Forum, and who wrote in 2000 that, ‘the reassertion of 
the practices of democratic centralism, tight internal discipline, and strong central 
coordination has provoked accusations that the boundaries for opposition and debate 
within the government, the ANC, and the tripartite alliance have narrowed’,200 almost as 
though debate ought to occur on his terms.  
 
This popular depiction is further borne out by Lodge who writes of party politics, which 
is the other familiar aspect of the argument concerning the flawed ‘structure’ of South 
Africa’s public sphere, that he found no evidence in 1999 that Cosatu or the SACP 
attempted to coordinate ‘former trade unionists and party members in parliament in such 
a way that they represent their respective organisational perspectives on a wider range of 
policy issues’ than labour and industrial legislation (where they were actually well 
represented through emerging corporatist arrangements).201   
 
This understanding also forms the backdrop for discussion of the place of other elements 
of civil society for theorists like Habib who has a broad three-fold categorization of 
contemporary civil society in South Africa, as will shortly be argued.  Although Habib 
and some of those he is sympathetic to in the new social movement sector that inherited 
many of the concerns of the United Democratic Front (UDF) is, like Gumede, well aware 
that positive marginalisation of civil society actors is a very complex terrain ‘uniquely 
informed by the post-apartheid moment in South Africa and the ways in which global and 
local processes of change have come together to marginalise and empower new 
actors’.202   
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For her part, prominent print newspaper editor, Ferial Haffajee, has said she finds herself 
‘tiring quite quickly of rhetoric and labels, of easy victories and magnified import (of 
occasion, impact and size of the new left), of predictable arguments and sketchy research 
that often emanates’ from the social movements and the intellectuals who support 
them.203
 
According to Johnson who expounds a fairly typical position ‘technical aspects of 
securing economic growth, implementing social programmes to reduce poverty and 
inequality, and deracialising the society are likely to take precedence over democratic 
goals like respecting political diversity or extending representation through strengthened 
provincial and local government’.204  According to popular wisdom Mbeki ‘unveiled a 
clear and detailed vision of South Africa that includes reducing poverty, stimulating 
economic growth and development, developing human resources, and creating jobs’ 
backed up by specific proposals at the expense of ‘people-driven participation’.205  One 
might be forgiven for thinking the country one was reading about was Post World War 
Two Japan! 
 
The Presidency’s various proposals and subsequent statements concerning policy choices 
made - usually derived from his annual State of the Nation speeches - are depicted, 
absurdly, as president Mbeki206 having assumed ‘policy perfection’, and being unable to 
learn from past mistakes as a result of the state’s collective leadership mania, and the 
perception of the ANC’s omniscience.207  The ‘main point of access to policy-making for 
the general public and most non-governmental organisations are the parliamentary 
committees’ it is alleged; but the use by the state executive, in its full complement, of 
consultants is viewed as nullifying to a large degree the use of this former democratic 
gain in any case.208
 
As argued, ample attempts have been made subsequently to flesh out that ‘configuration 
of factors’ which, depending on how they panned out would determine what kind of a 
democracy we would nurture; and scholarly opinion appears quite unanimous in asserting 
that what we currently appear to have in South Africa is a form of political power which 
Schreiner characterised in 1994 as a ‘form of public policy making very similar to the 
mid 1980’s where interest groups relied in large measure on secret lobbies with 
politicians and state bureaucrats’.209 How similar this is to the analysis offered by ‘the 
right’ of the opposition - ‘apartheid, in its collapse, spawned the democracy it 
deserved’210 - is a matter of debate certainly, but the fundamentals are presumed settled.  
 
Johnson went so far as to boldly conclude in 2002 that ‘the challenge confronting those 
concerned with promoting popular democracy and participatory forms of development is 
not simply to oppose the liberal paradigm and promote a leftist or socialist alternative’ 
but given the ANC leadership’s understanding of the relationship between political and 
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civil society ‘popular democracy requires nothing less than a redefinition of the form of 
state, and how it relates to social forces’.211   
 
2. 6 South Africa’s public sphere: let’s be fair 
 
Raymond Suttner argues that some of the current advisors on sustainable democracy have 
concerns and criteria for assessment that ‘are open to question’, including the identified 
problem that the ANC has failed to adapt to ‘normal’ politics and remains a liberation 
movement’.212  
 
Similarly, in trying to present a more ‘positive analysis of South Africa’s democratic 
prospects’ as a foil to ‘conventional arguments provided by local and international doom-
mongers’ Heidi Leigh Mattison argues ‘the minority feels unable to influence policy but 
that is nearly always true in majoritarian systems’, and ‘while it is true and striking about 
South Africa that there are circuits of decision-making operating outside the party 
system’ which have more effect than inter-party debates, she argues the nature of those 
circuits might still be democracy but that is not clear.213   
 
Mattison’s is an interesting take on the old debate, and one of the examples which she 
uses - the struggle to have the state deliver to the unemployed a basic income grant 
undertaken by the Basic Income Grant Coalition in its response to the Taylor Committee 
report on this welfare issue - shows the opportunity for ‘exercise of voice in another 
form’ (aside from through representational politics), illustrating the possibility of 
democratic lobbying.214  She concludes that her attempt to provide a more positive 
analysis of the democratic character of South Africa ended in a less positive conclusion 
than she had originally thought likely, and advised caution in categorizing these ‘circuits’ 
as themselves democratic. 
 
Mattison’s point about the need to analyse the possibly significant democracy deepening 
consequences encapsulated in other forms of political participation are instructive in that 
it emerges from the same ground as the enterprise attempted here.    
 
Suttner argues that it is not inevitable that National Liberation Movements are 
undemocratic and secretive in contrast to political parties, which are sometimes made out 
to be inherently democratic open and accountable.  He asserts that what needs to be 
assessed is not what form of organisation is adopted by National Liberation Movements, 
but what ‘quality of democracy’ ensues.215  That investigation ought not to start (as it 
sometimes seems to) from the farcical assumption that the ANC as the ruling party (read 
‘the state’ in this instance) adopted and continues to adopt a variety of different 
organisational forms which – like those in any other country with changing policy 
making processes – are deliberately meant to outmanoeuvre enemies within and outside 
the alliance structures.   
 
In order to grasp the nature of the public sphere in relation to decision-making structures 
democratic theorisation ought to focus on its object as lucidly as possible. For one, that 
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would be to mistake the public conversation as initiated exclusively by political 
structures. But secondly and perhaps most importantly, as discussed in chapter one, that 
overestimates the ability of the state to choose its decision making mode.  
 
2. 6. 1 State and decision mode: a reminder 
 
Offe’s argument that what is real about a capitalist state is its ‘constant attempt to 
reconcile and make compatible with its internal structure, or mode of operation’, the 
various functions it has, should serve as a warning to those who believe (‘radicals’ in 
Offe’s parlance) the state can ever achieve a ‘balanced integration of the state and the 
accumulation process’, that there is ‘neither visible nor to be anticipated a strategy that 
actually does reconcile the state’s functions’ of at once excluding itself from production, 
providing a facilitational role for accumulation, depending on accumulation, and denying 
it does these things.216   
 
Offe arrived at this conclusion as we saw by looking at the various possible 
institutionalized modes of operation (internal structure) that the state could adopt in 
performing its functions of productive policy (the state’s self-devised decision rules, 
where it has to respond not to demands but to negative events, namely the absence or 
disturbance of an accumulation process).217  All of these were found to be lacking in 
particular ways for the successfully conceiving and carrying out of the tasks generally 
thought to constitute the policy demands on a state.  The scope of data and events that 
take place outside the administrative structure and must be taken into consideration is 
relatively broad (unlike allocative policy where the state is called upon to ‘allocate’ fairly 
conventional societal goods), says Offe.218  
 
2. 6. 2 Policy making at the centre: re-reading the post-Mandela blues 
 
That form of state, as shown, has simultaneously been the object of scrutiny.  What 
exactly Johnson means by a ‘redefinition of the form of state’ is not clear.  Suffice to say 
that she likely refers to its present structure as being characterised as follows (here, 
anecdotally by Richard Calland): ‘With a man such as Thabo Mbeki in command, The 
Presidency represents the cerebral epicentre of power: fittingly, given his Socratic 
disposition, the brain of the anatomy of South Africa.  The nerve wires all emanate from 
here, with a network of influential people and forums, such as presidential councils.  In 
this context the cabinet is largely overshadowed...though certain ministers enjoy a special 
place in the anatomy.’219  Meanwhile Lodge has recently argued Mbeki is risk averse and 
dislikes confrontation220: ‘he is not susceptible to taking advice and incapable of 
changing course’.221   
 
There have been some accounts of what this alleged ‘form of state’ amounts to for the 
culture of policy-making. Susan Booysen characterises the 2000 - 2006 period as one of 
‘policy coordination’ that propelled new actors into the centre of policy influence 
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(dubbed ‘primary tier’, ‘for analytical reasons’ she argues) and as a result of this 
consolidation of the influence of the primary tier ‘it follows’ that secondary and tertiary 
tier actors receded in importance.222  This is a familiar story and although it aspires to be 
more theoretically informed than Calland’s anecdotal account of ‘the anatomy of power’ 
it ends up being as vague: ‘The Policy Unit (in The Presidency) is regarded as the engine 
room where policy proposals are scrutinized, and new initiatives generated’.223  Booysen 
maintains that government’s inward-directed policy coordination initiatives are 
contextualized through two points of departure; firstly the Government Communication 
and Information System which fathoms popular needs (with the help of popular Imbizos, 
or ‘taking government to the people’), and secondly, replacing broad-based consultation, 
The Presidency and Government Communication and Information System engaged ‘idea-
catchers’ that ensured feedback was channelled into the heart of policy-making.224  But 
how objective a portrayal is this?   
 
Admittedly, government does not do itself favours by selling its obviously self-initiated 
efforts at facilitating a public conversation and listening: ‘the flow of information to and 
from the second economy will be facilitated through the establishment of community 
development workers, the building of more community centres linked up to 
communication networks, and through the extended use of the Imbizo programme as a 
form of communication between communities and government’225. This leads people to 
focus their critical attentions at this level to the exclusion of other arguably more 
significant democracy-inducing mechanisms. A common perception is thus summed up 
by media analyst Guy Berger: ‘What's clear is this: for all the Imbizo interaction and the 
almost R250-million spent on government communications last year, Mbeki's leadership 
has not won extensive credit among many people…Instead, genuine interactive 
communication, using all platforms, will be the most effective way for them to move 
forward. It's the only way the current team can hope to persuade its alienated members 
that Zuma is unsuitable as top leadership material’.226
 
Although Booysen’s depiction determines to describe the ‘important changes at the heart 
of the Mbeki policy machine for the period 2001-2006’ it serves perhaps at best to better 
familiarise the reader with the established fact that these new institutional mechanisms 
and processes continue, as Booysen says, ‘to evolve’ into a changing labyrinth of 
institutions allegedly reliant ultimately on their ‘linkages to the centre’.  But whether it is 
Booysen’s ‘institutional labyrinth’ or Calland’s ‘cerebral epicentre’, one is left wondering 
whether they have been fair and accurate in describing the geography of the democratic 
landscape.   
 
The focus after 2005 appeared, as portrayed by both Calland and Booysen, to be on ‘the 
centre’ as the most important element in the structure, whereas Lodge’s 1999 depiction of 
the allegedly rapidly shifting nature of ANC policy formulation structures illustrate for 
our purposes that a shift has occurred in the discourse of political analysis.  We have 
moved from analysis of the Tripartite Alliance to The Presidency, but maintain that a 
similar relation with ‘outside’ actors and forces obtains.   
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How accurate either narrative actually is, is something that deserves scrutiny, and the 
case study attempted here shortly will attempt to shed more light on possible ways of 
testing the veracity of the prevailing orthodoxy, or at least providing balance. As 
independent consultant, Hoosain Kagee, writes in a reply to SACP deputy president 
Jeremy Cronin, ‘to blame South Africa’s problems on a powerfully managed presidency 
does not add up.  On the contrary, centralisation in The Presidency is necessary in our 
fractured policy planning process.’227 Cronin, typical of the conspiratorial script so often 
read from by the Left, had written that ‘since 1999 a powerful presidential centre has 
been formed around a privileged axis of key ANC state technocrats and a new black 
capitalist stratum.  This dominant axis has developed a project that, in part, bears some 
resemblance to the agenda of established white capital.’228
 
Writing in 1994 Schreiner observed that a system where party political processes are 
regarded as paramount and parliament as the final arbiter, is only necessary not sufficient 
to achieving democracy.  He writes that this also requires that different interest groups 
achieve influence via those mechanisms; that certain actors not be licensed over others 
and that laissez faire lobbyism be avoided through keeping processes of policy-making 
transparent and open.  This somewhat paradoxically requires the system not be ad hoc, 
and that it be developed systematically and programmatically across all relevant policy 
arenas and levels of society.229  As Kagee suggests might not the reorganisation of The 
Presidency briefly described above therefore signify that logic.  
 
In 1999 Lodge could refer to ‘wider discussions of policy within the ANC and allied 
organisations’ such as a Health Forum or a Housing Policy Unit, at the same time as 
questioning their actual impact, which he found to be waning.230 Currently those in these 
forum-type structures that coalesce around the broad ruling political alliance or outside it, 
hurl as much criticism at the current alleged central structures where power has been 
diagnosed as lying - and where policy is allegedly formulated - as new social movements. 
The latter, whose champions Haffajee criticized in 2007 as follows: ‘Their writings come 
to sound like a set-piece.  If we have learnt anything from the past ten years it is probably 
that struggle as tough and soul-sapping, as brutal and as violent as it was, was probably 
easier to do than freedom.’231  
 
Furthermore - and this ought not to be taken as implying that therefore all is well with 
democracy - she argues of ‘the real challenges and contradictions of running a modern 
social democracy’, that ‘increasingly the most innovative thinking and research is coming 
from the academies, NGO’s and institutions such as the HSRC, much of which is 
commissioned by government (unfortunately, it seems, with little effect).’232 This leaves 
out more than it says but is indicative of the feeling that the consensual critical position 
emerging from would-be democrats is not accepted without argument. 
 
Lodge also found, quoting prominent businessman and ANC-member, Saki Macozoma, 
that instead of relying on these forums, ministers (all major policy actors) tended to rely 
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on ‘the information loop’ they were in. These ‘information loops’ need not be construed 
as negatively as they have been. This will become apparent when we consider the nature 
of the public sphere, as discussed in chapter one, below. 
 
2. 7 South Africa’s political culture: in the interests of objectivity (defendants and 
prosecutors) 
 
Daryl Glaser asked in 1997 whether an adequate description of the ‘kind of civil society’ 
which could supply a context in which ‘governing institutions can be scrutinized and 
challenged’ has been developed by local writers.233 This might at first appear an odd 
formulation since surely it is simply a case of describing what exists, and whether it (the 
‘kind of civil society’) exists, or not?  The reason for referring to the dilemma Glaser 
points out is precisely the conceptual dilemma which this theoretical overview concerns 
itself with, though in respect of slightly different subject matter.   
 
The case being made is that a particular type of description using certain well worn and 
fashionable concepts and arguments (moulds) within that discourse (the intellectual 
‘factory’) of what exists in the South African democratic landscape in respect of the 
formation of political consciousness234 has come to dominate discourse about the public 
sphere and its relation to the formal political sphere, at a variety of levels, from the 
grassroots to the most theoretically-encumbered. Similarly to how an industrial mould 
constantly churns out a particular engineering component. As argued thus far the reasons 
for this should by now be clearer: lingering unmet expectations, hinged on increasingly 
deteriorating theoretical doorposts, given what is overlooked and how alleged evidence is 
interpreted through oversight.   
 
Something is lacking in the debate as a result of this hegemony of theorisation and 
description. Consider those who defend their critique of democratic processes as ‘the 
defendants’. They only allow for a conceptualisation of that constantly emergent and 
changing relationship along particular lines. Further consider, that what has taken place 
throughout this chapter thus far is that an arrest warrant was issued, and an arrest 
subsequently made.  
 
Certain theorists are accused of a crime throughout chapter two. To ensure, now, that 
they are locked up, the ‘case from the prosecution’ needs to be strong. This will only 
surface by way of believable evidence which implicates the defendants, ensuring they are 
found guilty. Like distraught naughty adolescents caught stealing it is understandable 
how they came to commit their crimes, but nonetheless they must stand trial.  
 
What follows is the evidence for the prosecution. The corrective conceptual interventions 
that have been made in chapter one were that part of the argument which set the jury up 
for ‘the hook’ from the prosecution. Evidence presented in chapter three will seek to 
conclusively bring into question the objectivity of the counter-evidence put forward thus 
far for the innocence of the defendants.235 The outcome might not be conclusive and 
might have to be heard on appeal of course.  
 
                                                     
233 Glaser, D, 1997.  
234 These are themselves admittedly well worn conceptual arguments; though as argued in chapter one, not 
exhausted of intellectual power by any means. 
235 Their crime is nothing short of inventing the popular case against the vibrancy of South Africa’s democracy 
 63
It is of course possible that they will only be found guilty on minor counts. But the 
evidence presented shortly is intended to go a good deal of the way, in conjunction with 
the background to the accusations against the defendants, to showing that the intuitive 
feeling some evidently harbour about the guilt of the defendants (the critics of the quality 
of democracy), is in fact justified on rational grounds. 
 
In the first chapter it was noted and argued that when claims to the effect that alternative 
or altered political arrangements are in order, one of the theoretical requirements from the 
critic was concrete depiction of structural barriers to participation.  There has been no 
shortage of such analysis in modern South Africa.  Where do they fall short?  It would be 
impossible to provide a complete account of how power in the public sphere does 
function but a start to that enterprise is definitely to point out where current depictions 
fall short.   
 
If the best description of what constitutes the nature of our public sphere and its relation 
to formal democracy processes is provided by one, those who argue their case based on 
the  indices provided by democratic consolidation literature (relying on the comparative 
method of political science, and comparing South Africa to other transition countries in 
say Eastern Europe or South America), or two, if the story of the recent centralization of 
power and what this allegedly implies about the state of participatory democracy 
approximates the limitedness of and true state of our public sphere, then the advocates 
who propose various corrective action based on that alleged fact certainly deserve our 
utmost attention. The position argued here concerning where these accounts fall short has 
attempted to show that critics have become so encumbered by past assumptions and 
oversights, and seeks to show how to begin arguing for a positive characterisation of the 
public sphere and its relation to political consciousness formation.  
 
2. 8 A less orthodox understanding of the nature of the public sphere (continued) 
 
To what extent does a more thoroughgoing analysis of the public sphere exist at present?  
I have referred to Raymond Suttner’s attack on democratic consolidation theorists, and 
those who write off the liberation movement as anti democratic.  While Suttner alleges 
that these theorists have limited reference to ‘hegemonic battles’, adding that ‘even where 
some tendencies are not contested at the moment, or openly contested within the ruling 
party or organization, this is not to say they are uncontested in ‘some less visible form’, 
or that they will not be contested some time in the future’236, this need not be the 
strongest counter argument however.  It is in effect an appeal to ignorance, which is far 
from satisfactory.   
 
Based on the theoretical arguments presented in chapter one the aim is to provide 
empirical evidence of this complex relation between the public sphere and the formal 
democratic process, from the standpoint of South Africa’s democratic processes.  The 
validity of the depiction of policy-making at the centre and what this implies about the 
relation of the state executive to outside social forces has been queried. This rejoinder to 
the orthodox critical perspective will be carried further by way of further introduction to 
the logic of that argument in chapter three, followed by a preliminary case study of a 
specific actor (or as I argue, ‘space’) the HSRC.  
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Attempts to delineate the contemporary structure of civil society are perhaps best 
exemplified by Adam Habib when he posits that the post-apartheid era has witnessed the 
‘normalisation’ of South African society in a neo-liberal global environment, which sees 
the legacy bequeathed by apartheid as having been reinforced and even aggravated.  He 
argues civil society can be divided into three distinct blocs each identified by a different 
sets of relations to the state.  The first are those defined as survivalist, the second as 
community-based and in some cases opposing the government’s decisions, and the third 
assists government to roll out its policies through contractual agreements.237  This is 
useful in better characterizing a ‘unit of analysis’ which concerns us in notoriously 
inaccurate theoretical terrain, but I argue that it also finds itself held partially hostage by 
the obsession with ‘the transition’ and the subsequent changes in political arrangements, 
to the detriment of a more accurate account of emerging democratic state-civil society 
relations. 
 
Habib’s argument is perhaps understandable given that his and other theorisation on 
South African civil society relied on the foundations laid theorists like Robert Fine, who 
asked in 1992 whether in fact the positing of civil society as a normative theory of what 
‘ought to be’ had not ‘come in the wake of its actual historical decline’ in South 
Africa?238   Habib’s case can be seen as a corrective to Fine’s ideological attempt to instil 
faith in the nascent political institutions. Habib’s theorisation on the ‘new social 
movements’ and their continuing prominence in the public sphere or civil society was 
thus direct counter evidence, making the point that Fine et al were biased in castigating 
those who pursued this allegedly mistaken theoretical route that under-regarded the 
importance of official political institutions like national and provincial parliaments.   
 
Fine theorised as he did in lieu of official political civil societies’ origin in South Africa 
being in the ‘veritable feats of civic activity in the 1980’s’239, and the new political 
framework which saw the civic leadership declaring its eagerness to join the search for 
consensus.240  On that basis Fine241 went on somewhat polemically to say that those who 
warned against ‘elite pacting’ - some intellectuals and trade unionists - failed to 
appreciate the value of party politics; and himself sung the praises of the party system as 
‘some form of political representation which was absolutely necessary’ to mediate the 
search for consensus.  Fine’s polemic in favour of party political organisation must be 
appreciated for what it was however; his analysis of civil society accepted as an 
ideological intervention with little predictive accuracy.  
 
Fine was above all concerned to bolster the case for local democratic political parties, 
fearing that to strong a focus on the potential of civil society focus would ‘repeat the 
illusion that the ‘big’ questions concerning the general administration of society can be 
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resolved by particular, local struggles in the context of existing political organisations’.242 
Although Fine definitely did not allow that civil society (and its relation to the political 
sphere by way of the public sphere) was actually a lot more complex and would remain 
so243 those theorists - for argument’s sake, Habib et al - who attempt to correct this 
oversight by arguing for the ongoing significance of civil society (usually based on the 
experience they have of particular interest groups) overcompensate unnecessarily to the 
detriment of accurate social science.   
 
The way in which the inevitable stabilization of political structures was characterized as 
being to the benefit of the ‘new black elite’ and the absolute detriment of others is what is 
meant by ‘overcompensation’.  The manner in which ‘the forum culture’ that existed in 
South Africa during and after the transition came to be viewed as obsolete; while 
processes within the ANC244 took on huge significance, followed shortly thereafter by the 
apparent all important shift to exclusive reliance on the central executive policy 
structures, meant that a parallel process of mass action, land invasions and student 
rebellions, came to epitomize for more and more observers the spiralling desperate state 
of affairs – the total disregard for the opinions of South Africa’s citizenry.  
 
That ‘linkages between those who spoke for the groups involved and sympathetic 
supporters in the corridors of power’ were increasingly contemplated245 began to be 
provided as evidence that indeed our democracy was becoming everything it should not. 
And that opponents of the policies being adopted had ‘no substantial political 
intervention’ strategy with which to back up their proposed solutions meant that some 
even saw the prospects of consolidating democracy as slim.246  Thus began the concern 
with the alleged dual exclusion of factions within the tripartite alliance, opportunistically 
seized upon by those of the right - who could now claim that this further confirmed what 
they had feared would happen all along - and all manner of groups outside, but often 
originally aligned with, the official boundaries of the alliance.   
 
As things stood these intellectual tendencies were strengthened by fears that overtures 
made to civil society in the form of invitations to join corporatist arrangements on the 
part of government were attempts to co-opt civil society groups, raising the possibility 
that ‘civil society could become an arm of the state’.247  This cooption argument was 
illustrated using the fact that after 1994 many civil society organisations did in fact enter 
into a ‘corporatist pact’ with the state.  There seems to have been quite a widespread 
acceptance of this partnership arrangement according to Johnson, but concerns remain 
about where alternative visions and values informing public policy will arise from, even 
as ‘the development language of ‘social partnership’ seems appropriate to South Africa’s 
continuing transition’.248   
 
This goes to the heart of my attempt to question the damage done by idealistic 
characterisation of the public sphere. While the description of the quality or substance of 
South African democracy suffers from the flaws pointed to thus far, how, without being 
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overly reactionary is the ‘positive case’ that adequate participative democracy exists to be 
made?   
 
What follows as I have noted is a depiction of how and why one could introduce an 
organisation like the Human Sciences Research Council, for instance - as one that 
comprises an important actor in the democratic public sphere, and insinuates itself in 
public conversation - into theorisation about the quality of democracy and the relation 
between civil society and the state in the context of South Africa.  This is ultimately in 
the interests of disputing the absolute validity of claims that structural barriers to 
participation are as inhibitive as made out by both one party dominance theorists, and 
those convinced of the adverse effect on democracy and open policy making of the 
reorganisation of The Presidency, or centralised power; so inhibitive and adverse that 
certain aggressive corrective action(s) are demanded.  
 
Ultimately what is being floated is the possibility of wilful dishonesty or negligence 
about possible social scientific evidence by many analysts. 
 
2. 8. 1 Conceiving it: a ‘new’ public sphere? 
 
The attempt to evaluate and delineate the width, length and depth of particular and 
general political conversation(s) ought to be informed by the insight that the 
‘connections, encounters, supports, blockages, plays of forces, strategies, and so on 
which at any given moment establish what subsequently counts as being self-evident, 
universal and necessary’249 cut both ways, so to speak.   We should not fall into the trap 
as pointed out by Ran Greenstein, of rather than analysing this complex space, simply 
conducting ‘an analysis of social forces, as if these forces had a meaningful pre-political 
and pre-discursive existence’.250   
 
How it would be possible to move away from this latter type of analysis is not an easily 
answered question, but a useful starting point might be supplementing ‘analysis of social 
forces’ with what has been hinted at in chapter one: a less ‘idealistic’ account of how the 
public ‘lays siege’ to the administration with reasons, using a nuanced analysis of the 
different ‘policy problem spaces’ of such areas as ‘economy’, ‘population’, ‘justice’ and 
how within each of these ‘spaces’ broader ‘projects of reality’ have been developed.251 
Greenstein hints at this when he speaks of ‘a process involving contestation within and 
between collective actors over the mode of organising and exercising power, and a 
process of repositioning social and political relations within wider discourses, which 
endow them with meaning (such as the discourses of nationalism, race, development, and 
alternative paths to modernity)’.252  As noted earlier Gotz argued that a ‘policy problem 
space’ is expanded upon, using ‘conceptual brokers’ operating in the zone of engagement 
between abstract programme formulation and the exigencies of implementation, which 
allow a variety of different viable interventions.   
 
The continued insistence that this process of political consciousness formation is not 
taking place optimally - via a democratic enough conversation - is summed up by a recent 
commentary from prominent Institute for Democracy in South Africa political 
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commentator Judith February when she writes, ‘Perhaps it is time South Africans started 
talking to each other, instead of at each other, as we started doing in 1987 in Dakar?  
How can we use such a national dialogue to influence policy and to create positive 
contention not only on issues of race, identity and ‘South African-ness’, but also on 
intrinsically-linked questions related to the economy and economic empowerment?’253   
This alleged problem of how we are not creating sufficient ‘positive contention’ deserves 
spelling out, for it surely refers to the problem of agenda setting, solution contestation, 
and manoeuvring in ‘wider discourses’, referred to by Greenstein (and no doubt others). 
 
The difficulty of instituting positive contestation is well illustrated in the following quote 
by an employee of the Centre for Civil Society based at the University of Kwazulu-Natal, 
when he writes,  
 
‘The adherents especially the elite of this system continue deceiving oppressed 
people that they must focus their energy on fighting for the so called better houses - 
“luvezunyawo” - and to pay “reasonable” rates’.254   
 
He notes crucially that this elite pastime is at the expense of what the oppressed should 
really be doing. What would seem to be a particular type of problem for ‘the elite’ is 
construed in a completely different fashion by someone affected by difficulties they 
understand as rooted in, and ultimately resolvable through, alternative problem 
definitions (and thus solutions).  This problematic issue speaks not only to that of 
allegedly insular technocrats seeking solutions via the introduction and contemplation of 
Gotz’s ‘policy problem spaces’, ‘projects of reality’ and the various attendant ‘conceptual 
brokers’ (savoirs) which themselves are part of an intricate agenda setting process, but to 
that of other problem definers in the public conversation.   
 
Robert Hoppe has presented a useful typology of problem definition strategies used to 
define problems in the public domain.255  As should be evident from the example 
presented below, a ‘problem definition strategy’ refers to the complex way in which 
problems ‘become what they are’.  The process by which they do could foreseeably be 
similarly fathomed by applying the method of scrutiny to alternate problems.  For 
example, Hoppe says, referring to one type of ‘problem-definer’, that 
 
‘The way the car mobility problem was framed by several technology assessment 
agencies working for national parliaments in Europe offers an example of the 
enclavist’s256 preferred problem definition strategy. The enclavist-egalitarian 
perspective defines the real issue at stake, as equal access to public space for all. 
Car mobility is a partial problem of excessive demand, over-expanded 
infrastructure, pollution of public space, and violation of health, ecological balance, 
and quietude of residential areas. Ultimately, the problem is one of control and 
cutting back on demand for car mobility, and substitution with more friendly, low-
tech, small-scale transport modes such as bicycles and light, zero-emission 
(electrical) vehicles.’257
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Although I struggle to believe it would be possible to argue that certain actors use 
particular clearly definable problem definition strategies of the types Hoppe outlines 
(there are four main types, which need not be mentioned) the way Hoppe scrutinizes 
problems from this perspective throws up useful insights.  Such difficulties exist with 
respect to other problems – the policy problem space under which the above debate 
would fall being anything from ‘public transport’, ‘mobility’, ‘population’ (or even 
‘global warming’) – and involve, there is no doubt, what Greenstein referred to as the 
repositioning of social and political relations within wider discourses.   
 
2. 9 Recognising the new in the old 
 
Specifically, to ‘reposition a social and political relationship’ amounts to the realization 
that what was previously thought to constitute an interest position (perhaps an exclusive 
one) for those embroiled in a particular social and/or political relationship needs perhaps 
to be re-thought to take into account where that relationship now fits into a wider 
discourse.  An example of a ‘wider discourse’ might for argument’s sake be that used by 
Hoppe, above.  There is a complex relationship between the parts of the discourses 
(savoirs) out there, so to speak, and the way in which ‘interest groups’ and political 
subjectivities come to attach themselves to these, or manufacture allegiance to certain 
combinations of those arguments (problem definitions’) making up the wider discourse.   
 
It must be noted that what was intended here was never a theoretical investigation of 
possible interest group (and coalition) strategies in respect of this undertaking, but an 
illumination of where a more thorough understanding of South Africa’s democracy, and 
the alleged structural barriers inherent therein, might start from.   
 
Similarly to Mattison’s attempt to better understand how democracy may not be as 
compromised by one-party dominance in South Africa - since for her, the question arose 
as to what extent civil society coalitions provide for popular participation258 - so I argue 
that the fact that the state relies on all kinds of information and decision modes (open to 
change and whose nature is clearly not completely under state control) raises the question 
as to how compromised the public sphere (as understood in the formulation of it in this 
report) can be.  
 
Surely, when considering the health of democracy, from the perspective of how inclusive 
the formation of political consciousness is, it becomes a case of what sort of problem 
definition types or strategies (see Hoppe) are ‘allowed’259 to exist in the ‘information 
loop’ into which the minister, is implicated or implicates himself?   
 
Now it is a political fact that, as Lodge found from Saki Macozoma260 in 1999, ministers 
tend to pursue policies that ‘emanate from the information loop that minister is in’.261  
Even a cursory introduction to how these information loops might be constituted - 
through a more, or less, intricate public conversation, or ‘an equal access ‘public 
sphere’’262 – and bearing in mind the way in which the state must pursue allocative and 
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productive policies, and how it does not appear able to approach its task of being a 
successful capitalist state with exactitude (due to the problems inherent in all decision 
modes available to it), the implications are seen.   
 
Consider this example: arguing about whether the particular question of the ‘incomplete 
deracialisation of apartheid’ had been adequately addressed, Rupert Taylor asserts that 
one of the main reasons for the shallow public debate on the matter is that ‘many public 
intellectuals have become overly concerned to serve a largely unimaginative technocratic 
policy-oriented role in the service of state designs, rather than raise questions’ that 
interrogate how effectively deracialisation has been addressed.263  Short of the creation of 
a national Ministry of Effective Complete Deracialisation the ability to address such 
questions in a democratic manner surely depends on the quality of the contributions from 
the public sphere about issues that will determine success or not in that particular 
endeavour, and whether the question continues to be addressed within wider discourses.  
The same goes for other issues.  
 
A measure of responsibility surely falls to those who desire to initiate or participate in a 
conversation about this, or any other topic, to take account of the interlocutor, ‘the public 
space’ in this instance.  This is clearly not an easy task!  How can the public sphere be an 
interlocutor?  Without falling back on useless concepts such as changes in the ‘mood of 
the political class’, and perhaps equally dubiously, ‘political culture’, how does one 
delineate what this entails?   
 
What appears a strange anecdotal example at first is provided by the reorganisation of the 
once thoroughly sinister Afrikanerbond, which as an organisation had an inordinate 
influence on pre-transition South Africa.  The infamous “Broerdebond” lost its last 
official representatives at the highest level of government when the NP withdrew from 
the national parliament and Cabinet in the late-1990’s, but the organisation continued to 
try and influence the public agenda through informal meetings with government officials, 
and various public campaigns, such as that associated with the SABC’s emerging 
language policy.264  The ‘Bond’ therefore evaluated the changing structure of the public 
sphere, and with its changed organisational constitution, decided its cause would best be 
served through engaging in a different manner to how it had previously. In short it should 
not be assumed that because a cause or argument is worthy or valid its backers need not 
as vigorously engage with, and renegotiate, the changing institutional communication 
landscape.   
 
Assuming that Thabo Mbeki and his government ‘assume policy-perfection’, never 
openly acknowledge past problems265 don’t carry out effective policy review, or rely on 
‘detached scenario-planning exercises’ and ‘integrative country-social analysis’266 for 
one, mistakenly appeals to the unreliable belief that the would-be correctors of this 
alleged malaise would be able to carry out more inclusive analyses (a ‘systematic policy 
review’), of a fundamentally different kind (so that they would ‘empower a new president 
to make changes appropriate to his or her own vision of the future’) to Mbeki’s 
administration, and secondly, fails to appreciate the difficulty all actors who feel they 
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deserve attention have had in plugging into or manipulating ‘wider discourses’267.   
 
It is an analysis that brazenly skims over the fact, that some succeed at creating, or 
plugging into these discourses, while others, more or less fail. The difficulty lies in 
analysing where an explanation for that oversight might lie: I propose that it might lie to a 
great degree in an inadequate appreciation of, and grasp of the necessary ‘procedure’ for 
engaging this emerging, or ‘new’ public sphere; no matter how reviled some of the 
discourse that makes it up.  
 
The following preliminary investigation by way of an exploratory case study involving 
interviews, seeks to further clarify the emerging nature of South Africa’s ‘new’ public 
sphere.  
 
The overall theoretical intervention is by no means solely reliant for any success it may 
have on the limited exploratory case study of the Human Sciences Research Council 
offered below. In other words my case does not succeed or fall on whether or not, or to 
what degree, HSRC functioning empirically bears out my case, but on the correctness of 
the portrayal of the mechanics of public conversation about values and policy questions 
in and via the public sphere in its relation to the political sphere - which may or may not 
be exemplified to whatever degree by the workings of the HSRC.  
 
The argument made about the transformation and adaptation of the HSRC to this ‘new’ 
public sphere is nothing more than a partially informed guess.    
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Chapter 3 
 
The South African Human Sciences Research Council: populating 
political theory through exploration? 
 
Thus far the case has been made that in the provision of alleged evidence for the veracity 
of critiques of the formation of political consciousness in South Africa’s democracy 
proponents should contemplate as far as possible the possibilities which exist in the 
public sphere for bringing influence to bear on the functioning of the state and its 
administration.  
 
It should be noted that influence is exercised not only through intimidation of political 
opponents or authority but also in the course of offering reasons for pursuing or not 
pursuing particular courses of action, which become available to authorities and for the 
wider public to contemplate, which are then in the public sphere.  
 
It was argued that the overconfidence in presenting critiques of this nature often stem 
from an inadequate theoretical conception of the public sphere, made up of the collective 
of all reasons - alluded to in the above paragraph – and outlined in chapter one.  But in 
chapter two arguments that reliance on certain assumptions about the political space are 
an added hindrance to objective analysis, were also presented.  
 
The following preliminary investigation by way of an exploratory case study involving a 
dozen interviews with individuals associated - in various important capacities - with the 
HSRC seeks to further query the emerging nature of South Africa’s ‘new’ public sphere.  
 
3.1 How theorists can be so wrong 
 
The critical bias about the state of South Africa’s democratic credentials is not surprising, 
since as alluded to in the first chapter, what constitutes the democratic policy space is 
extremely complex.268  The democratic policy space includes that which goes toward 
political consciousness formation. The argument has been put forward that at base many 
claims for the low quality of democracy stemmed from the use of a theoretical account of 
political consciousness formation that could not adequately appreciate the full extent of 
the public conversation and the complex nature of the public sphere and its relation to the 
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state, because of the over-idealized conception of how popular opinion and values could 
be bought to bear. Over-idealization results in a particular kind of focus to the detriment 
of careful analysis.  
 
This is by no means a position that would or should be accepted without contestation.  
For as it stands it amounts to a position similar to that of Suttner when he contends that 
not enough credence is given by one-party dominance advocates to the likelihood that a 
broader political conversation - in the form of contestation over the political agenda, 
values and norms, and practicable solutions – occurs in ‘some less visible form’.269   
 
Essentially the case being made, somewhat more controversially, is that democratic 
functioning and policy making - and all this entails, as argued - has gradually begun to 
occur in a broad arena (including importantly of course, ministerial ‘information loops’) 
which has been insufficiently theorised, thus leaving that arena and what occurs in it 
prone to constant attack, because a defence case does not as yet adequately exist.  Of 
course once one did exist it would equally be open to criticism for a variety of reasons.  
 
3. 1. 1 There are many distractions  
 
As early as 1992 Mala Singh argued about ‘transition’ South Africa that,  
 
‘It seems to me at the moment that agendas are being set in rather problematic ways, 
in interactions between leadership and intellectuals. Perhaps the whole question of 
generating policy agendas is in fact a fairly elitist type of phenomenon. But the issue 
is: what happens to that agenda, and what happens to the products that flow from that 
agenda? How can that be democratised? And what context and what organisationally-
driven social forces can actually force those agendas to become more democratised? 
If we get stuck with certain patterns of policy generation that are in fact elitist and are 
in fact problematic in a variety of ways, those are going to become quite well 
established. And it's going to be an incredible struggle then to dismantle.’270   
 
The theme that concerns us here (and worries many) was clearly established early on in 
South Africa’s democratic transition.  
 
The ‘new’ public arena that arguably has not been theorized adequately comprises new 
and traditional actors, the way they catalyze public opinion and ‘relay’ this to decision 
centres for consideration.  This arena has transformed markedly since the official 
transition, and arguably constitutes a different ‘object of analysis’ than that which 
preceded it, and has mistakenly stood in its stead to varying degrees ever since.  Hence it 
was contended that in order to carry out (absolutely necessary) valid ongoing radical 
democratic critiques better, cognisance of that emerging reality needs to be taken.   
 
If one considers this global theoretical weakness, the way in which contemporary events 
are ‘plugged into’ an inadequate theoretical grounding, is understandable. But consider 
the case of, in particular, one party dominance arguments that dominate political theory 
about South African democracy. They have the effect of focussing all theoretical energy 
on, for example the alleged effect of the continuing internal ANC battle for political 
supremacy, held to have all-encompassing and all pervasive negative effects on the 
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functioning of democracy, as asserted here by prominent public political commentator 
Judith February when she says, ‘is it any wonder then that someone such as Christine 
Qunta is provided space to be "expert" on anything from media freedom to land rights? 
The political climate is unhealthy and "the worst are full of passionate intensity", as (now 
deceased Irish poet) Yeats says. It is no exaggeration to say that we stand at a crossroads 
of democratic choice’271.  While elements of this critique deserve scrutiny as valid or not, 
is the situation as dire as all that?  February has spoken of the need to create ‘positive 
contention’ - a condition she feels is desperately lacking, which is obvious from her 
remarks above. 
 
The analysis of our democratic public space will continue to suffer in the absence of an 
adequate theoretical (yet concrete enough) mapping of that terrain; tending to 
underestimate what is and remains important, and allowing a variety of those272 who 
proffer new or alternate cures to the alleged democratic malaise the space to peddle 
partial remedies.   
 
3. 1. 2 The public sphere and decision makers: communicative abundance - more 
accurate theory and description, less anxiety 
 
John Keane characterises communicative practise in the modern ‘democratic project’ as 
follows: 
 
‘Further reflection on the subject of communicative abundance should teach us that 
the best political weapon against orthodoxies … is to cultivate the sense that we know 
that we do not know what is to be done, that life requires decisions and decisions 
require judgements, and that the publicly learned capacity to choose courses of action 
in a variety of differently-sized public spheres riddled with complexity, is the 
democratic art par excellence.  
 
It is true that communicative abundance does not somehow automatically ensure the 
triumph of this democratic art. Communicative abundance has several other effects, 
some of which are unhelpful or mildly harmful in a democracy, while others are 
perversely undemocratic. The pelting of audiences with a hail of political 
advertisements can and does produce frosty apolitical responses… Communicative 
abundance also arguably produces definite increases in levels of citizens’ inattention 
while they are supposed and expected to pay attention to affairs outside their 
immediate household and neighbourhood, and while through time their spatial 
horizons of understanding are definitely stretched by communicative abundance, 
citizens find it ever harder to pay attention to the media’s vast outpourings.”273
 
The theorisation of the effects of communicative abundance above is very far removed 
from concerns about the type of practises which would have to undergird the kind of 
society (and national conversation) that prominent South African social analyst and 
media commentator, Aubrey Matshiqi, argues we should attempt to cultivate.  While 
Keane argues that making sense out of communicative abundance is difficult for 
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societies, Matshiqi is concerned to see the cultivation of a society where self censorship 
(particularly through a media, allegedly insensitive to different viewpoints), through 
poorly exercised power, is banished; and an ‘equal access public sphere’ is vigilantly 
created, so as to ‘speak truth to power’.274   
 
In fact the two viewpoints seem in direct conflict since Keane’s worry is with how 
communicative abundance, as a fact, does not guarantee ideal democratic decision-
making; while Matshiqi is concerned to argue, in effect, that communicative abundance 
(something which is not an immanent concern to him) definitely does not exist in this 
country, because the public and private media, as a powerful arena in society, have the 
potential (in some cases actualised he suggests) to create conditions of authoritarianism, 
through creating the fear necessary to silence dissenting views.   
 
The stark contrast between these two perspectives serves as a further entry point for the 
discussion of our allegedly compromised public sphere.  Are we in fact dealing with an 
actual lack of space for critical public interventions of many varieties (through a 
multitude of arenas akin to Nancy Fraser’s model outlined in chapter one), or is there a 
tone of needless hysteria coupled with confused hand-wringing in these often very stark 
warnings?  Evidence would arguably point to the existence of a variety of contrasting 
views on any number of topics, or within and across any wider discourse that may 
exist.275  
 
It has been highlighted previously that rather than wishing to create an imperial 
presidency, the intention was an organised one.276  Keane’s warning that, with ‘life 
requiring decisions and decisions requiring judgements,’ and ‘the publicly learned 
capacity to choose courses of action in a variety of differently-sized public spheres 
riddled with complexity, being the democratic art par excellence,’ was, I argue, 
effectively the sort of understanding which was heeded in the decision to reorganise The 
Presidency.  Yet by now the view that an ‘imperial presidency’ was the intention, 
prevails, effectively unopposed.277  Confusion on this matter amongst others, has fuelled, 
I argue, an unfair share of controversy.   
 
3. 1. 3 Institutional changes 
 
Acknowledging this confusion and learning not to mistake opinion journalism for 
political theory is perhaps one of the first steps in creating an adequate theoretical 
understanding of this ‘new’ public sphere, commensurate with modern South African 
reality, as will shortly be argued. The reorganisation of The Presidency and the 
consequent refashioning of its relations to a variety of actors and current ideas (wider 
discourses) effectively denotes a massive institutional-discursive shift.   
 
Concerning the public sphere (of which Habermas for instance argues political parties 
form part) including both weak and well resourced actors of different types, the situation 
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that prevailed up until late 2004 was summed up by a former head of Cosatu’s Policy 
Unit278, 
 
‘The new South Africa inherited extraordinarily closed and hierarchical policy-
making systems279, controlled primarily by bureaucrats.  Departments focused on 
administering existing rules with only incremental change.  In contrast, the new 
government had to transform most policies rapidly, which radically increased 
departments' need for policy capacity.  Most responded by maintaining officials' 
nominal control over the policy process, with outside consultants as the main source 
of technical expertise and information.  Thus, for most new policies, consultants 
conduct any necessary research and write the first draft.  The problem with this 
model is that it undermines political direction. The politicians end up with a draft 
that may bear very little resemblance to the strategies espoused by the ruling 
party’280   
 
If this is true, the intention and eventual effect of the reorganisation of The Presidency 
would not seem to square very well with what has been maintained by critics of that 
move, such as management academic and author William Gumede, who lists policies 
allegedly insulated from democratic decision-making serving he argued as evidence of a 
growing trend.  In 2005 he stated that ‘new centres of influence on policy-making – 
outside the elected representative system – have been established.  Key among them is 
(sic) the presidential working groups: big business, black business, trade union, 
agriculture, international investment advisory council, and international IT council. 
Significant policies had their genesis or were fleshed out in these presidential groups and 
were presented to Parliament and the public as fait accompli.’281   
 
Gumede’s formulation assumes, most tellingly, that these centres of influence are ‘new’ 
in the sense that they replaced something which had existed to fulfil a similar role in the 
past. That is questionable. Arguably the Working Groups effectively extended the 
breadth of the public space.   Instead of an indictment of the form of democracy South 
Africa has this form of consultation might well perform a different function from that 
which is popularly and very seriously maintained of them. Might they not be better 
conceptualised as supplementary to the efforts of elected representatives, rather than 
simply exclusive channels for the influential?  If one considers that according to Ben 
Turok, a senior ANC MP serving since 1995, that the juniorisation of parliament has had 
‘a very substantial effect’ (82 per cent of ANC MP’s have left parliament since 1994)282, 
then these presidential working groups make even more sense.   
 
Considering the phenomenon outlined by Makgetla above might this reorganisation not 
be viewed as an attempt by political authorities to obtain useful information about values, 
goals and strategic questions from these groups, which could then be used in formulating 
political goals, and in so doing serve to re-take or more democratically redistribute 
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control over the policy process, than what had existed, and no doubt continued and 
continues to exist?   
 
The allegedly pernicious effect of these types of structural upheavals has only become 
more deeply felt, and lamented, with time.  In 1996 journalist, Marion Edmunds, wrote 
that Ran Greenstein, a researcher then at the Witwatersrand University Education Policy 
Unit, believed that heated disputes over influence over government policy were caused 
by the fact that ANC members and advisors who were being absorbed into government, 
lost touch with ‘the masses’, as they (the advisors and ANC members) struggled to deal 
with the state’s ‘unwieldy structures, leaving no channel for the popular feeling on 
policy’.283  Some years later this same researcher spoke of ways in which power is shared 
between civil society and state, by referring to ‘a process involving contestation within 
and between collective actors over the mode of organising and exercising power, and a 
process of repositioning social and political relations within wider discourses, which 
endow them with meaning (such as the discourses of nationalism, race, development, and 
alternative paths to modernity)’.284   
 
Greenstein’s view in 1996 suggests a great deal of sympathy with those who felt 
excluded from power by the restructuring of the state, while in 2003 he appears to 
suggest the need for a more nuanced view, in which he argues particular actors (should) 
come to inhabit discursive positions. That is something I argue is partially determined by 
considerations of what actors interests are according to the nature of the surrounding 
discourse, and how those interests would thenceforth best be articulated within those 
multiple discourses. That involves considered repositioning, and subsequent (to a greater 
or lesser degree) changes of the discourse, in the best possible meaning of the term 
‘strategic action’.   
 
Wider adoption of this type of approach to political analysis is not made easier with the 
belief, for instance, that it is possible for certain institutions to have a monopoly on 
progressive politics.  Established commentator, Richard Calland, recently asked - in the 
course of commenting on a popular march by a new social movement he reveres, where 
they demanded access to information from the Durban’s Mayor’s office - ‘who owns and 
controls progressive politics in South Africa?  Is it still the ANC?  Is it the secret funders 
that pump money to keep the ruling party’s wheels turning?  Or the companies whose 
interests so many in its national executive now serve?  Or is it now, in fact, new social 
movements such as Abahlali?’285  Although the question is largely rhetorical, meant to be 
provocative, is it not more objective when considering these types of questions to 
distinguish between successful and less successful efforts at manipulating or constructing 
(political) ‘problem definitions,’ by surveying the various problem definition strategies at 
play286 and how the combinatory dynamic playing out between these have shaped and 
created various problems, having emanated from the various specialist enclaves and mini-
spheres within the public sphere?   
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This would arguably shed more light on, and provide more useful answers, than the more 
easily digestible type of questions and answers Calland has proposed for consideration. 
The question which will be discussed shortly in connection with research, ‘popular’ 
opinion, politicking in general, and the HSRC specifically, is, if the breadth of the public 
sphere was for instance extended rather than circumscribed by these presidential working 
groups, has the depth of the (potential) public sphere been effectively conceptualised? 
 
3. 2 (Re) emergent interest in research for policy: introductory remarks 
 
The reception of the Native Club initiative, meant to encourage the public contributions 
of less well known black thinkers, after Thabo Mbeki called for more critical engagement 
from them, also signals an attempt by government to stimulate the kind of critical 
engagement felt to be lacking in broadsides emanating from what Sandile Memela, 
spokesperson for the Ministry of Arts and Culture, contentiously (and contemptuously) 
called the ‘celebrity pack’ of ‘coconut intellectuals’.287  Examples of the latter being 
academic institution director, Sipho Seepe, who wrote recently that while we had 
progressed in consolidating the democratic framework, ‘we have fallen short in matching 
this with the cultivation of a democratic culture,’ citing the case of violence in the 
Khutsong region resulting from the re-demarcation of provincial boundaries.288 More 
contentiously the ANC has itself initiated such developments as the Progressive Business 
Forum where it meets with business people for dialogue sessions.289   
 
Since the official onset of Thabo Mbeki’s presidency a variety of more important 
institutional political developments have been recorded with varying degrees of hope, or 
scorn. These include for instance the agreement by government and religious leaders to 
cooperate on various issues such as poverty and the social security system, along the lines 
of German and American practise290, and more recently the accelerated and shared 
growth initiative for South Africa (AsgiSA), which as a public-private working 
partnership seeks not to ‘solve all the economy’s problems’, but rather involves amongst 
other interventions for instance a panel of foreign economist working collaboratively on a 
series of research projects with local economists, to check on whether the initiative is 
setting priorities correctly.291
 
But equally interesting are other developments such as that referred to in 2000 by Richard 
Humphries, a researcher linked to the HSRC, who wrote in the Business Day that 
‘Legislative processes within government appear to have entered a new phase with senior 
government officials and ministers are joining their global colleagues in signalling a 
changed approach to the need to incorporate research data in the policy process,’ he 
said.292 He went on to list The Presidency, transport, provincial and local government, 
and the public service and administration national departments as heading up this trend 
toward relying on the ‘data and analyses of South African researchers from assorted 
science councils, universities and research centres’.  Humphries said the timing of the 
development should be ‘read against the evolution of the policy-making process in South 
Africa since the change of government in 1994’ - linking it ultimately to the sponsoring 
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of large scale interventions that attempt to better forge links between policy makers and 
social science policy researchers, by organisations like the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organisation.293    
 
Groupings unreceptive to such developments would likely resort to dubbing them as a 
further evidence of the likely entrenchment of a technocratic bent in policy making, and 
consider this to strongly support the belief that the likelihood of influencing the national 
agenda (at whatever level) has shrunk to increasingly negligible status.   
 
While Humphries specifically stresses the attempt to link social science policy 
researchers and policy makers represented by these efforts, adding that government 
would not find all social scientists receptive to the overture, the general development 
highlighted here is significant I argue.294   Contrary to the by-and-large mistaken focus of 
some on the insularity of particular parts of the political process, this development 
arguably represents one of the clearer demonstrations of a veritable sea change in the 
nature of public political processes (the ‘new’ public sphere).   
 
As mentioned, the role of parliament has been much debated, and in fact at present a 
panel chaired by an ex-ANC MP has been mandated to assess parliament and whether it 
is fulfilling its constitutional mandate.  This probe emanates from the recent African Peer 
Review295 undertaken in 2006.296 Indicative of prior frustrations over the unclear 
understanding from whence ‘positive contention’297 might originate, the then labour 
convenor at the National Education and Development Labour Council (Nedlac), Ebrahim 
Patel, said in 2000 that Nedlac (fears abounded that it was becoming simply another 
‘rubber stamp’ as parliament was said to be) should start a research wing like the 
International Labour Organisation, and for instance, co-ordinate the activities of different 
bodies like the National Skills Board.   
 
It ought to be remembered that the argument being made is premised on the fact that the 
state relies on all kinds of information and decision modes (themselves open to change), 
raising the question as to how compromised the public sphere (as understood in the 
formulation of it in this report) firstly, can be, and closely related to this, is or is not?  The 
developments listed (at random) above, far from signalling a muting of political 
contestation, indicate, along with the reorganisation of The Presidency, and the creation 
of the focused cabinet clusters, significant shifts. How exactly should we interpret the 
impact of these shifts from the perspective of democratic theory? I have tried to sketch a 
possible route.  
 
The collective phenomenon of change hinted at so far is not altogether different to the 
phenomenon Greenstein pointed out in the early transition years, where the ‘grass roots’ 
felt unable to ensure its voice was heard by new government officials, previously close to 
them, is arguably more dramatic in fact than the strictly political transition preceding 
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it.298  The difference now however is that a situation exists where the change effects more 
than the ‘grassroots’, but rather interest groups of great variety.  
 
President Thabo Mbeki did not make himself popular for instance when he 
controversially urged those at the 2006 annual conference of the South African Students 
Congress to ‘become part of the progressive intelligentsia who are actually engaged in 
the process of rebuilding South Africa’ unlike, he implied, reactionary commentators and 
analysts who he said claimed ‘to know everything about you (him)’ when some had not 
even met you (him).299  It might be argued that this institutional reorganisation smacks of 
elitism, but equally the shift speaks to a desire (and need) on the part of rulers (and likely, 
other) for more intelligible channelling of public intelligence of all kinds. 
 
Neither does Mbeki do himself and the institutional developments initiated under his 
presidential terms a service, by apparently undermining the ethic these same institutions 
attempt to encourage, through publicly lamenting the fact that ‘we cannot get everyone to 
sing from the same hymn sheet on the important question of how to build a non-racial 
South Africa, regarding the role of affirmative action in this regard’.300 This only sends 
out the message that the government is intractable on issues it deems there is little need to 
discuss, and which critics of the status quo are all to ready to broadcast. Much evidence 
points to the opposite being the case.   
 
Mbeki sells short the fact that a vibrant public sphere does exist – not, as argued thus far, 
in the form many have sought it, and where they have ‘found it’ claimed it is ignored – in 
this way.  
 
3. 3 Why the HSRC? 
 
The HSRC remains a controversial (and conventional) organisation to some, particularly 
those with ideals of critical objective scholarship that is answerable only to standards 
upheld by the academy, but I argue that it nonetheless serves to ground and catalyse 
important debates about social and political matters, which are arguably socially 
significant beyond their immediate apparent use.   
 
The position argued here is that the HSRC’s existence can be debated using the ‘ideal 
higher education framework’ about independent critical scholarship, but until there is 
more convincing proof that a potential alternative arrangement to build and sustain 
national intellectual resources exists, and is compromised by the HSRC’s existence, 
debate around the HSRC might be better focused on finding out if it allows space for the 
public sphere’s critical function, as set out broadly in its mandate.   
 
The HSRC as a parastatal science council tasked with carrying out public interest 
research, has a history steeped in controversy and linked to the apartheid state’s stated 
goals, by-and-large.301  But its transformation makes it a more relevant institution to the 
debate over what Judith February referred to as the struggle to create ‘positive 
contention’; and the HSRC’s role as regards this concept is a good starting point for 
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beginning to flesh out how the HSRC has begun to adapt to and form part of the ‘new’ 
public sphere.  The HSRC is firstly, a specific type of organ; an official parastatal which 
receives a National Treasury subsidy via the Department of Science and Technology.  
The HSRC is also an example of ‘a space’ that has evolved through judicious decision-
making.   
 
I have argued that the public sphere, in the sense we are interested, is constituted by 
communicative abundance and the unavoidable but less compromised than is often made 
out, ‘information loops’ mentioned by Saki Macozoma.302  These two realities are two 
sides of the same coin.  Too often it is assumed that the administration is or should at 
least be able to decipher the results of communicative abundance.  But in the same way 
that ‘flag burning’ to protest the presence of United States troops in Iraq, or blocking a 
highway with boulders signals something fairly obvious and might appear a clear 
statement; what exactly, and for what reasons, is anything but clear in any meaningful 
way.  The general idea is obvious: something is badly wrong, but what exactly, and what 
are you proposing?   
 
At a symposium in 1992 for researchers pondering their place in the emerging 
institutional arrangements of transition South Africa, Mala Singh claimed  
 
‘Expert knowledge may be only one aspect of the necessary conditions for a more 
rational politics. The sufficient conditions depend on the political relations between 
the state and its citizens and whether the available social, political and economic 
space is organised in such a way that the will of the citizens for a more rational and 
humane politics prevails. And to get to that point, mass political struggle for the 
deepening of democracy is as indispensable as expertise.’303
 
I wish to argue is that it is difficult to separate the two – political mass struggle and 
expertise – in this way.  Mass political struggle is surely less effective if it lacks 
expertise.  And in fact it does ‘mass political struggle’ a disservice to assume that it one, 
lacks a good deal of ‘expertise’, and two, eschews being associated therewith. In fact 
evidence of a popular movement’s endorsement of that fact lies in a 2005 Cosatu 
document emanating from its 2005 central executive committee, where it suggests the 
Industrial Development Corporation and HSRC be consulted as technical back-up for the 
development of industrial sector strategies.304  In addition there is plenty of evidence of 
the print media’s reference to HSRC research into issues of widespread concern.305
 
Greenstein’s argument about ‘a process of repositioning social and political relations 
within wider discourses’306 is important in beginning to comprehend how the complex 
public sphere is ‘plugged into’ political consciousness formation.  This ideal 
repositioning might also be likened to ‘coalition formation’, as Mattison argues when she 
used the example of the Treatment Action Campaign and its various allies to interrogate 
the democratic credentials of such movements.307  Outside of political power de jure 
many of the actors that have essentially led our (partial) (mis)understanding of post 
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apartheid democracy have, I argue, failed to greater or lesser degrees to either themselves 
plug into these ‘information loops’ saturated as they are by communicative abundance, or 
accord the process that goes along with that attempt, enough critical attention in a 
positive sense.   
 
As noted earlier the intention is not to offer an account of better strategic organizational 
possibilities, however.  Nor is the way the HSRC operates or the influence it has or has 
not had evidence of its ‘rising star status’ – that’s not what I am looking at the HSRC for. 
The HSRC is not a potential model actor for public intellectuals or researchers to 
coalesce around, or for ‘new’ social movements to mimic.   
 
The point of introducing the HSRC into this discussion, in the context of attempts to 
envision how ‘positive contention’ does operate, is to offer the HSRC’s transformation as 
indicative of certain trends in the public sphere.  If these trends were better theorised they 
might reveal a less one-dimensional picture of South Africa’s allegedly exclusionary, or 
insufficient, democratic culture.  Opportunities do exist for ‘positive contention’.   
 
I attempt to portray the HSRC and other bodies like it - particular actors in this ‘new’ 
global and country-specific public realm who are equally important role players’ as any 
of the other ‘traditional’ ones – as supporting struts in this understanding, which takes the 
public sphere and how it does have a bearing on the rationalizations within the 
democratic state, to be as important as deliberative democrats have argued it is.   
 
The HSRC (and its relation to government) as a little acknowledged feature of the public 
sphere should - along with other centres of research, and issue-based coalitions in the 
country, notably of the variety analysed by Mattison308 - be taken into account more 
when considering the vibrancy of the democratic public sphere.  Doing so might go a 
long way to illuminating to what extent our public sphere is compromised. It would offer 
a different perspective at least on that broader fundamental question. 
 
3. 3. 1 Initial research concerns 
 
At a 1992 researcher’s symposium held in South Africa, sponsored by the Canada’s 
International Development Research Centre, the present minister of Public Enterprise, 
Alec Erwin, who expanded on some of the dilemmas raised there about the place of the 
research enterprise in general in transition South Africa, said  
 
‘I think that universities are a linchpin. But why they must be the linchpin seems to 
me in the present situation in South Africa, (to be) that there are very heavy 
concentrations of intellectuals and resources. And they must use that concentration.  
If they are not capable of defending any interests, or articulating any interests - which 
I think is even worse - then I think we've got problems… 
 
…on the one hand research can flourish in a favourable political (i.e. open and 
democratic society) and economic (i.e. resources are available) situation. This 
suggests that researchers and intellectuals should be active participants in striving for 
such a favourable situation. However, on the other hand, does this not mean that the 
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researchers could become the instruments of particular political and economic 
interests in the process of transition? There is little doubt that such a dilemma exists 
acutely for many here tonight. Yet if the intellectual and research community can 
achieve a fine balance between these poles then the benefits to all aspects of society 
are very, very considerable, if often immeasurable.’309
 
Such were some of the concerns, about where, and how - for intellectuals with a likely 
major role to play in South Africa’s reconstruction - the dilemmas existed.  Erwin’s 
worry that universities might not be capable ‘of defending any interests, or articulating 
any interests’ is a telling one.  Erwin was responding to Witwatersrand University 
Humanities academic, Eddie Webster’s, concern that local universities were largely 
teaching universities and had not concentrated on producing research.  Erwin seemed to 
be hinting that it was high time universities made use of their concentration of resources, 
and effectively chose how they were going to achieve funding, or risk being manipulated 
by the state.  In his concluding remarks to the 1992 symposium the National Union of 
Mineworkers’ Marcel Golding stated, 
 
‘The first thing about the parastatals, universities, and those organizations that have 
generated research over a long period, I think the discussion is very interesting, but I 
think it seems to have been obsessed with the idea that one either has to get rid of 
those institutions and or build something new.  It seems to me that this dichotomy of 
trying to say that either this organization is totally useless and we need to get 
something else in its place or the idea that we should capture them and hope that they 
will change, is far to simplistic a notion.   
 
I think the whole process depends on capacity; the process depends on what our 
objectives are; and I think it also depends on the specific focus and demands that we 
do have.  But more importantly, I think, given the history of such organizations, both 
universities and organizations such as the CSIR310 and so on, there has been a history 
of patronage that's been built up over a long period of time, and I think the prospect 
of changing that is going to be extremely difficult.’311
 
Golding’s concern was with how the transformation of these research institutions will be 
difficult, and dependent on the variables he mentioned. There was clearly concern at how 
the relationship between a state that would rely on policy advice, and those who might 
provide that advice would evolve; so that ultimately the advice itself was not 
compromised.   
 
Lawrence Schlemmer a senior executive at the HSRC said at the symposium in response 
to a very critical presentation about the HSRC and its ability to transform from an 
organisation that essentially defended the status quo, said, 
 
‘I believe that I can speak with some authority about changes taking place in the 
HSRC because I am in some measure responsible for those changes. Obviously large 
parastatal organisations which functioned for so long under the past dispensation in 
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South Africa are not likely to be able to change overnight as it were. In the case of the 
HSRC, however, fairly fundamental changes in goals and organisational 
commitments have been taking place since the mid eighties.’312   
 
The HSRC self consciously, no doubt with its own (via those who led and staffed it) 
survival in mind, sought to re-model itself.  Following a discussion of the ANC’s – a 
social movement - policy research history at that symposium, Sipho Pityana summed up 
as follows, 
 
“I think that it's naive for us to pretend as though we're talking about a movement 
which has had a long culture of research. Researchers who are in the ANC are 
fighting for a position. There isn't recognition of research and the role of research. To 
what extent is it a good idea to have a research formation, fully fledged, within the 
ANC? And to what extent does that take away the autonomy of research and research 
work?”313
 
From this remark alone it becomes clear that the future relation of the ANC-in-power to 
the research sector would be a difficult one.  These concerns with the higher education 
system and research in general that would impact on the vibrancy and quality of the 
public sphere are by no means behind us.   
 
The until-very-recently, now former-Executive Director at one of the HSRC research 
programmes, Adam Habib, said in an interview with the author that even presently,  
 
“The problem is that no serious work is being done in the universities.  Unlike the 
United States system where the money is available for all types of research – because 
there is more money all round - research is not happening.  Teaching gets in the way.  
I believe the model is bad.  Vice Chancellors came up with faulty plans.  I mean, ‘a 
Linda Richter’314 should have been made HOD of the Psychology Department at the 
University of KwaZulu-Natal; instead she was poached by the HSRC.  Mark Orkin315 
provided a generic lesson.  He saw that there were two basic options: either cut 
expenditure (which the universities did) or grow income.  Orkin sold knowledge for 
income!  At universities the state’s GEAR policy saw the appointment of managers 
who subsequently failed to optimally do their job.  Mark Orkin ‘found’ forty 
academic staff that were not deployed optimally in universities and gave them an 
offer they could not refuse.   
 
Now, I have a model that sits somewhere between the proposed solutions to the 
research crisis.  The money should go neither to the universities, nor the (HSRC) staff 
to the universities, nor in turn should university staff go to the HSRC.  Instead my 
suggestion has to do with the science councils and their role.  The councils would act 
as the interface with universities - a broker.  The bulk of a research programme’s316 
work would be done by a team of researchers from the HSRC (and the other councils) 
and the universities.  Take for example my work with the Centre for Civil Society – I 
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ran two major projects there on ‘the state of social giving’ and on ‘social 
movements’.  On the latter there were sixteen researchers.  It was funded by the Ford 
Foundation.  With a research broker there is a win-win situation.”317
 
These concerns do not seem very different from Alec Erwin’s 1992 concern that 
universities with concentrations of intellectual resources need to use this advantage and 
achieve a ‘fine balance’.  Yet Habib’s reference to ‘the research crisis’ is interesting, 
since he clearly feels the HSRC for instance, does a lot of good work.  The suggestion is 
that not enough ‘serious work’ is being done by university researchers or the science 
councils as they presently operate.  The academy, he appears to suggest, might learn from 
the way the HSRC operates: necessity is the mother of invention. 
 
However, despite the ‘research crisis’ the HSRC continues to receive positive publicity 
for its emerging role.  ‘Increasingly’, said a prominent newspaper editor, ‘the most 
innovative thinking and research is coming from the academies, NGO’s and institutions 
such as the HSRC, much of which is commissioned by government (unfortunately, it 
seems, with little effect).’318   
 
Where do the divergences in opinion stem from?  Is it simply that to a large degree the 
HSRC’s Orkin’s ‘innovative thinking’ exists in a situation where the one-eyed man in the 
kingdom of the blind, is king?   
 
These differing appraisals suggest moreover that an answer has still not (ever?) been 
found to Muller and Cloete’s rapidly ageing question of ‘how intellectuals will deal with 
this tricky, imperfectly transformed terrain. Will (or even should) they professionalise 
themselves? Will we see a dissolution, or universalization of ideological commitments 
and a consolidation of their position vis a vis other social classes as South Africa moves 
towards a modern mixed-economy, probably social-democratic, state?’319   
 
With the ‘creative potential in specifying problems as post apartheid ones rapidly 
draining away’, and the increasing need for ‘revelatory problem statements’ that ‘define 
the relationship between indicators – constructions which once validated, ground 
action’320 a move toward relying on more explicitly evidenced-based policy advice (more 
on this shortly) is arguably not surprising, and confirms what Humphries identified as an 
emerging trend in 2000.321   
 
The period under review is one which we are struggling to define – especially as 
democratic theorists: an era following the one where as Gotz highlights problems were 
almost willy-nilly classified as post apartheid with little else by way of justification 
deemed necessary (aside that is from the researcher’s credentials, academic or otherwise).   
 
3. 3. 2 The HSRC in history 
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The HSRC was created by Act of Parliament in 1968, bringing together a number of 
advisory and research bodies that had previously been attached to the departments of 
Education and Manpower.322  Critical analysis of this parastatal focused on how in its 
early years it had ‘little if any credibility as an institution for promoting independent 
social science of a high quality’.323 But increasingly, ‘a careful laying bare of the 
bourgeois, racist and gendered modes of subjectification operating in (and operated by) 
knowledge domains; and a carrying out of similar critiques against the apparently neutral 
and liberal research institutes … and the later, ‘reformed’ state-operated HSRC,’ began to 
occur.324  While others argued that to expect a quasi-governmental organization like the 
HSRC to become very controversial is, perhaps, to demand to much of it…credit must be 
given where credit is due.’325   
 
In 1979 there was an attempt to co-opt independent social scientists by creating the 
impression that the agency ‘had become “free of bias”.’326  This was done through 
employing peer review carried out by ten HSRC in-house discipline committees.  It was 
at this stage that it served the expanded corporate state rather than simply being directly 
political or party-political.327  This was at a time when reform of various aspects of the 
apartheid system was underway, thus mirroring that search for partial socio political 
reform.  However far the output of the HSRC did move toward endorsing changes 
though, the overriding concern was with the ‘legitimization of the apartheid project’.  
Cloete and Muller quite sarcastically dubbed the period the ‘golden age of quasi 
academia’ at the HSRC.  ‘Individual researchers had a great deal of autonomy to initiate 
their own research projects and to engage in ‘academic’ research, they argued in 1991’328 
Adam Habib said, ‘As you know the period 1967-1989 was a period where the HSRC 
basically served a legitimating, managerial balancing role for the apartheid state.  There 
were a few dissidents.’329
 
From 1986 until 1991 Muller and Cloete categorized the HSRC as ‘accountable toward a 
broad marketplace of users with widely differing user criteria, and united only in their 
market-determined desire for research that is useful.’330  Extensive lobbying in 
government departments and the private sector, but more so the former due to the need 
for sufficient budgets which the private sector was not willing to pay, saw the HSRC 
revert to social engineering-type human science research which was available only to 
those who could pay.  ‘There was even a report on segregation written in 1988 at the 
HSRC,’ says Habib.331  Budget austerity (pre- and post-GEAR) meant also that ‘a few of 
the less obviously social scientific enterprises such as SA Sport Information, the South 
African Centre for Arts Information, SA Literature Reviews, and Contree, a journal on 
regional history, which had found a home at the HSRC over many decades, were 
'decentralised' to other institutions.’332  In addition to this restructuring a senior academic 
added that ‘what happened was that the funding arm in the HSRC was taken out, and 
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along with the Foundation for Research Development formed into the National Research 
Foundation.’333   
 
Financial intricacies of knowledge generation were not the only controversies dogging 
speculation about the HSRC’s future.  Senior executive at the time, Lawrence 
Schlemmer, in responding to queries about whether the HSRC was capable of becoming 
financially self sustaining, said he thought ‘that a major role for the HSRC is to 
emphasise data base activities. It must assemble information and make it available to 
everyone. It has the capacity to do it more effectively than isolated or atomised 
academics.’334  Then HSRC staff member, Caroline White’s, response to this thought was 
that she did not,  
 
‘…see any conflict between doing the sort of research that Schlemmer thinks needs 
to be done, and the way which I suggest. That is, having people who are doing the 
boring research and the data bases in government departments which do that 
research, and have an on-going relationship with people who are doing that.  And 
having academics sort of released - on the money that they get from the HSRC and 
perhaps working for a year or two years - released from their teaching to do full 
time research. My problem is with the organisation that I see not adapting to the 
future. Talking about allocation but actually not doing it.’335   
 
This is misleading in that White foresaw database activity being performed on a mass 
scale across government departments, and the HSRC acting not as a generator of research 
topics as such, but more a funding agency to supplement the funds researchers got on the 
open market.  But where would these topics come from?   
 
3. 3. 3 An evolving organisation - false comparisons in a different time 
 
Writing about the changing research landscape in South Africa a former methodology 
expert at the HSRC, Johan Mouton, writes  
 
‘the HSRC, on the other hand, seems to be moving back into a situation (similar to 
that of the late 1980s and early 1990s) where it is competing directly with 
universities and non-governmental organisations for state tenders and staff.  It could 
be argued that the ‘new’ HSRC is in exactly the same relationship to the new 
government as the old HSRC of the 1970's and early 1980's was in relation to the 
apartheid government! While acknowledging the handmaiden relationship between 
the ‘old’ HSRC and the apartheid government, Cloete and Muller question whether 
the HSRC actually was useful to the government that sponsored it. The same 
question can be raised about the ‘new’ HSRC.’336  
 
A senior academic close to the HSRC structures said,  
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“Now if you look at a conference held in 1992 published as a symposium in the 
journal Transformation, you’ll notice the position of one Sipho Pityana who was of 
the opinion that since the Nats337 had had access to an institution of the nature of 
the HSRC the new regime should to.  Why demobilise the HSRC, as some like 
Caroline White had argued?  This seemed to be the ‘position that won out.’  This 
became ‘the new song’.  Of course people tried to make it more responsive. The 
problem appeared to be bureaucratic not ideological.  When Orkin came in, in 2000 
the problem was still there?’338  
 
Another senior humanities academic offered the following opinion on the matter when 
interviewed:  
 
“When the government founded the HSRC I was a young man and thought that 
giving that money to the universities would have been a better idea.  As Foucault 
said, ‘when you create an institution it sort of runs away from you.  It becomes 
difficult to deconstruct.’  Why did the new government not sell the HSRC (an asset 
in Pretoria) and give the money to the universities?  Well, it was of course because 
of the employees there - the sunset clauses.  There was a price to pay. With few 
exceptions the HSRC has never produced any great scholars.”339   
 
“In 1994/5 there were changes at senior management – colour changes – but basically 
‘the place did not change fundamentally.  The ethos at the HSRC did not change. During 
the Mandela era the HSRC was in decline.  Mark Orkin applied and got the job,” said 
Habib.340 According to another former HSRC executive director, Roger Southall, “Mark 
Orkin was bought in as a ‘turnaround agent’.  He wanted to make the organisation 
dependent on external funding.”341  “What is fascinating, and see on this a 2006 article in 
The Economist, is that unlike in times past the HSRC is widely respected,” according to 
Habib, who added, 
 
“We could of course judge the HSRC according to a number of different indicators 
– peer review output, finances etc… Orkin restructured the finances of the HSRC.  
The universities did not say this; they go on about the quality of the staff.  Orkin 
paid good people 25 percent more than the market was willing to offer.  His only 
condition was that you did not run at a loss.  He restructured the programmes based 
on ‘gut feel’.342  The point is that Orkin ran the HSRC ‘like a king with his barons’.  
They had complete autonomy.  Olive Shisana343 had huge partnerships with people 
working on them all over the world.  Linda Richter had a plan where staff had 
targets based on how she split the parliamentary grant allocation.  Democracy & 
Governance (D&G)344 was run in a fashion where Roger Southall was the driving 
energy and they did not really rely on state tenders.  The eleven programs were sort 
                                                     
337 Short for ‘National Party’. 
338 Interview, 25 May 2007. 
339 Interview, Vale, P, 23 April 2007. 
340 Interview, Habib, A, 7 June 2007. 
341 Interview, Southall, R, 19 April 2007. 
342 ‘Taking into account the stakeholders’ views, there is scope for adopting a more representative mechanism 
for involving knowledgeable outsiders in setting research priorities for each Research Programme, particularly 
where these are financed through the Parliamentary grant’ according to the HSRC institutional review of 2003. 
343 Olive Shisana was executive director of an HSRC research program before taking over from Orkin as CEO 
of the HSRC in 2006. 
344 One of the research programmes at the HSRC. 
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of – and here I’m quoting what a friend said to me recently – like completely 
different NGO’s all reliant on the central administration of the HSRC.”345   
 
Habib’s vision for a more productive research enterprise - sketched out earlier - shows 
that he clearly found the way Orkin re-modelled the HSRC to be workable on a larger 
scale.  Astute management figures strongly in this conception as to whether an 
organisation is able to do ‘good work’ in the sense that it survives and develops integrity 
in carrying out its mandate.   
 
When asked what had happened to the HSRC under the directorship of Mark Orkin, the 
CEO from 2000 until 2006, and whether the strategy chosen had worked, Christa van 
Zyl, current Head of Business Development at the HSRC said ‘in the 2003 HSRC 
Review appears a picture presented by Orkin, of the HSRC as neither a university, nor a 
government department, nor an NGO, nor a Foundation, nor a business.  It therefore had 
to come up with a unique model to manage itself.’346 Former HSRC senior executive, 
Roger Southall confirmed this, saying, ‘The HSRC is a ‘curious outfit’.  When Orkin 
recalled Bloemfontein, where the D&G programme had a sub unit, it was simply because 
it was not making enough money.  I had made a case for expanding other programmes 
there but Orkin would not hear it.  Orkin never put his back into ‘the district idea’.’347  
Southall conveyed that he felt this sort of action compromised the HSRC’s 
developmental mandate to a degree. 
 
Another former researcher commented about the Port Elizabeth regional office (basically 
a unit like the one described by Southall) that,  
 
“There was an idea prevalent at the time I joined the HSRC that the PE office 
would be built up as a regional policy research body, closely linked to provincial 
government. However, provincial government has other bodies closer to them both 
politically and geographically, at the University of Fort Hare. Moreover, we had 
only two programmes working from the PE office – Employment, Growth and 
Development (EGD)348, and D&G (when I was employed).  The SAHARA unit 
also used our offices as a ‘base’ when doing research in the province – e.g. for 
training, for receiving and sending samples. But the staffing was minimal.”349   
 
Southall for instance believed that it would have made more sense to have the PE office 
in Umtata – the provincial capital – which squares with what Cherry said concerning the 
University of Fort Hare and the provincial government’s use of geographically closer 
research bodies.  Judging from Southall’s response, Orkin was almost singularly focused 
on the cost effectiveness of the organisation.  Orkin clearly had certain priorities which 
he decided not to dilute on the alter of pursuing other goals simultaneously.     
 
                                                     
345 Interview, Habib, A, 7 June 2007. 
346 Interview, Van Zyl, C, 27 June 2007; Mark Orkin wrote in Business Day in 2004 that ‘we ourselves are the 
ultimate resource for what we have to solve, towards what we want to achieve’.  He said ‘we mainly select work 
that is developmentally oriented and scientifically demanding, and yields not only report for users but peer-
reviewed scientific articles’. 
347 Interview, Southall, R, 19 April 2007. 
348 The HSRC consists of a group of programmes which are periodically ‘reengineered’ according to various 
criteria.  According to Habib, Mark Orkin restructured the programmes based on ‘gut feel’ or what he thought 
‘would fly’. 
349 Interview, Cherry, J, 15 March 2007. 
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Habib said, ‘The COUPE strategy was to be the guide and Orkin told his ED’s that as 
long as their programmes did not run at a loss and published they would get a piece of the 
parliamentary pie.350  For this they needed to restructure.  He focused on two main 
aspects of the COUPE strategy.’351
How seriously can the contention by Bawa and Mouton be taken then, when they allege, 
‘Cloete and Muller question whether the HSRC actually was useful to the government 
that sponsored it. The same question can be raised about the ‘new’ HSRC’352?   
This is an important question since it is not helpful to have a distorted picture in mind 
when raising these type of questions.  The significance of whether this is a true reflection 
of the HSRC has a bearing on whether the HSRC, as I claim, counts as an example of an 
actor or space in the ‘new’ public sphere I have argued is partially visible. 
Perhaps the best way of putting into perspective such a question is to cite research the 
HSRC was known to carry out, and contrast this with some examples of some of its 
current work.  Carolyn White said in 1992, when critiquing the HSRC’s alleged inability 
to adapt adequately to transition circumstances that ‘judgements of usefulness are hard to 
make objectively, but taking the HSRC's own mission, to be useful 'to all the inhabitants 
of South Africa', it is not hard to be critical of the Afrikaner-centric nature of a number of 
its projects, for example the genealogies of Afrikaans families, research into the 
Afrikaans language and dialects, Afrikaans literature and Afrikaans theatre.’353  Simply 
looking at some of the controversies raised by the HSRC’s work in the last ten years in 
only one major local media publication, the Financial Mail, and comparing the type of 
some of work being done by the HSRC at the time of Caroline White’s critique and more 
recently, the comparison is nothing short of laughable.   
In 1999 the Financial Mail covered one developmental challenge which the HSRC was 
instrumental in uncovering and addressing: ‘Confronted with these realities, and sceptical 
of the Department of Home Affairs' ability to issue the bar-coded IDs to the millions 
without them in time for them to vote, the IEC changed tack on the advice of the 
HSRC.354 Former Education Minister Kadar Asmal wrote in the Financial Mail in 2004:  
‘The release of the HSRC’s Human Resources Development Review 2003 has 
generated much interest in the media, including your own through an editorial and 
Carol Paton's article. As Paton says, the review is the "size of a telephone 
directory". Nevertheless, I am confident that the review, which was funded by the 
department of science & technology, will be an important contribution to inform the 
ongoing implementation of government's human resources development strategy.  
This strategy, led by the labour and education departments, also involves a number 
of other departments and is a good example of "joined-up" policy implementation, 
which the review considers to be necessary if human resources and development 
                                                     
350 The HSRC operates using a budget from National Treasury and money it earns from contract research. 
351 Interview, Habib, A, 7 June 2007. 
352 Mouton, J and Bawa, A, 2002. 
353 White, C, 1992, p 28. 
354 Laurence, P, 5 February 1999. 
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reforms are to interlock with broader macroeconomic, industrial and other 
frameworks.’355
Although it is not surprising that Asmal defended the report since he had backed the 
process since 2001, and though “joined up” policy in this sphere has not met with nearly 
the success level envisioned, with the advent of the joint initiative on priority skills - 
government’s new strategy to push through some of the insights emerging from this type 
of research - efforts continue to be made to use the research findings to full effect in 
collaboration with other institutional actors.     
 
It could easily be argued that dissatisfaction with government and its alleged insularity is 
somewhat misguided; since the dissatisfaction is arguably in actual fact - although 
understandable - a keen disappointment that things have not improved, faster.     
 
An ex-senior researcher at the HSRC stated,  
 
“I think the HSRC falls more easily into the civil society category than the state 
category.  It really does have a considerable amount of independence. I don’t think 
it is always effective or strategic in using this independence, but it certainly is not a 
lackey of the state.  In my experience in D&G, none of the researchers were ‘pliant’ 
– all were critical of government to a greater or lesser degree. Some – especially in 
the ‘public administration’ area – were less critical and less interesting and less 
productive; and some researchers were not very productive; while others were very 
ambitious. We did not work only for government departments; and when we did, 
they quite often did not like what we said.”356   
 
Southall added that the ‘The HSRC is reactive, yes.  Development agencies have a large 
say in setting research agendas.’357  Is the HSRC then just a useful tool in extending the 
agenda of whichever research agency funds the research it does?  The author’s own 
experience of contemplating and writing applications for funding suggest that there is no 
doubt the funding agencies do dictate to a large degree what can be researched but one 
takes these opportunities voluntarily and once work is underway there is leeway in 
choosing the themes and indices upon which to focus. The broad topics (discursive 
positions) they fund are obviously a function of wider societal processes and whether the 
funding agency chooses to use the researchers on future projects is up to them.358   
 
Asked if there was any other motivation behind the new HSRC national priority areas of 
2000, which the HSRC Council and management pushed through, than to access 
government departmental funding a senior humanities academic interviewee said, ‘What 
the HSRC in fact does is manufacture an ethical position for government, a stance; just 
like the South African Institute of International Affairs manufactures a position for big 
business on doing business in Africa for instance or in other international issues.’359   
 
                                                     
355 Asmal, K, 5 March 2004. 
356 Interview, Cherry, J, 15 March 2007. 
357 Interview, Southall, R, 19 April 2007. 
358 Former CEO Mark Orkin stated in 2002, ‘We select those projects where we can add scientific value.  And 
we find that the best researchers who maintain their publications and scientific, are also the ones who attract the 
grants or win tenders for the most interesting and far-reaching projects’; Business Day, 4 December 2002.  
359 Interview, Vale, P, 23 April 2007. 
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Habib replied to a question on what his take on criticisms of the HSRC by those who say 
its assets should have been sold in 1994 and given to the universities by saying,  
 
“Empirical evidence shows that the HSRC upped its research output nine fold.  I 
think many of the critiques - those who quibble - are churlish.  There was an 
“unholy alliance” against Orkin.  The HSRC could achieve a sustainable research 
agenda.  The problem with these critiques is that they assume that all is well with 
the universities – which to be honest are black holes.  They were given large 
amounts of money.  The historically black universities did nothing with it.”360   
 
Asked about the direction which the HSRC took after the 1992 symposium referred to 
earlier, and how exactly it has speeded the relationship between organised knowledge and 
political control, senior humanities academic Peter Vale361 argued,  
 
‘Mark Orkin distorted the market by transforming the HSRC so that it received both a 
government subsidy, and competed on the open market.  This is a distortion in this 
market.’362   
 
‘What happens exactly’, said the current head of HSRC Business Development363 ‘is if 
parliament gave R100 million grant per year and the HSRC needed R300 million to run 
judiciously the extra R200 million needed would be parcelled out (to generate the money) 
fairly between the research programmes, based on consultation’.364  She continued, 
saying,  
 
‘The HSRC is only able to meet its obligations to parliament by using other resources 
though.  But this is not bad thing, as without the pressure complacency could set in.  
On the other hand one would become little more than a consultant with to much 
reliance on private funds.’  
 
Presumably Peter Vale implies that the chances of a monopoly on funding sources due to 
the inability of knowledge generators to successfully compete in tendering, cuts down the 
diversity of knowledge providers.365  ‘The HSRC’ said Van Zyl ‘is a small organisation 
with big expectations’.366  Vale’s argument surely depends on there being a viable 
alternative to the HSRC, no matter how many different opinions there are about the 
quality of the type of research the HSRC does.  Mike Morris, presently of the University 
of KwaZulu-Natal, School of Development Studies, said at a researcher symposium in 
1992,  
 
                                                     
360 Interview, Habib, A, 7 June 2007. 
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363 She intimated to me prior to the interview that due to the nature of the research she would be speaking as a 
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364 Interview, Van Zyl, C, 27 June 2007. 
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‘Universities are riddled with uselessness and inefficiency as well. There is no 
particular virtue in deciding to put the money into universities either. The issue is 
trying to set up a correct kind of relationship between the state research 
organizations and the markets in the sense of private sector, community, trade 
unions, etc.  Setting up the correct kind of relationships with them, and having a 
particular kind of social vision, a plan, a growth strategy, which will enable us to 
move forward.’367   
 
Habib and Vale’s concerns point to this dilemma not having been solved adequately.   
 
Commenting on the similar theme, that of the HSRC’s constantly changing research 
priorities in order to deal with the difficulties of managing an organisation faced with 
budgetary austerity, the present head of Business Development, Christa van Zyl, at the 
HSRC commented, ‘a pendulum might serve as a metaphor for how the organisation 
operates.  Sometimes the programmes have more latitude, sometimes only some do; but 
in turning the organisation around entrepreneurialism had been required, especially 
initially.  Lessons have been learnt from mistakes.  This is organisational learning.  The 
HSRC had to be transformed on many fronts.  At first research programmes were formed 
around personalities – D&G was different from Child, Youth and Family Development 
for instance.  Experimentation was needed.  The amount of tender work undertaken will 
depend on relations established with the departments.  The Business Development Unit is 
there for ‘tender support’.  The requirements of the sponsor are always an issue in doing 
research.  I am not sure universities could be independent formulators of research 
either.’368   
 
A senior academic close to the HSRC structures said, ‘The better programmes within the 
HSRC get quite a lot from the foundations – the rest get government department funding 
mostly.  This is reflected in the Key Performance Indicators.’369 Former HSRC senior 
researcher, Maxine Reitzes, said, appearing to find this a significant and encouraging 
fact, 
 
“The fact that one has a consortium of funders means all their agendas – the state and 
the organisations – are part of the process.  But the proposal would be put before a 
panel consisting of one member of the HSRC external to the programme whose 
proposal it is, a donor representative, an academic, and government representative.  
At these panel discussions the parties would advise the researcher, that she had not 
read so-and-so on teleological conceptions of rights, etc”.370  
 
The HSRC advertises itself as an organisation that carries out research that is ‘evidence-
based’.  Reitzes said of this fact that, “When Mark Orkin came to the HSRC he was 
insistent that studies be evidence-based.  The evidence-based approach does not entail 
that the research is impartial.  Instead take an issue like land reform.  The researcher 
wants to know what the expectations of people are and what they want from policy in 
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in that National Treasury increased the R&D tax allowance from 100 percent to 150 percent in the 2006/2007 
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order to the better present to the policy-maker their findings on this, so that the policy 
maker can verify whether their own work is in fact based on a right appraisal of the 
situation he or she is attempting to address, or preferably use it to inform policy?”371  A 
senior academic interviewee familiar with the HSRC said, ‘As I understand it evidence-
led or -based research is meant to be the opposite of boomerang research – your case 
needs to be proved and it is not a case of knowing in advance what needs to be heard.’372  
Another said ‘it’s just a ‘fancy phrase for ‘know what you’re talking about!’.373  These 
are not identical understandings of the term which points to a certain amount of freedom 
in interpretation of both the kind of research task to pursue and how it is achieved.  
 
A former staff member of the HSRC who now works as a consultant said, ‘Mark Orkin 
began the management information meetings which were flexible and encouraged people 
to think out the box.  They took place sequentially with about four programmes per 
session.  The various proposals were conceived per programme and sanctioned by the 
executive directors.’374   
 
3. 3. 4 The independence and dependence conundrum 
 
The author raised questions of the HSRC board’s role in ensuring independence with a 
senior academic, who replied that ‘Enver Motala is the most active I would say.  He is 
always raising questions about the Council’s autonomy’.375  In 2006 an HSRC staff 
member delivered a paper at the a social science conference where he argued that social 
science research within the HSRC varies in terms of the nature of the problem being 
addressed, and the objectives which the research programme is seeking to address. He 
argued that although social science research is currently being carried out in a number of 
institutions, the HSRC is an extremely favourable environment for carrying out social 
science research within Africa.376  The author put this formulation to a former HSRC 
D&G employee, in written form, who replied, 
 
“I agree that the HSRC has no single research framework, and that there is variation 
in both objectives and actual research; also I agree that the HSRC is a favourable 
environment for carrying out social science research – although I am not sure about 
‘extremely’ as I have some criticisms based upon the limitations placed on research 
due to the ‘cost centre’ model adopted by HSRC which requires units to ‘raise their 
own funds’ to some extent through private or government contracts. An example of 
this limitation from my perspective in working in D&G was that when I joined, we 
had a strategic planning session and defined the key areas of research that we should 
be looking into.  I and a colleague put together what we thought was a significant 
longitudinal study on rural women’s rights, which fell within one of these key areas. 
We obtained ‘baseline funding’ from the HSRC to get the study going, but were 
under constant pressure to raise additional funds. We managed to do so in the first 
year of the project, but the project was not considered ‘sexy’ enough or within the 
scope of funding of various funders, and so the project – which was meant to run for 
three years – ground to a halt.  In fact, by the next D&G ‘lekgotla’ held a year later, 
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we had completely lost sight of the key research areas that we had defined, as we had 
all been drawn into other short-term projects for various clients.  The other downside 
to this model is that researchers, rather than having the space to define and work on 
what they think is important, are required to work on short-term and sometimes 
meaningless projects for the ‘clients’ who pay for such research. My chief frustration 
with the HSRC was that I kept on being allocated to short-term projects which had 
little interest to me and that I did not think would make a ‘difference’ to society.”377  
 
So the HSRC is quite dependent on external funders evidently, so it can stick to its agreed 
goal of relying on non government funding.  In being able to generate this type of 
funding the HSRC makes itself less reliant on government projects, and therefore able to 
carry out work for government when it does, which is not ‘he who pays the piper calls the 
tune’ research? Former senior staff member, Janet Cherry, confirmed this saying, ‘we did 
not work only for government departments; and when we did, they quite often did not 
like what we said.’378 Though, for Southall ‘as far as the HSRC goes the State of the 
Nation,379 is ‘pushing the limits’ of the acceptable.’380 Whilst referring to tendering for 
government research work, Christa van Zyl said, ‘on the other hand The State of the 
Nation was funded through parliament and international donors and would more readily 
qualify as ‘self-initiated research’.381   
 
It was as a consequence of Orkin’s revolutionary commercialised targets that at least one 
researcher left (though she was able to expand at some length on similar cases).  Cherry’s 
interview confirmed this.  ‘It became coincidental’, said Reitzes, ‘what researchers 
researched’.  She for instance claimed not to have done ‘specialized work proper’ in five 
years.’382   
 
A senior academic close to the structures of the HSRC described the HSRC mandate as 
‘complex, contradictory and demanding’. Researchers are meant to publish in 
international journals – the HSRC does not recognise chapters in books (this was under 
discussion at the time of the interview), mentor interns, and at the same time there is the 
Africanist agenda.  This all raises the question of sustainability of the entire 
enterprise.’383   
 
Roger Southall felt that, ‘as far as the impact of some of the cross cutting units go they 
don’t seem to do much.  Capacity Development ‘is a lot of talk really.  As far as interns 
go they get slapped on a research programme and there is little personal development 
opportunity.  They would get a better deal at a university.  The HSRC is not a teaching 
organisation.  The Capacity Development is lip service really.’384
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A highly publicized incident at the HSRC in which a senior executive resigned due to 
what he felt was an impingement on his right to free expression, was expanded on by 
Roger Southall,  
 
“Quite honestly it need not have turned out as it did.  The issue of his resignation385 
has to do with the corporate image of the HSRC: the HSRC’s media policy in this 
case.386  Olive Shisana was passing on the displeasure of the government, yes.  But 
after Xolela’s resignation the newspaper stories in the Mail and Guardian – the 
Haffajee interview – skewed and false.  Xolela said the HSRC was not a place 
where you had academic freedom which I disagreed with.  I urged him to ‘fight 
them on it’.”   
 
Southall explained that  
 
“If it had carried on it would certainly have gone ‘all the way to the top’ so to speak, 
and the government and HSRC management would have got ‘egg on their faces’.  
How could they have seriously interfered with him, stopped him from saying as he 
pleased in the end?  If they had they would have appeared the aggressor in the one 
place – the academy - where this behaviour is intolerable!  The only thing they (the 
HSRC) can rightfully get you ‘out on’ is releasing research findings which have been 
agreed to with the financer as confidential until a certain time.”387   
 
Southall added though that Xolela Mangcu felt doing as he suggested would have been 
intolerable, as Mangcu felt he did not want to work in such ‘an unpleasant environment’.  
Mangcu meanwhile acknowledged he had left the HSRC as a result of a disagreement 
with the new CEO Olive Shisana after she allegedly told him ministers were not happy 
with his public writing, saying, ‘What I could surmise from what she (Shisana) was 
saying was that we should not bite the hand that feeds us.’388  
 
According to a senior humanities academic close to the governing structures of the 
HSRC,  
 
“The current Deputy Minister of Science and Technology, Derek Hanekom, has gone 
on record as saying he is very happy with the direction the HSRC is moving in at 
present.  He was of the opinion that Orkin was too independent and wouldn’t 
subordinate himself enough.  Orkin would for instance allow the questioning from 
people like Southall.  Shisana is definitely in a more applied field - I mean health is 
about getting people off their death beds, right - that is ‘problem solving.’  Which as 
you know is one of the HSRC’s catch phrases.  And I have a sense that statements 
about the government from the council seem more positive.  I am not sure how 
everyone in the HSRC sees the Shisana appointment.  Orkin was not a politician like 
Shisana is.  Olive has her ‘implementation networks’ strategy.  The new HSRC 
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Policy Unit is a direct manifestation of the concern she has instilled about getting the 
knowledge across.”389   
 
3. 3. 5 The HSRC in the public sphere 
 
Despite these differing opinions, CEO since 2006, Olive Shisana, seems to have overseen 
a transition in which a similar commercial model to Orkin’s prevails, except there is now 
more emphasis on getting the message implied by the evidence-based research, across to 
policy makers, and other concerned members of society.   
 
This view of matters as far as the new HSRC CEO is concerned, were echoed by Habib:  
 
“Basically the HSRC partners with agencies and vice versa.  There is greater 
disaggregation.  There is more money from the state.  Olive bought in money. The 
R20 million for the new Policy Unit would not have come to the HSRC if not for her.  
Olive is extremely responsive to PAITECS390 but finance is the implicit priority – she 
is more statistical though about it.  Mark Orkin was very clever though to focus on 
two priorities in his strategy.  Olive insists on responsiveness to PAITECS.  There is a 
collective responsibility to Key Performance Indicators.  Olive has retained her 
profile from when she was a successful Executive Director.  Orkin left networking to 
ED’s.  Olive takes a lead in networking - going to London, and so on, to find 
partners.”391   
 
In 2004 the former Deputy Minster of Arts, Culture, Science and Technology (since 
disaggregated) had said – she is but one such official to have said similar things - ‘we are 
grateful to South Africans, including the HSRC’s contributors, who continue to play the 
role of fact gathering an analysis that gives government the basis for assessing alternate 
options and facilitates informed policy decisions.’392   
 
The development referred to by Habib – the HSRC Policy Unit - is financed by 
Department of Science and Technology (DST) ring-fenced funding.  Habib says,  
 
‘The unit looks at an area for three years, in–depth.  It is a fantastic model which the 
HSRC is in the midst of.’393
 
An HSRC press statement quoted Shisana as saying, ‘Obviously there are already 
excellent, established research units within and outside the HSRC who are working in 
these areas.  A key strategy of the Policy Unit is the establishment of networks involving 
researchers from various institutions and disciplines, policy makers, programme 
implementers in government departments and NGOs, as well as activists in civil society 
                                                     
389 Interview, 25 May 2007. 
390 The HSRC measures its performance in terms of indicators grouped under the acronym of ‘PAITECS’, 
which stands for Public-purpose mandate; International collaboration with particular emphasis on collaborative 
research in Africa; explicit attention to the Implementation and impact of research; ongoing and deepened 
Transformation of the HSRC workforce; Excellence and Capacity building in research, and Sustainability 
through securing of grants to support longer-term, large-scale research projects and programmes; HSRC, 
Annual report 2006/2007. 
391 Interview, Habib, A, 7 June 2007. 
392 Sonjica, B, 23 March 2004. 
393 Interview, Habib, A, 7 June 2007. 
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in process of policy analysis and policy dialogue’.394  Southall mentioned that, ‘The 
Presidency does think of the HSRC as ‘its organisation’’.395 In the context of how Cosatu 
has found the HSRC a compelling site for research,396 this suggestion perhaps deserves 
further scrutiny.   
 
Recent developments involving the HSRC speak to the organisation’s expanding role in 
facilitating the development of political consciousness formation, along the lines 
suggested throughout this intervention.  Consultant Renee Grawitzky broke the story of 
the creation of an ‘Employment Scenarios’ reference group under the auspices of one of 
the HSRC research programmes (or units), which starts a process that creates ‘space to 
ask creative questions’ and seeks to ensure ‘that  participants have the maturity to play 
out scenarios without being limited by narrow sectarian influences’.   
 
The HSRC as an ‘independent body’ was considered suitable to the task according to 
Sipho Pityana.  The forum includes prominent government figures from The Presidency, 
business and labour, including Cosatu’s General Secretary.397  ‘The group meets twice a 
year to conduct scenario-planning sessions but its members, bolstered by twenty eight 
experts and researchers, also take part in continuous rounds of concentrated debate.  The 
HSRC's scenarios are not government policy, nor is there an expectation that the process 
will lead to an employment strategy. However, it has encouraged ideas that are being 
taken back to the participants' institutions.  Alan Hirsch in The Presidency says if the 
Employment Scenarios research didn't exist, The Presidency would probably have had to 
commission the work. The work will feed into The Presidency's ongoing scenario 
planning as well as the 15-year policy review, on which work recently started.’398   
 
The HSRC’s work is by no means used exclusively by those who commissioned it, 
whether government or otherwise. In 2004 HSRC CEO Mark Orkin alluded to the fact 
that, for instance, pre-election market polls provide a resource for political parties, 
including smaller parties that cannot afford their own opinion polls.399  This is arguably 
also judicious way of carrying out the HSRC’s parliamentary mandate to provide public 
purpose research.  African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP) MP, Cheryllyn Dudley 
said, ‘I know we as the ACDP have made use of HSRC research often.  I recall the first 
time I was very aware of the value of their work was when they came to parliament and 
gave feedback to individual parties with reference to their surveys on party support etc.  
We found this very useful.’400  Dudley also referred to further HSRC research in 
November 2004 on welfare and poverty in a speech to parliament.401  The DA health 
                                                     
394 HSRC media statement, 10 October 2006; At a symposium on ‘evidence-based practice’ Olive Shisana 
spoke of how upon producing evidence, in a study for the Education Labour Relations Council, that 11 districts 
in the country was where the problem of HIV among educators was/is confined, and therefore that a pilot 
project where the Education Department (DoE) rolled out antiretroviral therapy treatment, instead of the Health 
Department, be implemented, the suggestion was shot down by the Department of Education;  ASSAf, 
September 2006. 
395 Interview, Southall, R, 19 April 2007. 
396 Louw, I, 10 September 2006. 
397 Grawitzky, R, 29 November 2006. 
398 Bisseker, C, 26 October 2007. 
399 Business Day, 13 April 2004. 
400 Dudley, C, Personal email communication with the author, 25 January 2007. 
401 Dudley, C, 2 November 2004. 
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spokesperson recently referred to joint Medical Research Council402 and HSRC work on 
HIV and other diseases among educators when addressing parliament.403
 
The HSRC has also been recently commissioned by the WK Kellogg Foundation, for 
instance, to conduct research, manage community based initiatives, and identify NGO’s 
to implement projects to combat growing number of orphans in sub-Saharan countries.404  
In a similar role, has been asked by the World Bank to assist in the roll-out and provision 
of technical support for the Affiliated Network for Social Accountability which aims to 
develop social accountability initiatives across the African continent from 2008.405  
Another significant recent project is the granting of R69 million over five years to a 
consortium led by the HSRC, including top literacy and numeracy research bodies, in 
order to implement a programme that seeks to develop the capacity of the education 
system.406 Current CEO, Shisana explained that it is important to work with the 
Department of Education in this because they would be implementing the reforms.407  
The HSRC was recently involved in chairing the 3rd National AIDS conference in 
Durban, after government released its five-year National Health Strategic Plan, in order 
to help forge consensus as to how to implement the plans, recommendations, and 
goals.408   
 
Another study by the HSRC has for instance involved a situational analysis of 
Historically Black Universities, and the determination that rural universities especially 
could play an effective role in reducing poverty.409  The HSRC has also worked on very 
technical, applied projects, such as jointly designing the City of Tshwane’s Safe City 
Policy, with the CSIR.410 Recently collaborated with Statistics SA in compiling and 
releasing a detailed publication on how to use census data.411   
 
It might even be effectively argued that if one considers how government departments – 
who make liberal use of consultants, and which basically function like the Foundations 
that to a great extent set agendas for the research community – function in brokering 
research412 the HSRC and other science councils, or perhaps a modified science council 
system along the lines suggested by Habib, could perform a bigger and more effective 
role in brokering and arranging such research partnerships 
 
Is the HSRC in civil society or the state administration?  Are we better off without its 
competition to the private sector? Others cite faulty research as reason not to disregard all 
and alternate types of information, data and opinion.  The HSRC, for instance, has been 
accused of using grossly inaccurate statistics and information and those studies were 
being used now by MP’s and state bureaucrats to arrive at misleading conclusions about 
                                                     
402 One of the other ten national science councils. 
403 Hartley, W, 8 January 2007; this is the research whose recommendations CEO Olive Shisana explained had 
not been taken up by government. 
404 Rosenberg, R, 11 November 2005. 
405 Moodley, N, 12 December 2006. 
406 I-Net Bridge, 22 January 2007. 
407 Blaine, S, 24 January 2007. 
408 Scott, C, 5 June 2007. 
409 Nkomo, M, 8 December 2006; details of the HSRC’s projects are available in their Annual Reports and 
Quarterly Reviews.  Details of the media’s coverage of their projects and the recommendations appear 
frequently in the national media – examples of these appear in the bibliography. 
410 Hlahla, P, 31 July 2006. 
411 Lehola, P, 19 September 2007. 
412 An interesting question, but not one it is possible to consider here. 
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immigration to this country’.413 At other times the HSRC has been accused of not 
consulting widely enough in the research it does414, but these concerns are all part and 
parcel of the research enterprise in general.  
 
Answers to this question were not the intent of this intervention. This exploratory case 
study therefore concludes on an agnostic note – as it always was going to. No profound 
conclusion regarding the nature of the organisation was ever intended. The point was to 
raise the possibility that political theorisation about South Africa had either 
misinterpreted certain facets of reality through oversight, or wilful neglect. Features of 
the HSRC in the ‘new’ public sphere illustrate in a more concrete sense where emphasis 
ought to lie in accurately appraising the state of South Africa’s democratic political 
culture. 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion: Wither Radical Democracy? 
 
The central argument in this dissertation is that arguing for a compromised or depleted 
political culture or space is extremely difficult if we consider the complexity of the public 
sphere. This involves arguing that by re-interrogating some of the concepts and 
arguments underpinning orthodox critical perspectives on democratic functioning, which 
tend to emanate from deliberative democratic theorists using a version of the concept of 
the public sphere, we find notions of the critical public sphere have been corrupted by the 
idealism that accompanies the nonetheless important concept of the critical public sphere. 
 
By illuminating this flaw in the orthodox critical democratic perspective, and adding that 
critique of democratic function is pronounced and misguided for a variety of historical 
reasons, and applying the final theoretical product to critiques of South Africa’s 
democracy, I argue that critiquing South African politics and policy making should in 
general be done with more care, since what is under-contemplated in orthodox critiques 
by way of the nature of the actual public sphere, is not negligible. A counter critique is 
the end result. 
 
Critics who start by characterising the political space as dominated by one party which 
allegedly renders the political space unfit for its critical purpose ought to be fairer in their 
accounts. The end result of this increasingly consensual critical position is that we inhabit 
only a relatively meaningless formal democracy. The exploratory case study of the 
Human Sciences Research Council which I go on to consider was chosen on the basis 
that it was possible it could throw up evidence of interesting illustrative tendencies in 
what I argue may constitute a ‘new’ public sphere. This was however nothing more than 
an informed guess.  
 
The theoretical possibilities I aim to highlight are arguably deserving of more focused 
appraisal in themselves, but the aim of this dissertation is to introduce the theoretical 
possibility of an under-theorised public sphere in a dramatically historically-encumbered 
atmosphere of political opinion and suspicion. That was done through highlighting how 
                                                     
413 Business Day, 7 July 2000. 
414 Kunene, O. B, 5 November 2006. 
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that situation came about, and less so, what would constitute evidence of the nascent 
theory’s correctness. It could very well be argued that other aspects of constitutional 
democracy – not flimsy speculation about so-called political consciousness formation and 
how this informs policy – are far more important to the quality of democracy than argued 
for here.  
 
If the HSRC is able to carry out its role (bearing in mind its by now virtual multiple 
mandate) to a significant degree and with a significant degree of dignity, as I have argued 
it likely does, this fact and its implications should not pass unnoticed by those who 
criticize the quality of South Africa’s democracy, and the nature of political 
consciousness formation.   
 
Is the HSRC compromised, in its mandate of delivering ‘social science that makes a 
difference?’  The jury will always be out, and make its measurement according to a 
variety of esoteric indicators, but evidence from interviews with present and former staff, 
and other relevant figures, points to this being unlikely.  The HSRC undergoes regular 
reviews (so far in 1997 and 2003), and is overseen by parliament through legislation 
(reporting to its committee system).  It was never the intention to pass judgement on the 
HSRC’s accountability, rather it was to argue that the validity of the consensual critical 
position on the state of democratic will formation in our nascent democracy ought not to 
be as comfortable or easy a position to hold given such empirical examples of tendencies 
in our democratic culture which are either overlooked, or equally likely, 
underemphasized. Above all it should surely be held in mind when theorizing about 
democracy that given voting systems, the representation of interests within different 
institutions, and so forth; political consciousness formation which obviously informs 
policy-making and which is after all the all-important output of any democratic 
dispensation, depends on freedom to articulate preferences. A question to bear in mind is 
therefore to what extent are we free; a question keeping thoughts on what has been 
discussed in perspective? 
 
The relation of civil society to the state is an aspect of our democratic culture which 
many have argued is to be found wanting, particularly since the ascent of Thabo Mbeki to 
The Presidency. Ironically this is arguably the case because it is since then that the 
policy-making process has been most vigorously open to heated dispute.  
 
I have argued that political consciousness formation would be shown to be much less 
circumscribed than is argued by critics if, instead of focusing on how particular actors 
have felt themselves excluded, a discursive analysis as suggested by Greenstein and 
expanded on by my own arguments about the public sphere, were the theoretical starting 
point.  
 
Honneth’s challenge to would-be civil society democratic reformers, to show the 
structural barriers to participation remains as forceful as it was when he laid it out in 
1993. I argued similarly that proving the insufficiency of the orthodox consensual critical 
position requires that the complex nature of the public sphere be acknowledged, which I 
have tried to sketch out in chapter one, and supplement throughout.  
 
What is the differentiated picture of the public sphere I have argued exists?  In summary 
there exists one, the picture presented by John Keane, of communicative abundance; in a 
situation where, two, the state is unable to perform most of its productive policy tasks 
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without massive public input; and thirdly, this communicative abundance in the public 
sphere might be further described in the way Nancy Fraser breaks down that complex 
terrain when she refers to an issue being ‘political’ if it is contested across a range of 
different publics.415   
 
So finally, how does the HSRC figure in better conceptualising that space? The HSRC is 
but one actor going about its business in a situation where the state needs, even 
encourages, the input of diverse voices in society.416 Given what is maintained about the 
complex public sphere, more attention needs to be given to it and other spaces and 
discursive battles as highlighted by Mattison for instance, for the fluid space it is. The 
reason for focussing on the HSRC (this was done in a basic fashion), was to highlight that 
contrary to the consensus that little space for ‘positive contention’ exists, or that our 
public sphere is terminally compromised, interesting theoretical questions concerning this 
critical issue deserve ongoing attention from social scientists.   
 
This perspective might in-itself give rise to a host of related questions.  A possible shift in 
the policy terrain, which Richard Humphries claimed was in evidence in 2000, deserves 
perhaps to be a theme which receives closer attention.  Alternately, to what extent might 
it be that the HSRC and other such institutions are actually a type of bridge that acts to 
shorten the distance which ‘reasons and their impact on policy’ must cross between 
specialized publics and ‘a range of different publics’, and vice versa?   
 
Ultimately Jurgen Habermas’ original concern with the public sphere was with the degree 
to which this space - where an ideal speech situation might be approached, sans distortion 
by power and money - could be theoretically envisioned.  It has been argued that the 
concept of the public sphere needs to be resurrected for further theorisation. Crying wolf 
at the slightest provocation is not helpful for democratic theory, and theory ought to be 
more carefully applied to reality because it informs understanding. I hope to have gone 
some way to providing a guide to how to begin that enterprise. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
415 Fraser, N, 1990, p. 166; Hoppe’s problem definition strategies might be a good way of understanding how  a 
‘political’ issue is contemplated, see in this report, ‘The ‘new’ public sphere?’ in Chapter 2. 
416 The excursus on the nature of the state derived from Claus Offe’s analysis is meant to have explained that 
fact. See Offe, C, 1975. 
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